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Abstract 
Abstract 
The "defects problem" has demanded considerable attention in recent years, with much 
emphasis given to the technical causes of failure. This research project examines the 
problem from a different point of view - that of human error. Taking as a starting 
point, technical publications in the construction industry, the research reviews human 
error literature from a variety of industries and perspectives and synthesises a model of 
error causation covering organisations in a construction project context. This model is 
then progressively tested in four studies, a general preliminary survey and three more 
detailed studies of house-building. Conclusions support the view that errors leading to 
failure in complex socio-technical systems often exhibit systems characteristics and 
involve the whole managerial structure. An improved model is proposed, which 
emphasises the importance of both project and general management errors. 
Key words - Human error, defects, project management, failures. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE DEFECTS PROBLEM 
This report documents an investigation of the nature and cause of errors leading to 
defects in construction work. Although concentrating on error, the investigation 
started with an examination of the technical causes of defects. The literature 
concerning defects reveals considerable repetition, suggesting that a lack of technical 
knowledge (as represented by the mass of books, reports, guides and case studies of 
defects) is not their main cause. The problem is more one of conveying existing 
knowledge from technical literature to finished product; that is to say, not so much a 
problem of what to do, but how to do it. The investigation, therefore, became drawn 
towards the human causes behind implementing technical solutions, causes which 
turned out to predominate in defects and failures in several industries including some 
far removed from construction. 
1.2 HUMAN ERROR 
In contrast to an extensive literature on the technical nature of defects, there is a 
general absence of work in the construction area related to their basis in human error. 
However,, recognition that "human error" and not "defects" are the key search terms 
opens a far wider range of sources, including psychology, sociology, management and 
engineering. These sources, whilst providing differing emphases, also reveal a large 
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measure of agreement. Categories of common types of error begin to emerge and some 
authors arrange these categories in a systematic manner according to the proximity or 
remoteness within an organisation of the category from the perceived perpetrator of 
the error. Some propose models consist of layered hierarchies. At the base of the 
hierarchies are technical errors made by operatives, towards the centre are a range of 
managerial factors and at the top, wider contextual factors. Authors suggesting these 
models, coming by and large from outside the construction industry, are not concerned 
with errors related to defects, but rather accidents or major failures. 
1.3 THE NEED FOR RESEARCH 
The discovery of this rich literature and of the attempts at "model building" was 
instrumental in directing work in two ways. Firstly, it emphasised the importance of 
searching widely and not always in the most obvious places in researching the subject 
of human error, and, secondly, it revealed a possible gap in current thinking on the 
causes and cures of defects. 
Regarding the first point, it is notable that authors writing on human error and coming 
from one of the sources mentioned above are often constrained by their own specialist 
knowledge to either ignore, or consider only in very general terms, other perspectives. 
This has the effect of the authors sometimes appearing to identify "the problenf', but 
not to be able to propose the solution. The literature, with some notable exceptions, 
appears to sit in a series of separate "boxes)) made from the specialist knowledge of the 
II 
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disciplines. A conscious effort at creative thinking is, therefore, necessary in order to 
identify all likely influences on the occurrence of errors and defects and, consequently, 
all disciplines likely to have a view on the problem. A further effort is required to 
understand sufficiently the content of the specialist disciplines identified in order to use 
their knowledge in further research. A final effort is necessary to search for common 
ground, or over-riding disciplines, which might link the disparate bodies of knowledge 
on human error. 
Regarding the second point, it has already been mentioned that human error has 
received scant attention from the construction literature. Where it has been mentioned 
(generally in civil engineering and related to disastrous failures), the causes of and 
cures for failure are presented in such a cryptic or haphazard fashion that the human 
error component has to be searched for or implied. Apart from some attempts to apply 
human error models to construction safety, no systematic effort has been made to 
provide what is essentially a link between knowledge related to the subject in 
disciplines "external" to the construction industry or project based industries generally, 
or to defects (as opposed to accidents and major disasters). It was towards this gap 
that the research was drawn. 
12 
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1.4 AN OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH METHOD 
By combining the wider literature and literature related more specifically to the 
construction industries an attempt was made at synthesising a model of error 
specifically related to construction projects. However, the volume of literature 
uncovered by applying the search terms to such a wide range of industries and 
disciplines, meant that it was necessary to continually revise the contents of the model 
in the light of new knowledge, even without the influence of the field work. The point 
at which a model was considered sufficiently "firm" to bring forward for further 
investigation, was therefore relatively arbitrary and revisions were anticipated at its 
conceptualisation. Field research took the form of an investigation consisting of 
separate steps, more or less building on each other. The contradictions sometimes 
evident between steps and the lack of perfect fit between conclusions from different 
strands of the research are evidence of the research process adopted - to build on 
knowledge as it was revealed either from literature, or from field research, to modify 
conclusions in the light of the building process and to carry out much of the work 
concurrently. An investigative methodology was thought appropriate to a research 
project which sought to synthesise knowledge from a wide spread of disciplines and 
apply it to another. The use of concurrency was, as with many construction projects, to 
save time. As with concurrency in other projects, its use in research carries the cost of 
engendering revision and rework and the marks of that are visible. Although at the 
outset, the research did not consciously follow a recognised methodology, the path of 
13 
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the research, as approximated in figure 1.1, is recognised in the literature on research 
design and methodology and is developed in Chapter 6. 
FIGURE 1.1 - THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
PRELIMINARY 
STUDY 
MODEL 
STUDIES OF swasacal 
HOUSE-BUILDING 
Interview 
REFINED 
A-10DELe- 
FURTHER 
WORK 
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1.5 DEFINITIONS 
Although the research adopts an inclusive approach to the study of human error, it is 
necessary to define boundaries. It could be argued that all errors are human in origin 
and any human action leading to an unwanted result should be considered a "human 
error". This would include the small proportion of errors that arise from completely 
unforeseen causes and, as a consequence are not amenable to human error research. 
Conversely, it would exclude "deliberate" errors, such as fraud, which by definition are 
not errors at all, but which clearly come within the definition of "human" if not "error". 
Many formal definitions of human error imply culpability, and thus include deliberate 
errors, by referring to externally moderated norms. For example, Stewart (1993) 
defines human error as "a human action that exceeds some limit of acceptability" and 
Bea (1994) as "a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an 
individual that can result in unacceptable or undesirable results". These definitions are 
more comprehensive than those, from for example the psychologist Lourens (1990), 
who consciously excludes culpability by framing the definition in terms of the 
perpetrators own intentions, excluding both "deliberate" and "negligent" errors. 
For the purposes of this research, a restricted view would seem to be un-necessarily 
lin-king. Although a dictionary definition n-ýight exclude deliberate acts, whilst logic 
might dictate that all errors are human, this study includes fraud, but excludes wholly 
uncontrollable consequences of human actions. Bea's definition of errors as 
15 
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"departures from acceptable or desirable practice", thus provides an adequate basis for 
investigation. 
A MAP OF THE RESEARCH 
The investigative nature of the research meant that it was not always possible to follow 
a clearly delineated path towards conclusions. In retrospect, however, it became 
possible to construct a map of the main research arena. The boundaries of "error", 
"non-error", their outcome and hence the scope of the research are illustrated in 
graphical form and are shown in Figure 1.2. To explain the figure, the central problem 
driving the research is defects. Defects imply a shortfall in terms of the product of an 
enterprise rather than a shortfall in terms of the process of production. A wider 
definition of failure would include the latter, which is often evident as "business" 
failures related to cost and time performance. A shortfall, in the form of accidents 
caused by either product or process failures, is an unfortunate, and usually avoidable, 
side effect of activities. They complete the "map" of the consequences of actions. 
A map of the causes of failures can also be drawn. It will be demonstrated that these 
are overwhelmingly human in origin. However, some failures are either unforeseen or 
predicted as a normal process of wear and tear. These classes of action are called 
(rather inelegantly) c4non-error" causes, as are frauds, which, whilst human in origin, 
are by definition not errors. The map is completed by dividing errors into two classes, 
manifest and latent. It is in this area of the map where the research is concentrated. 
16 
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The figure shows in red the "path" of primary research interest centring on the error 
basis of defects, but using an investigative logic, the research draws in apparently 
tangential areas of study to provide insights or corroborate findings on the "primary 
path". Human error related to accidents is a particularly active area of general research 
interest and this area, marked green in the figure proved relevant. Business failure, in 
terms of poor time and cost performance was also of interest and is marked in blue'. 
Also marked in blue is the converse of failure, success. Conformation of many findings 
uncovered in the study of error is found in the "success" literature related to general 
management, project management, quality assurance, and safetY2. 
1 Oakland (1993) and ACSNI (1993)from the perspectives of total quality management and nuclear 
industry safety respectively suggest links between quality and safety and business performance. 
2 VAiittington et a] (1992), Harrison (1992) and Miston and Eddeshaw (1989) draw links between 
safety, quality and defects. The first notes ""The most obvious effect of (programme pressures in the 
construction industry) is that (operatives) must increase productivity which in turn is likely to increase 
the defect rate. The parallels with the comments made by respondents in this research about time and 
financial pressures and their impact on safety are striking". 
17 
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1.7 THE RESEARCH STEPS 
TBE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature, first concerning defects, then error was analysed. This was later 
supplemented by reviewing areas, such as quality assurance, project management, 
reliability engineering and systems safety - literature generally concentrating on 
successful performance, rather than failure. The review involved technical disciplines, 
primarily engineering, but also the disciplines of psychology and sociology. The latter 
gave particular attention to human error in relation to accidents, disasters and 
catastrophes. As well as covering several disciplines, the literature spreads over many 
industries including construction, minerals, nuclear, chemical engineering, 
transportation and marine engineering. 
There was no clear point in the research at which reviewing the literature stopped and 
some areas are, at the time of writing, still being developed. However, the literature 
falls into and is presented (Chapters 2,3 and 4) as three perspectives on error covering 
technology, social science and management 
19 
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MODEL BUILDING 
After the review was substantially completed, the perspectives were reintegrated 
(Chapter 5) by extracting common themes, identifying differences in view and gaps in 
knowledge. From this process a model of the error process related to construction 
projects was conceptualised. This model forms the basis of subsequent field research, 
consisting of a preliminary study and three studies of house-building. 
PRELIMINARY STUDY 
The preliminary study (Chapter 7) sought responses to the model from the 
construction industry generally. For this purpose, a fairly wide section of informed 
opinion was surveyed by using a largely closed question type of postal questionnaire, 
but with an opportunity for respondents to supply additional comments. 
STUDIES OF HOUSE-BUILDING 
The studies were in three parts (Chapters 8,9,10): - 
eA statistical study which assessed the impact of individual factors in the 
model on measures of error. 
e An interview study to further assess the impact of factors and examine 
linkages between factors. 
* An observational study to more closely examine errors as they incubated in a 
representative setting. 
20 
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The conclusions from the studies of house-building are combined with those from the 
literature review and preliminary study in forming the findings from the research. The 
overall conclusions are, therefore, based on triangulating evidence. 
21 
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2 
A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ERROR 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
An analysis of literature from a technological perspective reveals several authors who 
have considered human error and its outcomes. Their writings can be loosely classified 
as follows: - 
* The forensic engineering and "disaster" writers 
9 Monographs particularly directed to human error 
e Research reports and case studies on human error 
2.2 THE FORENSIC ENGINEERING AND "DISASTER" WRITERS 
A number of authors have reviewed major disasters in the construction and use of 
buildings and engineering structures. Some are writing from the perspective of 
"forensic engineering", which has as its objects the analysis of the technical causes of 
failures, others from general interest. 
McKAIQ-(1962) 
The earliest author of failure monographs reviewed is McKaig who summarises reports 
of building and other collapses dating back to the nineteenth century. McKaig largely 
reports the technical causes of failure and the consequences in terms of human life and 
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damage. In passing, he notes "human error" reasons for these failures, including lack of 
foresight, fraudulent practices and negligence related to both the design and 
construction of structures. He makes no attempt to define "human error" or 
systematically analyse the causes of these errors and is often not specific as to exactly 
who had erred, but does point in some instances to gross failures in supervision and 
checking, confused responsibilities, unregulated changes, uncontrolled 
concurrent working' and financial pressures. These "themes", it will be seen, repeat 
throughout much of the literature reviewed. 
McKaig reports official recommendations in avoiding the repetition of failure that 
largely concentrate on controlling the identity of the individual. Thus, the report on the 
New York Coliseum collapse of 1956 recommended-- 
* Licensed engineers should be used for critical areas of construction 
* Contractors should be licensed 
e Building control officers should be graduate or licensed engineers. 
Similar recommendations were made in reports concerning collapses in 1911,1915, 
1922, and 1959, suggesting that deficiencies in the technical knowledge of 
practitioners of that time were considered more influential than wider managerial 
failures such as the division of responsibilities and control of changes. 
1 Concurrent working is where several stages of a project (for example, briefing, design, and 
construction) are carried out concurrently rather than sequentially (Morris 1994). This is usually 
done to save time. 
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FELD (1968) 
Feld writes from the standpoint of the forensic engineer and also points out the need 
for practitioners to acquire technical knowledge and/or be licensed to practice. 
However, he also cites failures in supervision both at the design and construction stage 
and poor co-ordination and divisions of responsibilities between key construction 
players (particularly in standard forms of engagement). Feld particularly stresses the 
need for carefully delineated responsibilities between specialists in suggesting: - 
"... there is general agreement that a clear-cut division of the total responsibility 
to the owner and to the public is desirable and as yet is non-existent". (page 
375) 
He also notes that clarifying responsibilities by simply transferring them to other parties 
may be counter-productive, but a clear demarcation between design and construction 
and concentrating design in the hands of one designer was needed. 
Feld notes the importance of communications in the form of properly co-ordinated 
drawings and the importance of controlling changes during construction (particularly 
by ensuring that significant modifications are made by issuing altered drawings and 
withdrawing the originals rather than by amendments to the originals on site). Finally, 
Feld notes the role of cost pressures in error, where he suggests that both cost pressure 
per se and fluctuations in pressures caused by a "boom and bust" business cycle can 
lead to discontinuities of resources and consequent mistakes. 
24 
2-A Technological Perspective 
KAN11NETZKY (1976), (122i) 
Following the format and approach of the previous two writers, Kaminetzky also 
concentrates on the technology of recent disastrous failures with some reference to the 
influence of human error. Kaminetzky points out the role in failures of lack of technical 
knowledge on the part of individuals, poor inspection and supervision procedures, 
poor division of responsibilities, lack of control over changes, the use of uncontrolled 
concurrent working, poor communications and pressures of time and cost. 
Kan-ýinetzky (199 1) notes limitations of checking which he suggests: - 
"Can at best serve as a deterrent to flagrant contract and code violation. It may 
well also serve to prevent constant and continuous errors often caused by 
ignorance rather than by ill-intent". (Page 41) 
He also emphasises the need to carefully define responsibilities and to assign duties to 
where he considers they are most effectively performed. Interestingly, Kaminetzky 
criticises the use of performance specifications in the USA in this respect, preferring 
the European practice of fully specified design: - 
"In Europe, engineers produce a complete set of drawings - every rebar is 
indicated, every rebar bend is specified. What the contractor gets is the 
complete story, allowing no deviation .... 
Once the contractors are developing 
something which is not spelled out in the design (as in the USA), then they are, 
in fact, designing, and that is where the trouble starts". (page 567) 
With respect to the role of communications in failure, Kan-dnetzky cites two instances, 
where poor formal communications were to blame. Firstly, a contractor mistook lines 
on a drawing and consequently left out the capitals to concrete columns (The result of 
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this omission was a punching shear failure of the associated concrete slab). The second 
instance involved an interpretation error of a drawing, where the dimension on 
reinforcing steel of 11/4" was mistakenly read as 1/4". This occurred because the drafter 
had written the figure I too close to a construction line. The error was not detected by 
checking or construction supervision and consequently the retaining wall was 
constructed using 1/4" steel reinforcement and collapsed as soon as it was loaded. 
Kaminetzky concludes by expressing, in common with many writers from different 
disciplines, a view that most failures in the construction industry are the product of 
multiple causes. 
ROSS (19"4 
Ross analyses reports of major construction failures from the USA construction journal 
Engineering News Record. In common with previous authors, he concentrates mainly 
on the technology of the failures, but also cites as causes of failure deficiencies in 
technical knowledge, fraud, pressures of time, poor inspection and supervision and 
poor division of responsibilities. 
Ross reports the occurrence of fraud in constructing pipelines in Alaska, USA in 1975. 
However, he notes that frauds were largely induced by technical failures and pressure 
of time - an observation suggesting that errors may be driven by other wider or more 
remote factors. 
26 
2-A Technological Perspective 
As with Kaminetzky, Ross emphasises the importance of clear cut divisions of 
responsibilities. He quotes CH Thornton, president of Lev Zetlin Associates 
Incorporated (investigating forensic engineers) from an Engineering News Record 
report of 9/4/84 on the Hartford Coliseum (USA) roof collapse of 1978, -. - 
". -. that the incompatibility of building systems due to a lack of co-ordination 
among members of the building team are behind most exterior wall and 
enclosure failures" (page 297) 
He continues by recommending better education of architects and engineers in the co- 
ordination of building systems. 
SCOTT (1976) 
Scott follows the format of the previous authors in analysing construction failures in 
the United Kingdom. Again, he concentrates predominantly on the technology 
concerned, but makes some reference to the human error cause of failure. Causes listed 
include lack of individual technical skill, lack of checking or inspection, poor division 
of responsibilities, the use of concurrent working, poor communications and pressure 
of time. 
Scott also questions the effectiveness of checking, in suggesting that checks and 
inspections should be unannounced and random. In common with Kaminetzky, he 
notes confusions of responsibilities as a cause of specific failures and reports the 
recommendations of the committee examining the Ferrybridge C Power Station 
Cooling Tower collapse of 1972, which advocated. - 
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"The establishment of clearly nominated areas of responsibility in future 
contracts between specification, design, and construction for each of the parties 
involved". (page 154) 
Scott later comments on the practice of concurrent working, where normally 
sequential activities such as design and construction are allowed to overlap. He notes 
recommendations of the report into the Milford Haven Box Girder Bridge collapse of 
1972, which included that-. - 
"checks and designs (should be) completed before work starts". (page 149) 
2.3 MONOGRAPHS PARTICULARLY DIRECTED TO HUMAN ERROR 
Whilst also reviewing technological causes in many case studies of disasters, two 
authors from a technological background have paid particular attention to the role of 
human errors in failures. 
PETRO SKI (19 8 5), (1994A) (I 994D) 
Petroski, in two major works (1985) (1994B) examines the nature of error in a civil 
and structural engineering context related mainly, but not exclusively to construction. 
In common with the "disaster" authors reviewed above, Petroski cites errors in 
connection with major failures, including poor checking, poor change control, 
concurrent working, poor communications, constrained costs and pressures of time. 
However, he provides a more detailed analysis of the considerations underlying these 
lapses. 
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Petroski stands out among engineering writers in pointing out that errors have a 
beneficial function in the development of technology. Examining the case histories of 
previous construction failures, he notes the role of error in innovation and quotes the 
19th century engineer Brunel's view of the Royal Commission of 1847 (examining the 
use of iron in railway structures) as "the commission for stopping further 
improvements in bridge building". This Royal Commission was set up, after several 
bridge collapses, to suggest improvements to design by reducing the scope for error. 
Petroski is also notable among technologists in distinguishing latent from active 
failures, a distinction noted independently by authors from the perspectives of 
psychology and safety engineering and to recur in this research. In discussing latent 
failure Petroski (1994B) points out: - 
"the absence of failure does not prove that a design is flawless, for a latent 
failure mode may be triggered by yet-unexperienced conditions" (page 160) 
Coupled with this insight is Petroski's (1994A) observation that case histories of major 
disasters focused on technological and individual factors are often ineffective as they 
provide: - 
"lessons .... 
(that are).... so specific as to seem hardly relevant to anything but a 
clone of the failed design" (page 52) 
Exceptions listed by Petroski include the Space Shuttle "Challenger" investigations, 
which explored: - 
"in considerable detail the manapement-enRineer interface". (page 52) 
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Petroski (1994B) does not decry measures of error control such as checking, but, as 
with earlier authors, notes their limitations. The problem of checkers making the same 
mistakes as the perpetrator of an error he expresses thus: - 
"It is the function of checking, whether by the original designer or by peers, to 
catch the omission of a critical calculation, the lapse in logic, the error in 
analysis, or the mistake in mathematics. But too often the process of checking - 
an integral component of the design process itself - is myopic. The original 
designer can continue to overlook the same errors of commission or omission, 
and the peer can nod at the faulty logic" (page 27) 
On change, Petroski (1985) notes that a cause of the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway 
collapse (Kansas USA, 17/7/1981) was an uncontrolled change to a detail of the 
construction (Petroski added that the original details were considered un-buildable and 
quotes the Engineering News Record report that "a detail that begs a change cannot be 
completely without blame when the change is made" (page 89)2). 
Petroski later (1994B) summarises some of the key elements in change control in a 
review of Galileo's "Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences" (Galileo 1954). 
Petroski quotes Galileo's story of the provision of an intermediate support to a stone 
column laid horizontally in storage. Differential settlement of the three supports led to 
the cracking of the column, contrary to the expectation that three supports would be 
an improvement. Petroski remarks: - 
2 The same quote is also cited by Ross (1984) who attributes it to a letter published in ENR from John 
Peterson, Department of Civil Engineering, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, USA and dated 
17/9/84 
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"Good practice dictates that the checker discusses his proposed design change 
with his peers and superiors to be sure that he is not overlooking something in 
what seems to be a clear improvement, and good practice also requires that he 
has the change approved by the engineer in charge. He presents his proposed 
change to them, and they all agree it seems an excellent idea. Thus the third 
support is added". (page 37) 
Presumably, had this procedure been followed in Galileo's example, the third support 
would not have been added. In relating the story of the marble column to current 
practice Petroski (1994B) adds: - 
"A knowledge of the story of Gallileo and the marble column and an 
appreciation of its implications for checking design changes might have alerted 
someone involved with the (Kansas) walkway design that here was a detail to 
be checked anew" (page 37) 
Petroski (1985) cites pressure of time as a cause of error, but also quotes the view of 
the US House of Representatives Conunittee on Science and Technology (1983) that 
"fast track" construction was a "least significant factor" in preventing structural 
accidents from happening ("Fast track" construction is a technique for saving time by 
running some operations, particularly design and construction concurrently). The 
apparent contradiction between the view that pressure of time is a cause of error, but 
that fast tracking is not significant suggests that some other factor, perhaps related to 
how the concurrency involved in fast tracking is handled, intervenes to confound a 
direct relationship between time and errors. This possibility is addressed by authors of 
major interdisciplinary reports and quality assurance monographs 34 
3 ACSNI (1993), Oakland (1993) 
4 The benefits of fast tracking remain contentious - see Tighe (199 1) for a critique of the process. 
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In emphasising the importance of communications, Petroski (1985) again quotes the 
US House of Representatives Conunittee on Science and Technology (1983) who 
listed "communications and organisation in the construction industry" first among the 
six factors they considered critical in avoiding construction failures. 
KLETZ Q 98 5), (1992), (1993) 
Kletz is a chen-kal engineer, writing about safety in the chernical and process 
engineering industries. In common with the construction based authors cited above, 
Kletz notes the role in errors of inspection, defining responsibilities, communications 
and cost pressures. Unlike some of the above authors, Kletz (1985) plays down the 
importance of the technical knowledge of the individual: - 
"Lack of knowledge is not the main problem (in accident situations). The main 
problem is that we do not use the knowledge we have. Accidents, with few 
exceptions, are not caused by lack of knowledge, but by a failure to use the 
knowledge that is available". (page 5) 
He suggests that there are severe limitations in either changing the behaviour of 
individuals to avoid making errors, or in blarning operatives for many errors. 
Regarding the former Kletz (1985) notes: - 
"instead of trying to persuade people not to make mistakes, we should accept 
people as we find them and try to remove opportunities for error by changing 
the work situation, that is, the plant or equipment design or the method of 
working. Alternatively, we can n-ýitigate the consequences of error or provide 
opportunities for recovery". (page 1) 
Regarding the latter, Kletz (1992) tempers accusations of ignorance and lack of skills 
made by many authors. Of the operatives who designed and installed a temporary pipe 
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that subsequently ruptured and precipitated the 1974 Flixborough disaster (which 
killed 28 people) he comments: - 
"The men charged with the task of making and installing the temporary pipe 
had great practical experience and drive .... but they did not realise that the pipe 
and its supports should have been designed by an expert in piping design". 
(page 360) 
Kletz noted that the underlying causes were un-controlled changes and lack of 
management support5. 
He also is one of few writers in the area of human error to consider the possibility of 
selecting individuals to remove "error inducing traits", which he dismisses as being 
both impossible and undesirable. He notes that weeding out the forgetful might "leave 
people who cause accidents for another reason" quoting in support research by Swain 
(1973). 
Although Kletz (1985) generally supports the value of checking, he also notes its 
liýnitations, in particular in connection with watching and checking for rare events. He 
reports an accident caused by a railway signalman's failure to confirm that a "train was 
complete by checking the tail lights": - 
"it is difficult for anyone to realise that an event that has never occurred in 25 
years has in fact just happened". (page 53) 
5 In support of the contention that blaming failures on human errors is misleading, Kletz quotes Hurst 
(1976), who suggests that "real" pilot error is only to blame for 1-2% of aircraft accidents, not the 
60% often quoted. 
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With respect to the role of communications in error, Metz (1985) particularly stresses 
the importance of informal communications in reporting two specific failures, the 
collapse of the West Gate Bridge, Victoria, Australia (a box girder bridge) and the 
construction of the walls to a compressor house. For the former, Metz wrote: - 
"No one told (the construction team) that (box girder) components must not be 
forced together, if they do not fit they must be modified. The consulting 
engineers made no attempt to ensure the contractors understood the design 
philosophy and that traditional methods of construction could not be used. Nor 
did they check the construction to see that it was carried out with sufficient 
care". (page 38) 
The last sentence illustrates the close link between some failures of communication 
with failures in checking. In this case, checking appeared not to be to detect "culpable" 
errors, but to ensure that the construction team were adequately informed. The second 
instance reported was that of the walls to a compressor house being built too strongly 
to blow out in the event of an explosion 
6: 
_ 
"In this case a construction engineer, not just a construction worker, failed to 
follow the design. He did not understand, and had probably not been told, the 
reason for the unusual design". (page 97) 
Kletz (1985) also comments on cost pressures and conflicts between safety and 
profitability in process engineering. He notes contradictions between first cost and 
costs-in-use (in advocating greater capital expenditure to reduce errors and hence costs 
in maintenance) and records the instance of an explosion and fire occurring because of 
a desire to increase production by bypassing safety trips. 
This is desirable in order to relieve pressure and reduce the impact of an explosion. 
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Finally, Kletz (1992) in common with Petroski, but unlike most technologists, 
proposes a model of accident investigation, which suggests that errors may have 
underlying or hidden causes: - 
"Accident investigation is like peeling an onion. Beneath each layer of causes 
and recommendations lie other layers. The outer layers deal with the immediate 
technical causes, the middle layers with ways of avoiding the hazards and the 
inner layers with the underlying weaknesses in the management system". (page 
356) 
This view of error formation, whilst unusual in literature from authors from a 
technological background, is echoed in writing, reviewed later, from psychology, 
reliability engineering and systems safety. 
2.4 RESEARCH REPORTS AND CASE STUDIES ON HUMAN ERROR 
Several authors, from a technological background, report research projects, case 
studies and their technical experience in human error and related subjects. The more 
significant of these are reviewed separately below, with the balance reviewed 
collectively at the end. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE. AUSTRALIA RESEARCH 
Mark Stewart and Robert Melchers, of the University of Newcastle, Australia have 
devoted considerable attention to the occurrence of human error in the design and 
supervision of reinforced concrete structural elements. From this work they suggest 
that the majority of structural failures are due to gross human error, with design and 
construction error as the dominant causes of these failures. Stewart (1995) adds, 
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however,, that most errors are related to reductions in serviceability and not 
catastrophic failure, thus, supporting the direction of this study in relating it to defects. 
They give both a definition for human error generally- 
"a human action that exceeds some limit of acceptability" (Stewart 1993, page 
278) 
And for human errors in a structural design context: - 
"A human error in the structural design context may be defined as an event or 
process that departs from commonly accepted competent professional 
practice". (Stewart and Melchers 1988, page285) 
The main thrust of their work is directed to examining the effectiveness of checking. 
Melchers (1989) reports error rates on modelled structural engineering tasks of up to 
14% without considering self checking effects and known design code ambiguities and 
Stewart (1994) notes that the cost of re-work amounts to approximately 5% of total 
construction costs. Stewart (1993), in attempting to quantify failure for various levels 
of checking, reports that the probability of failure with self checked design and 
unsupervised (by engineer) construction as 239 times higher than checked and 
supervise esign. 
Stewart (1993) also reports that errors remaining after engineering inspections of 
contractors work amounted to approximately 1.7% of the initial errors, thus 
confirming the effectiveness of independent checking of contractor's work. For design 
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checking, Stewart noted that one check reduced errors by 80% and two checks by 
95%. Stewart concluded by postulating that: - 
"It is reasonable to assume that a single (independent) design check and 
engineering imections constitute a realistic error control strategy... " (Stewart 
1993, page 290) 
Both Stewart (1994) and Melchers (1989) note, however, lin-ýitations of checking with 
Melchers reporting that it was very likely that many errors were made in practice even 
in structures that do not fail. 
Finally, Stewart and Rosowsky (1995) are two of very few authors within the 
construction industry to suggest a risk analysis 7 approach to hazard identification. 
ALLEN (1976,1986,1992) 
Allen, also writing from an engineering perspective, notes that human error 
predominates in the generation of defects and failings. I-Es main theme is, by drawing 
on the work of DeBono (1971,1976), to point out the inevitability of error in a 
structural and civil engineering context. He suggests that mistakes cannot be avoided 
because they arise directly from the way the mind works and also notes the roles of 
time pressures in errors. Allen (1986) gives an indication of the reason that time 
pressures cause errors: - 
7 Risk analysis involves systematic analysis of complex processes in order to identify weak elements. 
Two techniques are commonly used, fault trees, where a fault in a component or procedure is traced 
forwards to discover its consequences, and event trees, where an undesired event is traced backwards 
to identify all likely causes (see also Chapter 4, section 4.3) 
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"A useful experiment to show up the errors in the thin-king process is to try to 
do things in a great hurry. More mistakes occur because our actions are based 
on internal patterns triggered off by incomplete information - no time to puzzle 
over it and fully understand it". (page 4) 
Finally, Allen (1986) notes unclear drawings and inadequate construction procedures 
as causes of error. 
HADIPRIONO (1985), HADrPRIONO AND TAELER (1220) 
Hadipriono (1985) in an extensive review of press reported failures of bridges, low rise 
and multi-storey building and plant and industrial buildings, found design and 
construction defects roughly evenly split, with defects in materials and maintenance as 
a much smaller category. "External" failures in use were also a substantial category, 
but only for bridge and plant/industrial building failures. 
In reviewing these failures, he divides their causes into two broad categories, 
it enabling" as opposed to "triggering". The enabling cause is an event inherent in a 
structure due to design, construction, or maintenance deficiencies. The triggering 
cause is "an external event, such as a vehicle collision, impact or explosion, that could 
initiate a structural failure". This division of causes parallels the distinction made by 
Petrosky between active and latent error causes. 
Both Hadipriono and Hadipriono and Tahir cite as causes of failures, errors in 
checking, including particularly design checking, together with failures of independent 
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inspection of construction. In addition, cost pressures, poor communications and 
confusions of responsibilities are noted as causes. Hadipriono (1985) emphasises 
confusions of responsibilities at: - 
"Contractor - sub-contractor - construction manager - design engineer - 
architect - owner's representative, interfaces". (page 1478) 
In avoiding such confusions, Hadipriono and Tahir (1990) advocate continuity of the 
design concept by the designer and owner. 
Hadipriono (1985) also implicates changes, discontinuities, and losses of design 
concepts as causes of failure and gives the example of the 1978 Hartford, Connecticut, 
USA roof collapse, where a change in the bracing system to improve buildability 
caused buckling of truss members and consequently the collapse. 
BROWN AND XIAOCHEN YIN (198. ý) 
Brown and Xiaochen Yin also review press reported failures from a structural design 
perspective and in so doing note both the inevitability of error and that, for most major 
failures, more than one individual error is involved. They note the role in errors leading 
to failures of poor checking procedures, poor division of responsibilities, poor 
commurucations (particularly through the medium of drawings), inadequate funding of 
both fees and construction, compressed time schedules, the economic climate and 
sociaUcultural pressures. 
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On the last influence, Brown and Xiaochen Yin list amongst factors affecting the 
likelihood of errors occurring, human conditions, including social origin, cultural 
background and education. They also note factors "external to the building process of 
"the political system" and "social conditions". 
In common with Petrosky, they suggest that there are benefits with errors and that, to 
a certain extent errors should be tolerated. 
ELDUKAIR AND AYYUB (1991) 
Eldukair and Ayyub also analyse press reported defects and failures and conclude that 
human error predominates in the generation of defects and failings. Whilst also citing 
individual factors, poor checking and supervision, poor communications (particularly 
between architects, engineers and contractors), costs and social constraints, they 
follow Petrosky and Hadipriono in proposing that errors can have latent and active 
elements. They extend their analysis to propose a multi-layered structure of error 
influences, dividing failure causes initially into natural and man made hazards, 
variations within common practices and departure from common practices. Later they 
attribute the causes of a large number of failure cases as shown in Table 2.1 -. - 
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TABLE 2.1 CAUSES OF FAILURE 
(Eldukair and Ayyub 1991) 
Personality Percentage of failure 
cases 
Project architect 3 
Structural engineer 48.2 
Resident engineer 31.1 
Inspector 27.6 
Contractor (head office) 3.8 
Contractor (site staff/supervision) 59.6 
Contractor (workmen) 17.4 
Operator (e. g. crane) 2.8 
(r some overlaps involved) 
Analysing the cause of failures further, the authors classify error into-- 
Primary cause - covering the technical causes of the failure such as "poor 
erection procedures" These were cited in 54.3% of failures. 
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Secondary cause - covering managerial reasons for failure such as the "lack of 
supervision and control". These were cited in 36.6% of failure cases. These 
were cited as the possible underlying reason for failure. 
They further report that deficiencies in the division of work responsibilities contribute 
to about 30% of cases. These deficiencies were the dominant "management" cause of 
failure. In addition, they implicate financial pressure in 11.6% of reported cases, noting 
that cost constrained maintenance programmes were cited in 52.3% of cases of bridge 
failures. Finally, they note that "environmental errors" were implicated in 56.1% of 
cases, within which political pressures influenced 10.4%. 
DAOUD AND HAMDANI (198. ý) 
Daoud and Hamdani report research into the incidence of mistakes in construction in 
the Gulf region and note problems of poor supervision and inspection procedures, 
inadequate division of responsibilities, poorly controlled changes in the form of 
variations and poor communications generally. In particular, they cite the lack of a 
clear understanding of the rights and responsibilities of each party to a project as a 
major sources of problems in construction. They also note "changes in personnel as the 
work progresses" and later in their paper they generally implicate failures in "quality 
assurance, checking/review systems, tolerance levels, related to variations". 
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ROLLINGS AND ROLLINGS (1991) 
Rollings and Rollings are concerned with defects related to the construction of airfield 
pavements. They echo points made above concerning the preponderance of errors as 
the cause of defects and point out causes related to the individual (expressed as 
"ignorance", or "laziness, greed, fraud and pride"), poor checking, poor 
communications, constrained costs and time pressures. 
They particularly cite inadequacies in formal communication tools, including the use of 
inadequate specifications, blindly lifted from past projects and including outdated 
materials. They comment that blindly following standard details, where an unexpected 
condition exists, can lead to error. With respect to cost pressures they note that: - 
"Poor quality work achieved at a cheap price is definitely a functional failure". 
(page 282) 
JONES AND NATHAN (199Q) 
Jones and Nathan analyse the failure of a supermarket roof in Burnaby, British 
Columbia, Canada and quote extensively from the Canadian Government report on the 
failure (Government of British Columbia, 1988). They note that the collapse was the 
result of multiple causes and cite checking errors, concurrent working, poor division of 
responsibilities, lack of control of changes, cost and time pressures. 
In common with other authors, including Petrosky (1985), they note the limitations of 
checking, in particular the fact that checkers in this instance made some of the same 
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n-ýistakes as the original perpetrators of errors. Jones and Nathan (1990) also cite, as a 
cause of the collapse, confused responsibilities: - 
"among owner, project manager, prime consultant, architect, structural 
engineer, and even tenant" (page 155) 
They further note that the checking process, in itself introduced to reduce error, may 
actually have led to divided responsibility (by shifting some responsibility from 
perpetrator to checker). 
Jones and Nathan (1990) also note the effect of change on the project, where an 
increase in concrete slab thickness contributed to the collapse of the roof, and 
problems of "obscure" communications. They report the Commission 
recommendations (Government of British Columbia, 1988) that engineering structural 
calculations be submitted with drawings and specification when applying for a building 
permit. These calculations would become a "public document", subject to review "for 
legitimate reasons" in order to "stiffen the standards of care of the poorly organised 
engineer". The recommendations have a parallel with the suggestions of writers from 
psychology reviewed later, that communication links should be visible. 
On the subject of cost pressures, Jones and Nathan consider that bidding for 
professional services contributed to the collapse. They again quote the Conm-ýission 
findings, that structural engineers should be made to carry professional liability 
insurance and use a schedule of minimum fees. 
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BUILDING RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT STUDIES 
Since 1980, the United Kingdom Building Research Establishment has conducted a 
number of studies of defects arising on building sites, which give some insight to 
human error causes. Griffin (1990) in conducting a large survey of 116 Local 
Authorities, concentrates largely on technical causes, with only passing reference to 
error related causes. He does, however, note multiple occurrences of defects, implying 
a lack of knowledge transfer underlying their cause. He suggests that an increased 
number of defects occurring between the years 1983 and 1989 might similarly be 
because advice given in guidance publications was not being used. Finally, he notes the 
need for new working practices to meet the demands of changing technology, but 
without spelling out the desired practices. 
Bonshor and Harrison (1982A, 1982B, 1982C, 1982D) report studies of 15 
traditionally built housing projects in order to determine the origin of faults in 
construction. They adopt a classification of origin as follows: - 
o Design 
e Specification 
o Materials 
o Site 
o Shared (design/site/specification) 
9 Other 
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Of these, site origins predominate. However, when design documentation as a whole is 
considered (design, specification and some shared causes), this was the largest 
category of cause. Bonshor and Harrison (1983A) estimate the cost of faults and 
report that the extra cost of a correct detail (in the first place) is on average only about 
one-fifth of the cost of an adequate (later) remedy for a defective detail. They conclude 
by commenting on the contributions to faults of skill, care, supervision and design/site 
interface problems. They link these contributions by noting that there is no single 
action which could remove the problem of faults in construction. 
Harrison (1993) updates Bonshor and Harrison (1983A) in an observational study of 
18 housing schemes. He uses the same classification as the earlier study and, in 
analysing 976 faults, finds a similar preponderance of those originating from site. 
Whilst faults originating from design and specification continued to form a large 
proportion of all faults, in this study the combined total of design, specification and 
other faults was still less than faults originating from the sites. Harrison suggests that 
this lower proportion of design faults compared with the earlier study may simply be 
because less sets of working drawings were examined. Much of the study concentrates 
on the technical causes of defects classified by element or by types of technical 
performance failure. In passing, however, he mentions the continuing occurrence of 
faults detected in the earlier study, suggesting that poor knowledge transfer is behind 
many faults. He also notes the need for greater care as a result of the greater 
complexity of modem building. 
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Bentley (198 1) reports observational site studies of 27 non-housing construction 
projects, concentrating on observing the site activities of clerks of works and site 
managers. He recorded "quality related events" (events causing the "clerks of works, 
site managers, architects or tradesmen to pause in their work and consider the quality 
or 'rightness' of the building" (page 1)) These he categorises into 13 causes: - 
Workmanship 
9 Lack of skill 
* Lack of care 
* Lack of knowledge 
e Poor planning by tradesman 
* Poor contractor's organisation 
* No protection of completed work 
Aspects of desi2n or proiect information 
9 No co-ordination of design 
e Difficult to build 
e Design will not work 
* Unclear/missing project information 
9 Low quality design 
* Designer not understanding materials 
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Of these, lack of care by tradesmen and unclear/missing project information rank as the 
largest two categories, accounting for 42% of all quality related events. The 
categorisation mixes technical and managerial causes, but in further qualitative 
analysis, Bentley sheds some light on human error related causes. He notes that 
problems often resulted from more than one cause, that division of responsibilities and 
the associated roles adopted by project participants were important in avoiding 
problems and that time and cost pressures were influential. He notes that planning, 
inspection, checking and consultation were important functions of site managers on 
well run sites and suggests that,. - 
"A co-operative clerk of works/site agent team could do much to maintain 
good quality, particularly where their combined technical knowledge and 
experience were a good match to the needs of the job" (page 4). 
Bentley notes the importance of detailed inspection as an essential part of a quality 
control system, but suggests that it will, not of itself produce good quality work. 
Rather, he emphasises project management functions particularly related to 
communications. He further notes that on sites achieving satisfactory levels of quality 
the project culture was marked by commitment to the job and a high level of 
consultation between everyone concerned: - 
"Sites with acceptable quality standards tended to be characterised by a 
cconsultative' approach to problem solving - anyone on site could raise 
questions and many individuals could contribute to solutions" (page 6) 
In contrast, Bentley reports a site with very poor perceived quality: - 
"On this site there was a lack of effective management coupled with extremely 
poor project information (often incomplete and sometimes incomprehensible). 
Everyone was performing, strictly within the limitations of their formal role. The 
clerk of works was dealing with problems alone, with little consultation with 
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trades' foremen or the agent. The architect was reluctant to visit the site. When 
he did he was inundated with queries arising from the drawings". 
Bentley concludes by noting that in general, quality standards on site did not rely 
significantly on formal checking and acceptance or rejection of completed work. 
Rather they resulted from the efforts of site managers and clerks of works 
concentrating on an "environment where good work could and was likely to take 
place" (page 6). 
OTHER AUTHORS 
Several other monographs and reports of research projects or case studies consider 
human error from a technological point of view. These include Bartholomew (1987) 
who is concerned with the performance of smaller projects, Chadwick (1986), 
concerned with construction project quality, Dea and Gans (1986), concerned with 
procedures in improving project controls and several authors who are largely 
concerned with error in connection with either forensic engineering, defect analysis, or 
the performance of completed buildings'. 
In addition Nfills, Denis Associates (1988A, 1988B), writing a restricted circulation 
report concerning building defects for the UK Association of Building Component 
Manufacturers, Korman (199 1 A, 199 1B and 199 1 Q, in editorials for the Engineering 
8 Including Addlcson (1977,1992), Blockley (1977), Ellingwood (1987), Ferry Borges (1990) 
Frangipol (1987), Freeman (1975), Garratt (1978), Gnaedinger (1987), Harris and Chancy (1969), 
Knoll (1982), Lamb (1985), Lew (1984), Matousek (1982,1992), Nowak and Tabsh (1988), 
Patterson (1984), Porteous (1992), Peck (1981), Ransom (1994), Robson (1978), Sanchez-Silva et 
al (1996), Scott (1986) Smith (1976,1977), Sowers (1993) Sriskandan (1986). 
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News Record, and an editorial for the ASCE (1978) journal "Civil Engineering" make 
several points related to human error. 
Common contentions in these works, echoing points made above, include agreement 
that human error is involved in the majority of defects and fOures (Blockley 1977, 
Frangopol 1987, Harris and Chaney 1969, Knoll 1982, Lew 1984, Matousek 1982, 
Nowak and Tabsh 1988, Peck 1981, Sowers 1993, Sriskandan 1986), that error causes 
can be divided into active and latent components and modelled in terms of primary and 
secondary factors (Chadwick 1986, Ellingwood 1987, Matousek 1992), that error 
occurrence is inevitable (Nowak and Tabsh 1988) and that failure has multiple causes 
(Sanchez-Silva et al 1996). 
Sriskandan (1986) points out the role of selection of the individual in avoiding errors 
and Lew (1984), Ellingwood, (1987), Nfills, Denis Associations (1988A, 1988B) and 
Ransom (1994) note the importance of checking. 
Ellingwood (1987) repeats comments noted above that checking is only partially 
effective, particularly for gross errors. This is because they are too rare to be easily 
noticed and consequently likely to slip through the process. The similarity with 
comments made by Kletz (1985) reported above, from a chemical engineering 
perspective, is notable. 
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The ASCE (1978), Chadwick (1986), Ferry Borges (1990), Nowak and Tabsh (1988) 
and Lew (1984) repeat arguments that errors can to a certain extent be tolerated, with 
both Ferry Borges and Nowak and Tabsh suggesting a differentiated approach to 
checking. The latter suggests the use of sensitivity analyses to direct attention to the 
most critical elements of structures. 
Poor divisions of responsibility are noted as a cause of error by Ellingwood (1987, 
Nfills, Denis Associates (1988A), Ferry Borges (1990) Sriskandan (1986), Gnaedinger 
(1987), Robson (1978) and Chadwick (1986). An illustration of the problem of 
confused responsibilities is provided by Korman's report of a US Court case (Korman 
199 1 B), concerning defects at the (then) newly constructed Stamford, Connecticut, 
USA train station (Wilbur Smith and Associates vs the US Justice Department). 
Confused responsibilities were given some prominence in the article. The divided 
responsibility between designers was particularly noted: - 
0 Concept design - Skidmore, Owings and Merril. 
Prime architect/engineer/program manager - DeLeuw, Cather, Parsons 
0 Designer of record - Wilbur Smith Associates 
0 Construction manager - Sverdrup and Parcel 
0 General contractor -0 and G Industries. 
Korman further quotes structural engineering witness C. H. Thornton, who was 
appeafing on behalf of a defendant: - 
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"When you take the person who conceived the design away from the shop 
drawing review you generally end up with a disaster". (page 9) 
Change as a cause of error is cited by Chadwick (1986), Lamb (1985), Scott (1986), 
Sn-ýith (1976,1977) and Sriskandan (1986). Chadwick (1986) advocates the use of 
"change control" namely requiring that changes have approval from the owner and 
engineer, according to the criteria: - 
I Would the change be cost effective and not delay work elsewhere? - 
Would (any) related system operate safely (and in the nuclear power 
industry, would it be licensable). 
Change control is a technique drawn from general project management (Archibald 
1976, Morris 1994 - see Chapter 4) and its use in connection with construction errors 
is reinforced by Chevin (1993), who notes the value of controlling changes at the 
design stage of a project. 
Ellingwood (1987) and Chadwick (1986) both note and criticise the practice of 
concurrency and make recommendations including the provision of detailed plans using 
critical path planning and work breakdown structures and adequate control points to 
assess completion of previous steps in construction programmes. 
Problems concerning communications are noted by Bartholomew (1987), Lew (1984), 
Nlills, Denis Associates (1988A 1988B), Korman (1991A 1991B), Ellingwood (1987), 
Porteous (1992) and Dea and Gans (1986). Lew (1984) notes the collapse of a cooling 
52 
2 -A Technological Perspective 
tower at Willow Island, West Virginia, USA in 1978, where no guidelines concerning 
erection of the tower were given by the design engineers to the contractors and the site 
foreman was left to make the decision of when to remove formwork. Korman 
(1991B), in reporting the US Court case mentioned above quotes the construction 
manager concerned, in criticising "flawed contract documentation". 
Chadwick (1986), Bartholomew (1987), Robson (1978), Mills, Denis Associates 
(1988A) and Gnaedinger (1987) note the role of cost pressure in error occurrence and 
Nfills, Denis Associates (1988A) and Korman (1991A, 1991B) also point out the role 
of pressure of time. Mills, Denis Associates (1988A) also point out pressure in the 
form of the excess demands of clients. They note that over half of claims brought 
against architects arise from the lack of a proper appointment contract and the 
consequent confusion over client expectations. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Some common themes are revealed in the above literature. Many authors including 
Kletz (1985), Allen (1986), Nowak and Tabsh (1988) and Stewart (1991) point out 
that human error causes predominate in failures in construction. Some suggest that 
errors are inevitable (Kletz (1985), Nowak and Tabsh (1988), or indeed beneficial 
(Petroski 1985). 
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Kaminetzky (1991), Harrison (1993) and Sanchez-Silva et al (1996) are examples of 
authors indicating that errors leading to failure have multiple causes and both Petroski 
(1994B) and Metz (1985) further consider the latent and active components in error 
formation. Petroski in particular notes the value of considering the "management- 
engineering" interface in any failure investigations. Hadipriono (1985), Hadipriono 
and Tahir (1990), Eldukair and Ayyub (199 1), Chadwick (1986) and Ellingwood 
(1987) are all authors who develop the concept of latent and active components of 
error formation in considering "enabling" or "triggering", or "primary" and 
44 secondary" causes. This consideration ties in with the detailed analysis in the 
technologically based literature, where managerial causes including poor division of 
responsibilities and lack of control of changes are regularly indicted. 
In examining the causes given for errors in greater detail, they can be grouped into 
three broad bands. Firstly, factors of lack of technical knowledge, fraud and negligence 
expressed in terms such as "laziness, greed, fraud and pride" (Rollings and Rollings 
1991) are widely cited. To this can be added poor selection of technical personnel and 
lack of adequate self checking. These causes appear to be related to the identity and 
qualities of the individual error perpetrator. 
Secondly, causes related to failures in detailed project management feature large in 
forensic engineering and case study reports. These failures relate to checking, poorly 
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divided responsibilities, change, the use of concurrent working, and poor 
communications (both formal and informal). 
Thirdly, causes related to driving factors of constrained costs and time are noted by 
many authors, with some also noting more general factors related to "cultural" 
(Brown and Xiaochen Yin 1988, Bentley 198 1) or "societal" (Pepperell 1987) 
demands 
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3 
A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE ON ERROR 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The two social sciences most concerned with human error are psychology and 
sociology. Their main interest is related to errors leading to accidents and major 
failure, rather than defects and their work spans a range of industries where, generally, 
the consequences of error have been or could be seen to be extremely severe. 
3.2 PSYCHOLOGY 
A number of authors writing from the perspective of psychology have given particular 
attention to human error. Most notable in the field of cognitive psychology 
(summarised as the study of the thinking process of the mind (Eysenck and Keane 
1990)) are Rasmussen (1983,1987,1990), Reason (1987,19901,1991), Norman 
(1988) and Lourens (1989,1990). Contributions from behaviourism (centred on the 
study of stimuli and responses (Sutherland 199 1)) include Duff et al (1993,1994). 
RASNWSSEN (1983, ET AL 1987,1929) 
Rasmussen's contribution to thinking on human error centres on the synthesis of a 
widely cited typology for error causes at the level of the individual. Rasmussen (1983) 
divides errors into three types: - 
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* Skill based slips and lapses 
* Rule based errors 
9 Knowledge based errors 
Skill based slips and lapses stem from the mechanism of the mind for dealing with 
routine activities. These operate at the automatic level of information processing within 
the mind. 
Rule based errors stem from another mechanism for dealing with routine performance. 
For often repeated actions requiring some cognitive input, there is a tendency for the 
individual to apply rules that have worked in the past. Errors occur in situations of 
informational overload (where a wrong rule may be applied in panic), of the first 
"exception" to a rule which has always worked in the past (the so-called "strong but 
wrong" rule) and of rigidity (where an old rule may be applied inappropriately). 
Knowledge based errors result from faults in the deliberate thinking process required 
for problem solving. Knowledge based thinking is very resource intensive and is 
restricted by such factors as lin-ýitations on the capacity of the mind as a processor (so- 
called workspace lin-ýitations), selectivity (where attention is selectively given to the 
wrong feature), inattention to unseen problems (so-called "out of sight, out of mind" 
phenomena) and overconfidence. 
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Rasmussen (1987) defines error with reference to internal goals as: - 
"an act that is counter productive with respect to the person's (Private or 
subjective) intentions or goals". (page 293) 
This contrasts with definitions from the technological writers, in that it relates errors to 
subjective and not to objective intentions such as the "commonly accepted competent 
professional practice" used as a measure by Stewart (1993). The effect of this more 
restricted definition is that Rasmussen tends not to consider as errors those which meet 
subjective intentions, but still fail to meet objective criteria (in other words, errors 
related to ignorance, fraud and negligence are excluded). 
However, Rasmussen (19879,1990) does give considerable attention to wider 
considerations than the internal workings of the mind. In common with Petroski 
(1994B), Rasmussen (1990) decries highly specific analyses of accidents in 
suggesting: - 
"we should be fighting types of accident causation, not these individual 
tokens". (page 1190) 
He also gives reasons why managerial factors should be considered in error 
occurrence. He considers that an inadequate response from operators depends on 
conditioning taking place during normal work. The conditioning is performed by the 
conscious decisions made by work planners or managers, but, in the context of 
accident analysis, the actions and decisions of managers were easily missed. This 
Leplat and Rasmussen (1987) 
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demands that accident analysis should examine more closely the concept of 
responsibility for error and pursue errors further up the managerial hierarchy. 
Rasmussen (Leplat and Rasmussen, 1987), in common with Stewart and Rosowsky 
(1995), suggests a risk analysis'O approach to hazards, but later (Rasmussen 1990) 
tends to play this down by pointing out that modern workplaces are more dynamic 
than traditional work environments and involve more supervisory tasks, decision 
making, diagnosis and contingency planning - tasks which are not amenable to risk 
analysis techniques. 
REASON (1987,1990,1921) 
Reason (1990) draws on Rasmussen's (1983) typology of errors, but gives much more 
attention to wider causes. He provides a similar definition of error, again restricting 
errors to the unintentional, but he gives some attention to violations (classed as 
unintended, sabotage and partly deliberate). However, his definition still excludes 
deliberate frauds and negligence. 
In common with Kletz (1985) and Nowak and Tabsh (1988), Reason considers that 
errors are inevitable and provides a psychological perspective of the benefits of error, 
complimenting that of Petroski (1985): - 
10 See footnote 25 on page 104 
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"Errors are the inevitable and usually acceptable price human beings have to 
pay for their remarkable ability to cope with very difficult informational tasks 
quickly and ... effectively". (page 148) 
"Human fallibility has its origin in useful and adaptive processes. In particular, 
they arise from a natural tendency to minin-ýise cognitive strain". (page 148) 
He repeats the view that failures are usually the result of multiple errors, and notes the 
converse that error avoidance relies on multiple measures. 
Reason (1990) gives considerable attention to cognitive processes that impede error 
detection at the level of the individual. These include relevance bias, where the 
individual is selective in considering solutions, relying on partial explanations and 
desensitisation to discrepancies between the real "world" and "mental" model in the 
n-ýind. Errors of ornission figure large in surveys noted by Reason and forgetting 
intentions is a common form of lapse. To avoid errors, Reason suggests self- 
monitoring, training (especially training which allowed subjects to make errors) and 
feedback. However, he notes that training has limitations and comments that most 
errors, being an intrinsic part of mental functioning, cannot be eliminated by training. 
Reason(1990) parallels Petrosky and Kletz in making a distinction between latent and 
active errors. Latent errors are those made in the design, management or supervision 
of a system, which, of themselves, do not serve to cause a failure, but which could 
contribute. Drawing on a review of industrial accidents, he considers that latent errors 
are assuming greater significance: - 
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"Close examination of 6 case studies ... 
indicate that latent rather than active 
failures now pose the greatest threat to the safety of high technology systems" 
(page xi) 
Reason later develops this distinction between latent and active errors in proposing a 
"resident pathogen metaphor" - latent defects in a system waiting for a combination of 
circumstances to occur. In making the distinction, Reason (1991) (quoted in Bea 1994 
at page 222) implicates managerial factors and emphasises the influence of more senior 
managers over error occurrence: - 
"The higher a person's position within the decision making structure of the 
organisation, the greater is his or her potential for spawning pathogens". 
Although implicating managerial factors in errors, Reason, unlike the "technological" 
writers, is not specific as to exact cause. He notes the benefits of independent 
checking and suggests that some diagnostic errors are only detectable by others 
(diagnostic errors involve conscious processing analogous to construction design), and 
also criticises self checking in reporting research into nuclear power accidents by 
Woods (1984): - 
"Whereas half the execution failures were detected by the crews themselves, 
none of the diagnostic errors were noticed by the operators who made them. 
They were only discovered by 'fresh eyes'- nearly 1/4of all errors remained 
undetected". (page 164) 
Later, however, Reason (1990), encapsulates in the phrase "the Catch 22 of Human 
Supervisory Control" the dilemma of trying to make human operators into rare event 
checkers, thus closely following points made by Kletz (1985) and Ellingwood (1987), 
that checking for rare or gross error can be ineffective. He also comments on financial 
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pressure as a cause of error and suggests that senior management might put profits 
before safety because they are making choices between profit/safety on the basis that 
profits are relatively certain, objective and favourable, whereas safety investment was 
based on probabilities of outcome (an event may never occur), does not always involve 
objective assessment and incurs cost. 
Reason gives some attention to institutional attitudes, cultural issues and social 
pressures and lists general failings of "incompetent management", "selective blindness", 
"conflicting goals", "reversed logic" and "fallible management structures". He quotes 
from Lord Justice Sheen's report on the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster"-. - 
"the underlying, or cardinal faults lay higher up the company ... 
from top to 
bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness". (page 
193) 
Reason later expands these points to discuss "organisational reasons for errors" and 
quotes Westrum (1988) in listing organisations as being one of three types, 
"pathological" (an error prone organisation), "calculative" (an organisation which 
performs adequately under normal conditions) and "generative" (an organisation which 
acts as a "responsive error neutraliser"). He lists "organisational responses" of "denial", 
"repairing" or "reforming", the last being considered less error prone than the former 
two types. Despite these analyses, Reason gives little specific detail of why certain 
organisations behaved in one or other way in error situations. 
11 Department of Transport (1987) 
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NORMAN (1988 D 
Norman reviews human error, from a psychologist's perspective, in the context of the 
design of artefacts. In common with authors cited above, he notes the inevitability of 
error and suggests measures for avoiding their occurrence, including self-monitoring, 
training (especially training which allows subjects to make errors) and feedback. He 
suggests, without spelling out detail, principles for "transfom-ling difficult tasks into 
simple ones" including: - 
o Making things visible 
* Bridging the gulfs between execution and evaluation 
Getting the mappings right 
Points related to visibility of actions and communications have parallels in comments 
made by technologists including Jones and Nathan (1990). 
Norman cites a number of serious industrial accidents caused by design deficiencies, 
but also notes managerial pressures in the instance of the shooting down of a Korean 
12 Air Lines flight in 1983 
. 
In this incident, the inertial navigation system of the airliner 
could not be changed in flight and the crew would have had to return to the departure 
airport to reset the system. However, a contributing factor to this accident was 
reported to be the threat by the airline's management to "discipline" the next crew that 
returried prematurely to base. 
12 The aircraft strayed into airspace controlled by the USSR 
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LOURENS (1989 1990) 
Lourens (1990) is concerned with traffic accidents and emphasises the importance of 
human error in that context. He notes that: - 
"In most analyses of industrial, air traffic, and road accidents, an error by one 
of the operators emerges as the main, causal factor" - 
(page 1252) 
However, Lourens (1989) also suggests that definitions of human error can be 
flexible: - 
"According to Singleton 13 , almost any accident involving a man-machine 
system can with equal validity be traced to inadequate machine design, 
inadequate training, inadequate instructions, inadequate attention, and 
unfortunate coincidence of relatively rare events, or just human error" (page 
420) 
Lourens (1990) reinforces this "flexibility" in reviewing attribution theory 
14: 
_ 
"An overall tendency has been found to attribute what happens to other people 
to their personal responsibility, but to place much more emphasis on the role of 
external circumstances, when explaining what has happened to oneself'. (page 
1257) 
In common with Petrosky (1985) and Reason (1990), Lourens points out the benefit of 
error and implies a hierarchical view of error occurrence similar to that cited by other 
authors. Regarding road traffic accidents, Lourens (1990) implicates wider "systemic" 
factors thus: - 
"The evidence that a person causes an accident by making an error is often only 
circumstantial and might be given too much weight because of a possible bias 
towards blan-ýing the victim. As a consequence, the "therapy" most often 
13 See Singleton (1973) 
14 See Heider (1958) 
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chosen as a way to reduce the number and effects of human error is to try and 
change the person. Selection, training, and information campaigns are preferred 
to structural adaptations of the system, although the results of the former are 
often poor". (page 1252) 
DUFF ET AL 0 993,1994) 
Duff et al concentrate on improving the safety performance of the individual by 
applying behavioural techniques. Duff et al (1994) reports research evaluating the 
benefits of using goal-setting, feedback and training techniques in improving safety on 
UK construction sites. The results indicated that such techniques were effective, as 
measured using objective assessment of safety performance, but the researchers also 
made comments concerning the role of management in safety: - 
"Although no attempt was made, as an integral part of the research 
programme, to evaluate the effect of management commitment, it became 
apparent that this was probably having a significant impact upon some of the 
results. 
It was evident on some sites that the site management, despite support for the 
project from senior company management, were not fully committed to the 
research activity.... 
While the evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that management 
cornmitment is a factor which should be objectively measured, and its effect 
evaluated, during any extension of this research". (Page 75) 
Duff et al (1994) identify the need for research into organisational safety climate, 
management style and organisational structure in future work. In a postscript to the 
paper, the authors also recognise the role of wider causes of safety problems of poor 
communications (in the form of an inadequate specification) and cost pressure. 
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WRITERS - CONCLUSIONS 
The contribution of authors writing about human error from the perspective of 
psychology is largely centred on the internal thinking process as illustrated in 
Rasmussen's typology of errors as skill, rule or knowledge based and definitions of 
human error (Rasmussen, 1987, Reason 1990) which relate to internal reference points 
rather than externally moderated norms. However, all authors reviewed here consider 
wider factors and Reason (1990), in particular, follows other authors in emphasising 
the active and latent component in error formation. 
Unlike authors from a technological background, however, psychologists do not, by 
and large, indict specific managerial failures. Reason (1990) makes some reference to 
the behaviour of organisations and Norman (1988) refers to the need for visibility in 
communications. They appear to recognise the limitations of cognitive psychology in 
explaining the wider causes of errors, but are unable to propose specific corrective 
measures. In contrast, the direct citing of factors such as the poor division of 
responsibilities, uncontrolled changes and uncontrolled concurrent working, by the 
technologists is refreshingly specific. Duff et al (1994) are an exception, in that, 
although working from a behavioural perspective, more detailed recognition of the role 
of management is apparent. This probably stems from the fact that the authors are 
based in a school of technology and include technologists. 
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Paradoxically, the emphasis on managerial measures to avoid errors may introduce 
another branch of psychology, that related to leadership, motivation and control in the 
workplace and generally classed as social psychology. That branch makes little direct 
reference to human error, but may be more influential in improved error performance. 
3.3 SOCIOLOGY 
The literature related to human error written from a sociological perspective is mainly 
concerned with the sociology of disaster, major accident or major economic failing. 
The more notable in the field include Turner (1978,1992), Perrow (1984), Sagan 
(1993), Collingridge (1992) and Vaughan (1990). A contrasting perspective is 
provided by writers from the "High Reliability Organisation" school, including Roberts 
(1993), Rochlin (1993) and Schulman (1993). These write, in the main, not from a 
disaster perspective, but from the perspective of organisations which successfully avoid 
errors occurring. Wilson (1989) considers specifically the accident record of the 
construction industry from a sociological perspective. 
TURNER (1978.1992 
Turner's main contribution to the literature on human error is in his close examination 
of the social context of three major disasters, the Aberfan coal tip slip of 1966, the 
Hixon level crossing accident of 1968 and the Summerland fire of 1973 (Turner 1978). 
He acknowledges that errors can have multiple causes and notes generally that 
disasters are caused by social and administrative as well as technical factors) but 
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expands on this to give specific failings. He cites comments of the Tribunal 
investigating the Aberfan disaster'5 concerning the culture of the coal industry as 
including: - 
"a pervasive institutional set of attitudes., beliefs and perceptions which led to a 
collective neglect of the problems of safety relating to tips by almost everyone 
concerned". (page 54) 
The components of this collective neglect he lists as including: - 
eA set of industrial beliefs which gave little consideration to tips. 
e Few staff appointed to deal with safety in tips. 
* Organisational. practices oriented away from problems of tips towards those 
of mines. 
e Literature on tip safety was neglected or not given wide circulation. 
Consequently- 
"when decisions about the siting of new tips were being made, little or no 
trouble was taken over this problem". (page 55) 
Referring to the I-Exon level crossing disaster 16 , Turner notes: - 
"the central and most distinctive contributing feature leading up to the disaster 
was a failure on the part of a large number of individuals in British Rail 
departments, in the management of road hauliers concerned and in the Ministry 
of Transport to bring together creatively the information which they all had, or 
had access to in a way which would have made clear the danger of the new 
crossings to a long, slow moving vehicle which was already part of the way 
15 I-IMSO (1966) 
16 Where a large, slow moving lorry carrying a transformer became stuck on a level crossing in the path of 
an express train (See HMSO 1968). 
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across an automatic half-barrier crossing when it began to close" - this was a 
"failure in creative problem solving". (page 55) 
According to Turner, Summerland was notable for a gap in the continuity of the 
project between the design and construction of the shell under one design team, and 
the design and furnishing of the building by the lessees, employing a second design 
team. Factors considered by the commission of enquiry 17 included the use of informal 
contacts and it concluded that the underlying factors were: - 
"many human errors and failings, and it was the accumulation of these, too 
much reliance on an "old boy" network and some very ill-defined and poor 
communications which led to the disaster" (page 57) 
In summarising the similarities between the Aberfan, ffixon and Summerland disasters, 
Turner indicates some reasons for organisational failings. He lists these as including: - 
RiOdities in perception and beliefs in manisational settino 
For example the National Coal Board view of coal tips as external to the coal mining 
business and the reference to fire escape stairs at Summerland as "service stairs". 
Quotes from the Aberfan tribunal" illustrates the problem: - 
"Rubbish tips are a necessary and inevitable adjunct to a coal mine, even as a 
dustbin is to a house, but it is plain that n-ýiners devote certainly no more 
attention to rubbish tips than householders do to dustbins". (page 58) 
"We found that many witnesses, not excluding those who were intelligent and 
anxious to assist us, had been oblivious of what lay before their eyes. It did not 
enter their consciousness. They were like moles being asked about the habits of 
birds". (page 58) 
17 Isle of Man: Govemment Office (1974) 
"' IHMSO (1966) 
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Turner comments: - 
"Thus there is a possibility of a vicious, self-reinforcing circle growing up 
where it is generally believed that an area is not important or problematic. The 
staff employed, therefore, are not specialists in this area, and are not employed 
to look at it, so that the presence of new staff serves to reinforce the beliefs 
which placed the new staff there". (page 58) 
The decoy problem 
This organisational problem consists of issues, other than the one causing a failure, 
deflecting institutional attention away from an issue later to cause a disaster. The 
example given by Turner is the possibility that the Summerland complex may not have 
been seen by the regulating authorities as either a conventional large building or as a 
conventional theatre and the appropriate regulations were not, therefore, applied. 
Turner suggests an "initial response" to the decoy phenomenon as to: - 
"consider whether there may not be means by which organisations can scan the 
problems which they do in fact deal with, and then try and look behind them to 
see if they are obscuring potentially dangerous ill structured problems". (page 
60) 
Organisational exclusivity - disregard of non-members 
This problem is seen by Turner as the "organisational view" that it only need take 
account of matters arising from within the organisation. Turner cites, as an example of 
the problem, the "fobbing off' of the Aberfan Council's anxieties about coal tips by the 
NCB with "ambiguous and misleading statements such as'we are constantly checking 
these tips"' 
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Remoteness Of tOID management 
Again referring to the Aberfan disaster, Turner notes: - 
"The top management of the NCB had an idealistic view of what should have 
happened with regard to tip safety and tip siting, but they took no action to 
check on it, or to check that men of the right training were available". (page 
63) 
Turner gives some source "internal" reasons for organisational errors based on the 
concept of bounded rationality as propounded by Simon (1957). The concept proposes 
that the extent of searching for solutions to managerial problems is "bounded" by the 
impossibility of reaching an optimum solution. This in turn means that managers 
"satisfice" in making choices (that is they choose the first available satisfactory 
solution). Satisficing in itself can, thence, lead to error'9. He further draws on work by 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) in pointing out conflicting organisational needs for 
integration and diversity. In resolving these conflicting needs, a hierarchy of authority 
can develop, which in turn fosters a culturally determined organisational outlook, 
practice and knowledge. He summarises this as follows: - 
"groups of decision makers are trying to behave rationally, judging their 
success by means of criteria which are approved within their organisation". 
(page 167) 
Unfortunately this behaviour n-ýight not correspond with that necessary for the effective 
avoidance of certain errors. 
19 The concept of satisficing is taken up by Reason J (1987)in "Collective planning and its failures" in 
Rasmussen et al (1987) 
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Turner further lists managerial requirements in avoiding disaster under a general 
heading of a "creative response". This response includes: - 
o Awareness 
e Opportunities for managers to examine problems 
* Measures to deal with organisational bias and the decoy phenomenon 
* Specific consideration of "strangers" to the organisation (e. g. the public 
using a site, but not part of the close site organisation). 
In a later work (Turner 1992) expounds four general characteristics of a good safety 
culture: - 
9A caring organisational response to the consequences of actions/policies. 
Commitment to this response at all levels, especially senior. 
e Feedback of incidents to practitioners. 
e Rules and norms for handling safety problems, supported in a flexible, non- 
purutive manner. 
Turner (1978) gives specific attention to communications problems: - 
"In situations of'disjunct information', the simple remedy of'better 
communication' will not work unless resources are increased so that the 
problem is no longer ill-structured, or unless the problem defined is reduced to 
a size which can be adequately handled by the existing information net". (page 
61) 
He follows up by suggesting several reasons for communications failures including: - 
o Non-receipt of information 
e Distortion of information 
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10 Ambiguity of information 
* Overwhelming volume of information causing: - 
Overlooking important details 
Inadvertent disregard of relevant information 
e Lack of an overview concerning communications 
Turner further adds that a sub-class of disaster can arise because of the barriers to 
certain kinds of communication erected by social habit and routine intercourse. He 
suggests that patterns of communications are structured by: - 
e Authority and division of labour 
9 Territorial considerations 
9 Formation of cliques 
Finally, Turner (1992), in common with Rasmussen (1990) criticises the use of 
structured quantified risk analyses in avoiding errors and suggests: - 
it .... most major systems failures arise as a result of 
ill-structured combinations 
of factors, whose dimensions become apparent only with hindsight (and) it is 
clear that such events cannot be well captured by means of highly exact 
anticipatory risk assessments". (page 190) 
PERROW (1984) 
Charles Perrow proposes a "theory of systems, of their potential for failure and 
recovery from failure" in his highly readable and widely cited monograph "Normal 
Accidents". He "focuses on the properties of systems themselves, rather than on the 
errors that owners, designers and operators make in running them" and in so doing 
brings a sharply contrasting perspective to that provided by (in particular) by the 
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"technological" authors cited above. For example both Perrow and Ross (1984) report 
on the failure of the Vaiont Dam, Italy, on 9 October 1963. However, the latter 
concentrates on the technical reasons for failure, with passing reference to the 
prosecution and conviction of supervising engineers and managers, whilst the former 
ignores technical factors and reports the Vaiont technical board findings: - 
"the disaster was the direct result of bureaucratic inefficiency, muddling, 
withholding of alarming information, lack ofjudgement and evaluation and lack 
of serious individual and collective consultation". (page 238) 
Perrow considers that "something more basic and important than (for example 
operator error) contributes to the failure of systems" He is scathing concerning the 
concept of "forced error" namely an error induced by the perpetrator him or herself In 
reporting a mining accident where an operator was dragged into a conveyor belt whilst 
trying to keep the area below it clean he suggests that: - 
"if the operator did not keep the idler area clean, one strongly suspects he 
would be forced to look for another job" (page 247 - my emphasis) 
Further related to mining accidents Perrow comments: - 
"As I have tried to indicate,... experience and training are perhaps less relevant 
than job pressures, careless management, and supervision, and above all, the 
inherent dangers of these enterprises". (page 249) 
The central thesis of Perrow's book is the propounding of "normal accident theory". 
He defines a normal accident as: - 
"the interaction of multiple failures that are not in direct operational sequence" 
(page 23) 
The elements of a normal accident are: - 
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*A large number of components (parts, procedures, operators) 
* Two or more failures among interacting components. 
9 Tight coupling, comprising 
Very fast processes. 
Failed parts which cannot be isolated 
No alternative method of maintaining production 
Perrow attributes these characteristics (summarised as a combination of interactive 
complexi1y and tight coupling) to a number of high risk industries including the nuclear 
industry, aircraft, air traffic control and shipping. Major accidents are considered 
inherent in these industries as compared with more loosely coupled, linear industries. 
Perrow surnmarises the difference between the types of industry thus: - 
"Loosely coupled systems are said to have 'equifinality' - many ways to skin 
the cat; tightly coupled ones have 'unifinality"' (page 94)20. 
Perrow compares air traffic control with shipping (both of which he considers to be 
tightly coupled and complex industries) and makes a distinction between their relative 
safety records. The good record of air traffic control he attributes to the high status 
and influence of victims, highly visible nature of accidents and the independent overall 
control of navigation by controllers. In contrast, shipping accidents involve low status 
anonymous victims and lack of independent control. In all industries Perrow reports 
that: - 
(. ( we found rampant attribution of operator error to the neglect of errors by the 
Great Designers and the Centralised Managers" (page 35 1) 
20 Terms drawn from General Systems Theory (Bertalanfly, 197 1) - see Chapter 4 
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He concludes by reiterating that the point of the book: - 
"is to see these human constructions as systems, not as collections of 
individuals or representatives of ideologies..... They are systems that elites have 
constructed, and thus can be changed or abandoned". (page 35 1) 
Unfortunately, Perrow, in acting as a detached observer, gives little indication of how 
or in what direction any changes should be. 
THE HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATION WRITERS 
The writings of these authors stem from research work conducted from 1984 by a 
group of researchers at the University of California at Berkeley (Marone and 
Woodhouse 1986, La Porte and Consolini 1991, Roberts 1989 and Rochlin et al 
1987), into the operation of what they called I-Egh Reliability Organisations. The thrust 
of their work is based on the premise that it is more productive in discovering the 
reasons for failure to study organisations, which although involved in high risk 
enterprises, manage to maintain a good record of error-free performance. From their 
observations,, these researchers have extracted high reliability strategies, summarised 
as: - 
e The use of duplication (or redundancy) 
e Decentralisation of decision making 
*A culture of reliability (using socialisation and training) 
e Continuous operations and training (not sinking into "dangerous 
complacency") 
*A capacity to learn and a belief in the effectiveness of learning 
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9 Political elites and leaders who place a high priority on safety and reliability 
The philosophy of the group and direction of their findings is summarised in a 
collection of writings edited by Karlene Roberts (1993). She acknowledges Perrow 
(1984), Turner (1978) and Vaughan (1990) (reviewed below) and the reported 
research is expressed to be complimentary to their analyses of failure. 
Roberts outlines the HRO studies of the US Federal Aviation Authority Air Traffic 
ControL the Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Plant at Diablo Canyon, 
California USA and the US Navy's nuclear powered aircraft carriers. Rochlin (1993) 
summarises the definition and characteristics of HROs arising from the studies. HROs 
are involved with complex technology, require managed reliability and safety in order 
to avoid error and are supervising the technology involved. The distinguishing 
characteristics of HROs are that they- 
* Search continually to improve operations 
* Set ambitious goals, without risking errors 
9 They do not rest even in quiet periods. 
Rochlin emphasises the focus of the HRO research as being on the 
"static and dynamic characteristics of organisations that have not just 'avoided' 
failure through good fortune or the vagaries of probability, but actively who 
have managed to control and reduce the risks of technological operations 
whose inherent hazards make them prone to join the list of classical failures. In 
other words, these organisations have not just failed to fail, they have actively 
managed to avoid failures in an environment rich with the potential for error" 
(page 15) 
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Rochlin adds, as a distinguishing point from the generally detached observational view 
of Perrow (1984): - 
tc we note only that organisations cannot reduce risk by reducing external 
demands for services. Nor can they act to modify the socio-political 
environment in which they are situated. Therefore, their only choice is to seek 
to manage risk within the external framework in which both risk and demand 
are defined". (page 18) 
"The underlying belief, and the foundation of organisational reliability, is that 
only through its own performance and behaviour can the organisation control 
the (probability) coefficients; that it can continue to operate only if both the 
probabilities and, to some extent, the risks themselves are effectively managed 
and controlled through its own training, skills, and error detection and 
correction mechanisms. The alternative is probably the external imposition of 
intrusive regulation or increasingly stringent operational requirements, both of 
which are seen by our organisations as having a decidedly negative impact on 
safety". (Page 19) 
Rochlin lists eleven observed characteristics of HROs: - 
I Errors are recognised as being omnipresent and eternal and vigilance the price 
of success 
Sources of error are recognised as dynamic and thus monitoring mechanisms 
must be continually renewed/reinvigorated 
3 The operating envirom-nent is considered a constant source of threat 
No rationalising of the problem solving process into one best approach is 
possible or used. 
Multiple simultaneous informal organisational structures exist 
6 Anticipatory modes of dealing with problems are used. 
7 Support is provided for organisational units searching for latent errors. 
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8 An unwillingness exists to "test the boundaries of reliability" (i. e. HROs do not 
use "trial and error" learning) 
There are no "stopping rules" (i. e. rules limiting the extent of searching) in the 
search for self improvement 
10 A tradition of adherence with formal rules (expressed as "going by the booV) 
11 Even when full analysis of errors is available, the organisation still perceives the 
need to search for error. 
Douglas Creed et al (1993), in reviewing the HRO research methodology of analysing 
4C reliability" returns to Perrow (1994). The object of reliability is to avert the (normal 
accidents' that Perrow sees as inevitable due to the interactional complexity and tight 
coupling inherent in hazardous technologies. They assert that HRO researchers 
examine effectiveness as the goal rather than "ineffectiveness as the non goal" (p66) 
and focus on the cultural aspects of HROs. These are based, in the final analysis on 
individual adherence and inculcation of shared values coupled with a harsh and 
unforgiving punishment structure (which includes injury and death). 
IFErschhom (1993) in reporting a case study of a nuclear reactor, stresses the role of 
leadership and contrasts the concept of hierarchy with that of bureaucracy. The latter 
he considers dysfunctional and caused by organisational leaders not taking the risks of 
the enterprise. I-Ershorn indicts punishment as a cultural force driving error and the use 
of "checks and balances". where one part of an organisation checks another, as a 
procedure based on a false analogy with the operation of Government (where, for 
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example, the Judiciary checks the Executive). In High Reliability Organisations checks 
and balances should not be necessary - "a good baseball team does not have checks 
and balances" (page 143). He considers checking inverts authority by emphasising 
4C rules rather than roles", but without a system for backing up action where gaps in the 
rules are found. He sets out a four part model of effective organisation for high risk 
settings which includes: - 
IA hierarchical structure 
Delegation which is broad and deep 
Two classes of procedures 
a) Grounding procedures giving broad guidelines, which applies to a 
wide range of circumstances and is strictly applied. 
b) Detailed procedures where employees are free to vary precise steps 
as long as they fulfil intentions. 
Procedures under class (a) are analogous to a National Constitution and (b) 
analogous to the Common Law. 
Emergency procedures to integrate (a) and (b) 
In advocating a hierarchical form of structure, Hirschhorn makes the point that the 
hierarchical form derives from the military and the contingencies of battle. He 
considers that it remains a powerful social intervention for managing risk. 
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Weick (1993) analyses the Tenerife air disaster of 1978 and, in quoting La Porte and 
Consolini (1991) notes the importance of talk and inter-crew communications and the 
cultivation of inter-personal skills in the avoidance of future similar accidents. Weick 
also acknowledges and uses Normal Accidents Theory (Perrow 1984) but actively sets 
out methods (by training and forewarning of conditions of vulnerability) to avoid 
circumstances leading to the tight coupling and complexity. He notes-- 
"As we have suggested, any system, no matter how loose and linear it may 
seem, can become tighter and more complex when it is subjected to overload, 
n-ýisperception, regression and individual response" (page 191) 
SAGAN (1993) 
Sagan takes Normal Accidents Theory and contrasts it with BRO Theory in an analysis 
of nuclear weapons accidents in the USA from the end of World War Two up to the 
present. 
He notes that errors leading to major nuclear incidents had not occurred, but that this 
appears to be by chance rather than design. He suggests that events related to nuclear 
weapons reveal two disturbing characteristics, firstly, that several potentially 
catastrophic accidents occurred and were not controlled in the way that HRO theory 
would suggest and, secondly, that accidents were covered up and n-ýis-reported in such 
a way as to "turn the experience of failure into the memory of success' 
Sagan concludes by supporting Normal Accidents Theory. He suggest limitations of 
the HRO approach by quoting March (198 1): - 
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44as long as we assume that organisations have goals and those goals have some 
classical properties of stability, precision and consistency, we can treat an 
organisation as some kind of rational actor. But organisation do not have 
simple, consistent preference functions. They exhibit internal conflict over 
preferences. Once such conflict is noted, it is natural to shift from a metaphor 
of problem solving to a more political vision". (page 46) 
Sagan found organisational errors behind "human error" (meaning error related to the 
workface operative) and widespread n-ýis-attribution of blame to operators. This 
attribution error was, itself, the cause of a lack of organisational leaming: - 
"The common tendency to assign blame for accidents on operator errors, and 
thereby protect the interests of those who designed the system and the leaders 
of the organisation was also found to increase the likelihood of repeated 
mistakes" (page 246) 
These observations echo those of Perrow and, from different perspectives, those of 
Reason (1990), Petroski (1985) and Metz (1985). The problem with the findings 
appears to be that, in common with Perrow, Sagan is unable to propose ways of 
handling failures in risky systems. 
COLLINGREDGE (1992) 
Collingridge examines six major failures, the space shuttle programme (not the 
Challenger disaster), nuclear power, North Sea oil, Videotex, large irrigation schemes 
in the developing world and high-rise system building in the UK. None of these failures 
was primarily related to loss of life, but rather involved economic or environmental 
considerations. He attributes the causes of these failures to inflexible technologies and 
centralised planning, interdependency and vested interest in a project's continuance. 
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These lead to the perpetuation or hiding of n-ýistakes, eventually concluding with costly 
failures. With respect to high rise system building he notes: - 
"It is hardly newsworthy when some group of businessmen and bureaucrats 
make mistaken investment decisions because of over-confidence in the 
technology that it involves. Optimism is likely to be with us for some time to 
come. What is startling is not that mistakes were made, but that perfectly 
ordinary errors turned out to have extraordinarily high costs, which must be 
borne for decades to come by people who had no involvement in these 
decisions". (page 137) 
In avoiding large institutionalised blunders, Collingridge proposes that projects, 
systems and technologies should be such that they allow trial and error learning and 
incremental improvement. On the use and value of such learning he notes that: - 
* Errors should be kept to a minor nature. He notes that "effective trial and 
error can only happen when the errors which are bound to occur impose a 
modest degree of pain and suffering" (page 5). 
e Not too much should be changed at once, allowing "incremental learning" 
e Trial and error learning allows lessons to be learned quickly. 
e Some mistakes should be allowed to occur as they are inconsequential. 
Trial and error learning favours technologies with high operating and low capital costs 
with (using Perrow's terminology) loose coupling and a less dedicated infrastructure. 
The problems that Collingridge notes with his case studies of failures is that of 
inflexible technology leading to centralised choices, which in turn lead to centralised 
planning, interdependency, vested interests in a project's continuance, the perpetuation 
and hiding of mistakes and eventually costly failure. 
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He cites the economic failure of the space shuttle programme as being caused by: - 
9 Inflexibility with long lead times, capital intensive technology, very large 
unit size and a dependent infrastructure. 
9 Centralised choices with central public funding, a "monopoly of experience" 
and a lack of an independent view. 
9A lack of incremental development. 
Overall, he suggests that chosen technologies and methods of development can lead to 
large errors: - 
"The case studies show the astonishing blindness to error that organisations can 
show when their structure frees them from one of the normal embarrassments 
of organisational life, confessing that things did not work as well as they should 
have and calling for changes of some sort to be made". (page 157) 
In common with Perrow and Sagan, Collingridge does not specify the means by which 
some error intolerant technologies can be changed to allow the trial and error learning 
proposed. In the case of high-rise building and irrigation schemes, alternatives may be 
obvious in the form of traditional low-rise construction and smaller irrigation schemes 
based on alternative or intermediate technology. In the case of the space shuttle or 
North Sea oil exploration, alternatives are less obvious. Indeed, this point is covered by 
the HRO writers, who contend (Roberts 1993) that trial and error organisational 
structures are totally inappropriate for high risk enterprises. 
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VAUQHAN Ll 99oq 
Vaughan (1990) extensively reviews the documentation related to the space shuttle 
"Challenger" disaster. She notes that the accident resulted from failure of technical 
components, of the organisation responsible for its production and use and the 
regulatory organisations designed to oversee the entire operation. She follows several 
authors reviewed above in commenting that the accident could not be explained by the 
failure of the technical system alone, but, apart from some comments concerning poor 
communications, lack of visibility of communications and pressures of time and cost, 
she takes a wide organisational view of the disaster. 
Her central thesis is that the autonomy of regulators overseeing the development of 
Challenger, coupled with the symbiotic interdependence of regulator and regulated, 
predisposed the mission to failure. This thesis, whilst interesting, can be criticised in 
two ways. Firstly, Vaughan presents no direct evidence that the failure of the critical 
component causing the accident was caused by regulatory (rather than internal) 
omissions. This she adn-ýits in noting that-- 
" 
.... no 
direct evidence exists that allows us to assert that these organizational 
patterns caused the accident" (page 254) 
Secondly, she also is forced to admit the limitations of the "sociological" approach in 
noting: - 
"... both preventative strategies and post-accident attempts to correct the 
organizational contribution to technical system accidents are handicapped by 
out lack of skill at converting research findings into diagnostic 
recommendations for organizations" (page 255) 
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WILSQNfjl989) 
Wilson draws on work by contingency theorists including Burns and Stalker (1961) 
and Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) who distinguish mechanistic from organic 
organisations. In suggesting that the construction industry consists largely of organic 
types of organisation, Wilson notes that most safety legislation is designed for more 
mechanistic types working in a "steady state". The legislation assumes, amongst other 
conditions, that working environments are controllable, that organisations can maintain 
relatively stable work forces, that the physical work place consists of a permanent 
factory or other facility and that stability of production allows the development of rules 
and procedures to minimise the scope for human error. 
In arguing that these conditions do not exist in the organic construction organisations, 
Wilson iternises and categorises some factors that distinguish construction project 
work from process industries. Broad categories of environmental, organisational and 
individual factors are identified. Environmental factors include external influences such 
as the weather, the working environment and political influences. In construction 
projects, these influences are strong. Construction work takes place outside, using 
temporary structures and is characterised by improvisation. The construction industry 
is also susceptible to government economic manipulation and thus cannot easily predict 
future work or resources needed. 
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Wilson includes as organisational factors, project management functions of 
specialisation and control of projects, echoing problems (such as poor division of 
responsibilities and control of change) identified by technological writers. In contrast 
to more mechanistic organisations, construction projects are characterised by ad-hoc 
specialisation by sub-contracting, and control of projects (including the organisation, 
co-ordination, planning and supervision of quality) requiring a greater degree of 
delegation to site management and sub-contractors. 
Individual factors particular to construction work are iten-ýised as including 
discretionaU powe , experience and risk takin . 
Construction work is distinguished by 
a work force exercising a high degree of individual discretion, relying on experience 
rather than conscious education or training and being required and prepared to take 
higher risks. 
Wilson concludes by emphasising training and education of both operatives and 
managers in safety and accident prevention. He places particular stress on the key role 
in construction of the site manager and consequently the importance of the formal 
training of this individual. However, whilst stressing that each site manager should 
undergo a formal course of training in safety, health and welfare, Wilson is less specific 
concerning what the manager should study within that course. He does not identify 
whether training should emphasise the mechanics of accident prevention as such or 
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whether it should address some of the underlying causes of error centred on inadequate 
project management that Wilson had identified earlier. 
OTHER AUTHORS 
Other authors reviewed in this section include Clarke and Short (1993, Dombrowski 
(199 1), Quintanilla (1987), Roberts et. al (1980) and fEggin and Jessop (1965). 
Clarke and Short (1993) follow Sagan in commenting on ostensible "FEgh Reliability 
Organisations", noting that they have very clear, well agreed upon operational goals 
and enjoy abundant resources. They suggest that the method of automation used on 
the USS Vincennes (ostensibly an HRO) had an affect on the accidental destruction of 
a civilian airliner 
21: 
_ 
if 
..... cruisers 
like the Vincennes are automated in ways that thwart the human 
networks that produce reliability" (page 391) 
They also note in case studies of the Challenger crash and the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
the factors of "locked organisational behaviour", "entrenched organisation", "vested 
interests" and "multiple goals" causing inadequate responses and inflexibility. 
Dombrowski (1991) espouses the view that errors stem from failures in personal 
judgement as opposed to failures in communications, procedures etc. However, it is 
not clear whether the failures in judgement are managerial or operational. Quintanilla 
(1987) proposes a hierarchical view of human error which follows authors from 
psychology and technology. However, he further criticises the 
21 The USS Vincennes shot down an Iran Air aircraft (flight 655) during the Iran - Iraq war 
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c4psychological/engineering perspective" as engaging in "individualistic myopia". He 
later indicts the dynamics of change in quoting the view of Johnson (1980) that 
change is the "mother of trouble". 
Roberts et al (1980) in a study of pilot error note the importance of error in invention 
and diffusion of knowledge, but also give attention to avoiding error by clearly defining 
responsibilities (giving an example of reduced accidents subsequent to the appointment 
of a squadron air safety officer covering air, industrial, driving and general accidents). 
They also consider the role of culture in the commission of pilot errors noting possible 
cultural biases that could cause errors. They report, firstly, that some mistakes made by 
pilots are considered serious by their peers even though they are minor in themselves. 
These mistakes are termed "diagnostic" because they indicate that a pilot who makes 
such errors is also capable of erring in much more serious contexts. Conversely they 
noted that some errors are considered by pilots as minor, but that independent iudges 
consider them to be "high in danger" and they conclude: - 
"If the danger estimate is correct .... there 
is a contradiction. There may be 
dangerous errors which have an element of positive affect and may not be 
judged too harshly by the system. These errors may be congruent with other 
values held in the larger system ...... 
(page 19) 
In other words, there may be a culturally biased attitude towards certain errors. 
Finally, I-Eggin and Jessop (1965) in a study of communications in the building industry 
distinguish formal and informal communications and suggest that the main factor lying 
behind communications difficulties was the nature of relationships between the 
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communicators. They identified a mismatch between the technical interdependence of 
industry resources and the organisational independence of those who control them. 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL WRITERS - CONCLUSIONS 
In contrast to authors from a psychological or technological perspective, Turner 
(1978), Perrow (1984), Sagan (1993), Collingridge (1992) and Vaughan (1990) 
examine error in the context of organisations as a whole. Insights revealed in their 
writings include the realisation that organisations are in themselves error-prone, that 
operations within the organisation rarely go according to plan and that conflict 
between individuals or sets of individuals in the workplace is the norm and often 
politically motivated. 
Perrow, Sagan, Collingridge and Vaughan, however, whilst providing perceptive 
insights are relatively devoid of suggestions for improving the performance of 
organisations carrying out complex and dangerous activities. Perrow offers the "take it 
or leave it" option of not engaging in certain activities, whilst Sagan deplores accidents 
in nuclear weapons systems without suggesting alternatives to the nuclear deterrent 
theory of the 1950s and later. Vaughan frankly adn-fts that translation from theory to 
practice is problematical. IFEgh Reliability Theory, though considered naive and 
deficient by these writers, is more helpful because it suggests improvements. it may be 
better not to engage in nuclear armament, nuclear power generation and space travel, 
but air transportation, shipping and large scale construction is necessary. if this 
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contention is accepted, then Turner, the High Reliability Organisation writers, Roberts 
et al (1980) and IFEggin and Jessop (1965) are more helpful. Turner, in particular, gives 
detailed indications of why three disasters took place and offers concrete proposals for 
improvement. These boil down to a caring and participative managerial System 
oriented towards both the operations of the organisation and other relevant activities. 
Roberts et al (1980) observation of the influence of cultural orientation as a factor 
influencing error outcomes is interesting in that it gives reasons for some serious 
mistakes by operators, not related to methods and systems, but to perceptions of a 
much wider society. 
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4 
A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON ERROR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This perspective consists of a fairly heterogeneous grouping of literature with the 
common theme that they all relate in some way to managerial theories. Five sub- 
themes are identified as follows: - 
* Total quality management and quality assurance, including construction 
quality assurance 
o Reliability engineering and systems safety. 
e Interdisciplinary reports and collected works 
* Project management literature 
9 Systems theory 
4.2 TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
A large literature exists on total quality management and quality assurance, which has 
implications relating to error, and this review covers indicative works. Authors 
reviewed from the general quality management literature include Oakland (1993), Bell 
et al (1994) and Stebbing (1993) and from a construction background several 
publications of the Construction Industry Research and Information Association 
(1988) Barrett (1992,1994) and the ICE (1989). 
92 
4-A Management Perspective 
TBE GENIERALý_ýýýýýýýýýý 
Literature from total quality management contains close parallels with some authors 
reviewed previously. For example Oakland (1993) and Bell et al (1994) both note that 
faults are not caused solely by the workforce and they emphasise the responsibility of 
management for quality. Bell et al quote Den-ýing (1986): - 
"85% of quality problems are due to faults in the system rather than faults in 
the employee" (page 94) 
They add: - 
"Thus blaming workers is de-emphasised, and responsibility for product or 
service quality is placed largely in the hands of management" (page 94) 
The links between Turner (1978) and Oakland (1993) are particularly notable. Oakland 
stresses: - 
I Participation. 
"The emphasis throughout all stages of .... TQM implementation should be on the participation of all employees, especially those who will be directly affected 
by changes" (page 98) 
"Recognition and the chance to participate are the only effective incentives 
(towards the implementation of TQM)" (page 437) 
Orientation to outsiders,. 
"The House of Quality" (Total quality management system) is "a'system' for 
designing a product or service, based on customer demands with the 
participation of members of all functions of the supplier organisation" (page 
45). 
Consensus based effective leadership. 
"Total quality management starts at the top". This includes "Visible 
management commitment" (page 41) 
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"Quality function deployment is consensus based and therefore promotes 
teamwork, creates communications and leads to a global view of the 
development process" (page 45) 
4 Fostering positive attitudes 
"Total quality management is concerned chiefly with changing attitudes and 
skills so that the culture of the organisation becomes one of preventing failure - doing the right things, right first time, everytime" (page 3 1) 
Unlike Turner,, however, Oakland does also stress individually based measures. - 
"Total quality management is concerned with moving the focus of control from 
outside the individual to within" (page 3 1) 
Terms such as personal commitment, personal development, acceptance, 
understanding and involvement are widely used. Personal responsibility for actions and 
self inspection are emphasised. 
Other features of the TQM approach include advocating the careful division of 
responsibilities between parties and a systematic use of control and correction 
measures. Bell et al (1994), in particular, make several comments relating to detailed 
management, which strongly echo technological writers. They stress clear definition of 
responsibilities, the control of project changes and the control of concurrency (by using 
'phase exit reviews' and 'concurrent engineering 22) . Drawing on work by Shingo 
(1986), Oakland also notes the value of source inspections, short feedback cycles and 
fail safe systems. Thus, TQM, whilst it emphasises cultural and social aspects, includes 
" Concurrent engineering is a body of knowledge devoted to managing the simultaneous 
development of several project stages. The Institute of Concurrent Engineering publishes a journal 
and a synopsis of the discipline can be found in Prasad (1993) 
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techniques and systems related to measures recognised by authors from other 
perspe ives. 
Oakland, in common with many other authors recognises the limitations of trying to 
change personal characteristics, but also suggests that the "culture" of an organisation 
is dependent on, rather than a determinant of, managerial factors: - 
"Many (TQM) change programmes do not work because they begin trying to 
change the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of individuals. The theory is that 
changes in these areas will lead to changes in behaviour throughout the 
organisation... " 
"What is required, however, is virtually the opposite process, based on the 
recognition that people's behaviour is determined largely by the roles they have 
to take up. If we create for them new responsibilities, team roles and a process 
driven environment, a new situation will develop, one that will force their 
attention and work on the process. This will change the culture" (page 408) 
Oakland (1993), Stebbing (1993) and Bell et al (1994) support checking in order to 
reduce quality problems, but distinguish checking of the output for defects and 
checking of the quality management syste (in the form of quality audits, surveys, 
inspections and sampling). Oakland is scathing about checking as traditionally applied 
in British industry and notes: - 
"(The) ritual (argument between production and quality control) is associated 
with trying to answer the question, "Have we done the job correctly"... There is 
still a belief in some quarters that to achieve quality we must check, test, 
inspect or measure - the ritual pouring on of quality at the end of the process" 
(page 14) 
Instead, Oakland advocated the use of (inter alia) self inspection, very short feedback 
control cycles, good communications and extensive training. The prevalent TQM view 
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expressed by Oakland appears to be based on improved self correction rooted in co- 
operative and participative performance23. 
Oakland comments on the conflict between cost and performance by suggesting that a 
link exists between a low defect rate and improved economic performance: - 
"Time and money spent on quality-related activities are not limitations on 
profitability; they make significant contributions towards greater efficiency and 
enhanced profits" (page 24) 
This suggestion, repeated later in major interdisciplinary reports (ACSNI 1993, Bea 
1994), indicates that the relationship between cost and performance may not be direct, 
but influenced by the intervening variable of managerial performance (in this case 
related to Total Quality Management). 
THE QUALITY MANAGEMENT LITERATURE RELATED TO 
CONSTRUCTION 
There is a large literature concerning quality management in construction, mainly 
concerned with the implementation of quality management systems rather than 
examining the overall philosophy of total quality management. It concentrates on and 
stresses the importance of proper procedures, organisational charts, auditing, the 
keeping of records, and the production of manuals and detailed checklists (Duncan 
23 A view which is echoed by Morris (1994) in supporting the Japanese total quality management 
principles. The latter, he reports, are based on teamwork, catching errors before they are passed down 
the production line, full involvement of suppliers in achieving improvements and a product design 
process that integrates downstream production expertise into product design. 
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1989, Johnson 1989, Oliver 1990 1992, Hughes and Williams 1991). The role of 
legislation and third party certification is also stressed by many (Barrett 1994, Ashford 
1989). 
The importance placed in the general quality management literature on participation 
and co-operation is not reflected in construction industry writings. Certainly, the text 
of many publications mentions participation (Oliver 1992, Duncan et al 1990), 
attitudes (Johnson 1989), leadership and involvement (Chetwood 1989). However, the 
flavour of texts following exhortations to lead and participate, is one of imposition 
rather than participation. A quotation from Duncan et al (1990) illustrates the point: - 
"The introduction of a (quality management) system should be not by 
imposition, but by each manager .... ensuring that there 
is a common 
understanding of management's procedural interpretation of requirements"' 
(page 53) 
In other words, by imposition! 
The obsession of the construction related quality management literature with 
formalised rule based procedures, when compared with the analysis of previous 
literature concerning errors and quality management can be criticised on three 
grounds: - 
It does not follow the general quality management literature or is it 
based on research findings. 
2 It is "rule bound" and generally downgrades the importance of 
66roles". 
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It is reductionist in approach. 
I Failure to follow the cluality management literature 
The contention that quality assurance procedures are imposed within organisations 
from the top down is supported in that in none of the standard texts reviewed are there 
any formalised procedures for involving the workforce in determining the nature of the 
quality system, although consultation is sometimes offered in the implementation of a 
given system. There was generally no evidence of any research underpinning the 
literature relating to implementing quality assurance. 
Indeed, an exception is research (Meyer 1994) indicating that a "bottom-up" process 
of implementing a quality system, supported by enlightened leadership, is more 
productive than the top-down process generally implied: - 
"If the leader wants to engage his subordinates he must first of all analyse his 
own attitudes and emotions as they come out through his actions. Then he 
must make sure that his subordinates experience that the quality system will 
help and empower them in their working situation. If the routines and 
checklists become an additional burden they will be sabotaged sooner or later" 
(page 90) 
The bottom-up process of implementation involves delegation and participation. This 
theme is taken up by Barrett (1994) who also notes the human side of the organisation 
in construction quality assurance and stresses the need to achieve self management of 
workers who are motivated to achieve high quality. These two authors are very much 
the exception to an overall gap between quality management theories and applications. 
The gap is recognised by Juran (1988), a key quality management writer, who notes 
that: - 
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"There is no evidence that a company using the ISO-9000 standards, or 
certified according to these, is any better quality-wise than other companies" 24 
Construction qualitv assurance is "rule bound". 
The emphasis in the literature on manuals, procedures, checklists, organisational 
charts, records and auditing by third parties (Duncan et al 1990, Oliver 1990,1992, 
Kettlewell 1989, amongst others) illustrates the importance of rules to the authors. The 
dangers of such an approach in high risks situations has already been pointed out by 
Hirschhorn (1993), but a few construction based authors also take up the theme. 
Sioholt (199 1) emphasises the role of participation in forming positive attitudes to 
quality in the context of introducing quality management systems in house-building and 
points out the danger of focusing on paper systems rather than the quality of managers. 
Meyer (1994), in advocating participation, emphasises the role of the leader and 
Barber (1992) acknowledges the limitations of a rule based approach in pointing out: - 
"The diagnosis of faults and design cures cannot be entirely reduced to 
procedures. It is necessary also to allocate responsibility and authority to 
individuals, and to allow them sufficient freedom to pursue any matter to a 
satisfactory conclusion" (Page 82). 
Finally, Seymour and Low (1990) inveigh against: - 
"Management and control procedures ... treated as technical processes that are 
neutrally undertaken by robot-like functionaries who, book in hand... check the 
course of work against it" (page 21) 
"In essence QA rests on the belief that the probability of a firm's producing a 
good quality product - whatever it is - will be increased if distinct, formal and 
extensively documented procedures, administered by specialist quality 
managers, are used, The emphasis of QA seems to involve a shift from 
24 Quoted in Barrett (1992) page 6 
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internally and organically generated concern with quality, by the actual 
producers, to a mechanically imposed set of procedures whose efficacy is 
guaranteed by external controllers and assessors" (page 25) 
They conclude by advocating the resurrection of the notion of professionalism and re- 
emphasising such concepts as care, integrity and morality. 
Construction ciuality assurance is reductionist in approach 
Most writers (for example Duncan et al 1990, Oliver 1992) recognise the limitations of 
quality assurance when it is applied to construction, in that briefing, design, 
construction and commissioning are often separate and QA systems are designed to be 
"Firm" specific. The authors then proceed by proposing systems applicable within one 
or other of these construction divisions. The unspoken assumption appears to be that 
the combination of separate quality assurance systems will amount to the whole and 
that the links between them are sufficiently unimportant to be ignored. This 
reductionist assumption is criticised in the systems literature reviewed later (Von 
Bertalanffy 1971, Blockley 1992) and can be contested on logic grounds alone, where 
examples of potential interface problems can be imagined (examples would include 
"overlay" problems where specialists drawings do not "match up"). 
A few authors squarely address this criticism and propose alternatives to the usual 
"firm based" QA systems. Barber (1992) notes: - 
"Dealing with quality problems can pose special difficulty on projects where 
responsibility is split between more than one organisation. A defect affecting 
the work of one may be the result of a fault in the work of another. Quite 
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commonly, there may be contributory faults in the work of more than one. In 
such situations, it is essential that there should be unified overall responsibility. 
Under conventional forms of construction contract, the final responsibility for 
the investigation of defects and approval of solutions has been allocated to the 
Engineer or Architect. The model (QA) standards do not address the difficulty" 
(page 83) 
"Suitable contractual arrangements are required in order to transcend the 
limitations of an individual organisation's quality systenf' (page 85) 
"For an overall project quality system, authority must cascade from the top. 
This can readily be achieved with turnkey projects as a single organisation has 
overall responsibility. A solution is provided in relation to nuclear installations 
by BS5882 through the client body having over-riding responsibility for quality. 
Another solution has been recommended by the Construction Management 
Forum under the title of "Project Control Plans" for application in conjunction 
with construction management contractual arrangements. There is, however, a 
general lack of provision for overall project quality systems in conjunction with 
other contractual arrangements. This is a significant gap in the existing 
International Standards and forms of contract, but the problem can only be 
overcome if contractual and quality management aspects are addressed 
together" (page 57) 
Barber also notes with approval the French systems of latent defects assurance, which 
involves the appointment of independent agencies (Bureaux de Controle) to monitor 
design and construction overall. 
Although the disadvantage of quality assurance systems operating only within separate 
firms in the construction process is recognised, the separation of quality as a business 
objective from other objectives is rarely recognised as dysfunctionally reductionist. 
Indeed, several authors (Johnson 1989, Duncan et al 1990, Oliver 1990 1992) actively 
advocate the separation of quality assurance from other objectives, by the setting up of 
QA departments and the making of QA appointments. However, elsewhere in Oliver's 
(1992) report, the author recognises that quality, cost and duration are all related; a 
101 
4-A Management Perspective 
theme which is repeated by McCaffer (1989), Langford and Ndili (1991) and Barber 
(1992). The interrelationships between business objectives are emphasised in several 
other places in the literature, but the effect of giving separate attention to quality in 
construction quality assurance literature is to ignore the fact that quality is dependent 
on good general management (and in a project context, good project management). 
Thus, although several authors (CIIUA 1988, Lawrence 1989, Duncan et al 1990) note 
factors covered in earlier literature, such as responsibility definition, change control, 
control of concurrency (by advocating "hold points" etc. ), planning, supervision and 
monitoring, few pursue these factors further. There is no recognition that good 
programming and cost control, by for example careful assignment of technical 
responsibilities, influences quality. This is so, even though the "forensic engineering" 
writers reviewed earlier have widely cited failings concerning these issues as causes of 
disaster, failure or defect. 
THE TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
WRITERS - CONCLUSIONS 
In common with many authors reviewed previously, these authors stress the role of 
management in achieving quality. For the general quality management writers, the role 
should include participation, the use of consensus and the fostering of positive 
attitudes. Unlike many authors, particularly the sociological writers, quality 
management specialists also stress personal factors including individual commitment, 
involvement and acceptance of responsibility. Many general quality management 
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proposals also echo conclusions from technological writers. Clear division of 
responsibilities, control of changes and concurrency are stressed. Checking is 
considered important, but of the quality system rather than the technical output. 
The literature specifically covering construction quality management appears not to 
relate either the philosophy of general quality management, or the findings from the 
technological writers to the problem of quality in construction. This gap is partially 
filled by a small number of writers expressly recognising that it exists, but the overall 
sense is that construction quality assurance is both divorced from any theoretical base 
and tied into sets of rules and procedures in direct contrast to the recommendations of 
authors from other backgrounds. 
4.3 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND SYSTEMS SAFETY 
A large body of literature exists, which is particularly concerned with the reliable and 
safe performance of industrial processes. This literature hitherto has largely 
concentrated on the "dangerous" industries, where outcomes might have extremely 
severe consequences for society, but recently some publications have specifically 
covered the construction industry. Conclusions from this literature often closely match 
those from other perspectives covered earlier. 
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EMBREY 0 992) 
Embrey (1992), writing from the perspective of Probabilistic Safety Assessment25 
closely follows the psychologist Reason (1990) in analysing the events surrounding 
major accidents into active and latent errors. Latent errors, he further divides into 
operational (maintenance) errors and organisational (design, management or policy) 
errors. Embrey proposes a three level category of accident causation: - 
9 The actual "combination of latent, active and recovery errors that gave rise 
to the disaster" 
9 "Error inducing factors" 
* "I-Egher level policy factors" 
A further possible level of "other more global factors such as the general economic 
situation and the prevailing political philosophy" (pages 199-200) 
Embrey synthesises the three levels of accident causation into a model with the object 
of incorporating managerial factors in probabilistic safety assessment. The result is 
MACFHNE (model of accident causation using hierarchical influence network). The 
three levels of causation are labelled in NUCFHNE as direct causes, level I causal 
2' For a detailed review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment and related risk analysis and human error 
identification techniques see Kirwan (1992). Kirwan gives a brief synopsis of the probabilistic safety 
assessment approach as: - 
"(The) approach ... 
is to define a set of undesirable events ... then 
identify what ... 
failures 
... can 
lead to these events ... (it) then quantify the 
likelihood of each failure and each failure 
combination and derive a prediction of how often the event will occur, along with estimates 
of its consequences (e. g. number of fatalities)". This results in the "risk picture" of a plant for 
use in deciding "whether the plant can be built or allowed to continue running" (page 300) 
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influences and level 2 causal influences. He also specifically notes factors leading to 
errors of confusions of responsibilities and poor communications. 
HARRISON P1 (1992) 
Harrison P1 (1992) reviews human factors in the use of quantified risk assessment and 
initially points out the importance of management in safety improvement programmes. 
He later refers to a "socio-technical pyramid" in proposing a hierarchical view of 
accident causation, with the accident as the tip of the pyramid, supported by factors of 
operator reliability and engineering reliability. These were, in turn, supported by 
factors of communications and feedback control, thence organisation and management 
and with the system climate at the base of the pyramid. 
He expressly draws a link between quality management and safety and suggests 
improvements of better inspection during and after engineering construction (Quoting 
Kletz 1988), that organisations clearly and unambiguously define responsibilities and 
that project changes be better managed. Regarding the last Harrison notes, in the 
development of a "template" for the elements of a process safety management system, 
"The Management of Change". This management includes: - 
e Written procedures to manage changes 
* All plant changes should trigger some kind of plant review 
Kirwan explained the use in risk assessment of fault trees, which start from a failure and trace 
backwards to possible initiating events, and event trees, which start from an event and trace forwards 
towards possible failures. 
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9 All personnel affected should be informed 
* Organisational changes should be controlled (i. e. staffing changes) 
Harrison also notes the role of cultural attitudes in fostering safety and suggests key 
elements in process safety management systems (in the chemical industry) as including 
management attitudes and management organisation. 
HURST ET AL (1991) 
Hurst et al (1991) in a paper covering research into errors in process plant construction 
note that human error was the largest known direct contributor to 500 recorded 
incidents and also that human error was a cause of failure in preventative mechanisms. 
Only a 7.6% contribution to failure was classified as not recoverable (that is not 
attributable to human error). Hurst et al (1991) classify errors as "operating errors" or 
"socio-technical failures". The latter they define as "underlying causes of failure or the 
failure of a potential preventative mechanism ....... these are a function of the whole 
system". They later develop a hierarchical scheme with reference to pipework failures 
in process plants. Their scheme lists accident causation as including-. - 
I Engineering reliability 
2 Operator reliability 
Communication, information and feedback control 
Organisation and management 
5 Systemic climate 
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WHITTINGTON ET AL (199Z) 
Whittington et al (1992) specifically research management, organisational and human 
factors in the construction industry. They record, in connection with construction 
accidents, that accidents often have multiple causes (for the accidents they studied 
there were between 3 and 15 causes and an average of 7 per accident). They note that 
strong parallels exist between safety as an objective and quality and that generic 
management problems have been highlighted by major accidents such as the Piper 
Alpha and Kings Cross disasters. Thus, they set out as the thesis underlying their 
research that poor management decision making together with inadequate or 
inappropriate controls make a major contribution to many accidents occurring on 
construction sites. In emphasising the importance of managerial solutions to safety 
performance they note the need to recognise the socio-technical context within which 
accidents occur. They also note that a managerial approach is particularly important in 
the construction industry, where the potential for highly engineered safety defences is 
low. 
However, the research underlying their report indicates that construction accident 
investigations are often myopic. They draw a contrast between the more "systems- 
critical" approach of major investigations (including major construction accidents) and 
the "person-centred" approaches traditionally adopted. They note, in referring to 
DeJoy (1985), that supervisors favour explanations for accidents that are internal to 
the workers: - 
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"Assigning responsibility to individuals absolves the supervisor and company 
from direct blame and typically leads to recommendations for behaviour change 
often through disciplinary approaches" (page 12) 
Hence there is a failure to routinely carry out causal analysis in construction accidents. 
They also note the role of attribution in reporting that subcontractors are more willing 
to discuss the impact of planning and organisational failures on site safety performance 
than their personal failings. 
Wl-ýittington et al divide accident causes into factors related to the injured party and 
immediate work colleagues, site management issues and headquarters issues. In their 
review of construction incidents, they report that approximately a quarter involve 
injured party factors, a quarter headquarters factors and one half site management 
factors. They expressly postulate a hierarchical model, which operates on four levels: - 
I Company policy level 
Project management level 
Site management level 
Individual level 
They report specific factors influencing accidents, echoing comments made by authors 
writing from a less specialist technological background, including poor supervision, 
remoteness of responsibility (caused by some procurement paths), uncontrolled 
changes, poor communications, cost and time pressures. With regard to the last two 
factors,, they again indicate the hierarchical nature of error occurrence in project 
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management by noting that financial and time pressures were seen to lead to a 
preference for short term contracting and to adversely affect safety performance by: - 
* Diffusing responsibility 
9 Making it difficult to establish systems 
e Reducing on-site supervision 
* Making it difficult to maintain on-site standards 
o Reducing investment in training 
* Reducing the likelihood that safety will be dealt with early in the project life- 
cycle. 
They note "cultural" factors in construction accidents including the fact that safety 
systems were perceived as not being "owned" by the site employees and point out 
features of organisational culture in the construction industry. These include that it 
"values initiative and flexibility" and that "risk taking is seen as endemic" in the 
industry. 
Finally, in attacking what they saw as an inadequate planning strategy (including poor 
sequencing of work, unplanned variations, conflicts between safety and production, 
incorrect pricing ofjobs, excessive programming pressure and poor co-ordination of 
work) they suggest that the corollary of many factors identified by technological 
writers might be good project planning. They advocate the use of more formal 
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systems for proactively identifying risks, selecting appropriate methods of work and 
scheduling work to minin-ýise hazards. 
OTHER AUTHORS 
Several other authors write from a reliability engineering or systems safety perspective 
including Billington and Allan (1992), Stix (1989), Gertman (1993), Hahn et al 
(199 1), O'Conner et al (1993) and The Safety and Health Practitioner (1993). These 
advocate techniques such as risk analysis. From within the construction industry, the 
Health and Safety Executive (1985), Health and Safety Executive (1987) and the 
European Construction Institute (1992) use a similar approach. The recently enacted 
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (HMSO 1994) have also given a 
clear impetus towards formalised risk analyses in construction design and planning. 
The UK Health and Safety Executive (1985) stress the importance of managerial 
factors in reporting that only 9% of industrial maintenance accidents had human error 
as the direct and final cause. They add that workers were primarily responsible for 
16% of such accidents between 1980 and 1982 (inclusive), but that managers were 
primarily responsible for 54% and contributed to a further 15%. More specifically, the 
European Construction Institute (1992) stress the role of the client in defining 
responsibilities in relation to safety, health and environmental responsibilities and the 
Health and Safety Conunission (1992) note that interruptions to work activity are a 
frequent cause of accidents. Communications, participation and feedback are all 
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emphasised in a paper by Zohar et al (1980) relating to encouraging workers to use ear 
protectors in noisy industrial plants. They found that timely feedback and participative 
management was far more effective than the alternative of disciplinary threats as a 
means of ensuring compliance. 
Markku Mattila et al. (1994) show a link between better budget performance and better 
safety performance in research with first line construction supervisors, thus reinforcing 
views from authors from a quality management perspective, amongst others. The 
intervening variable identified in their research relates to "management" factors of 
monitoring, feedback and improved communications. They note: - 
"Analyses of companies with successful safety programmes have shown that a 
high quality of management is linked with a higher level of safety" (page 86) 
In contrast, FEnze and Raboud (1988) note a non-significant positive link between the 
relative cost of construction work and average injury frequency. This may explain an 
apparent contradiction in views concerning the influence of cost on error. Relative 
cost (i. e. whether a project is running under or over budget) may be directly correlated 
with error rates, but absolute costs not so clearly. In other words, trying to meet 
unrealistic budget targets may increase errors but both error rates and costs may fall 
when appropriate managerial measures are taken. However, the causality of the link 
between budget performance and error rates must be treated with caution in the light 
of the work by Markku Mattila et al (1994). If cost pressures do lead to errors, the link 
may be much more complex than indicated. 
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THE RELIABILITY AND SYSTEMS WRITERS - CONCLUSIONS 
In common with many other writers, these writers emphasise human error as the cause 
of failures and, amongst human error, management errors. Accidents are seen to have 
multiple causes and these can be arranged in the form of a hierarchy with latent 
managerial and wider factors underlying more immediate and direct active errors. The 
view of error inducing organisations as "socio-technical" systems is widely voiced and 
the knock on pressure of cause on cause is illustrated. 
Linked to this view of organisation is the emphasis from reliability engineers on risk 
analysis and more generally the view that risks can and should be identified and 
allowed for at the outset. This forward looking, if rather mechanistic view, maps on to 
the Fligh Reliability Organisation literature and contrasts with Perrow's (1984) 
fatalistic Normal Accidents Theory. 
Where detailed managerial measures are discussed, these authors repeat the 
technologists' emphasis on supervision, division of responsibilities, control of changes, 
control of concurrency, good communications and a participative culture. The role of 
cost and time pressure is also noted. 
Some authors link safety and quality as common objectives and closely associated with 
this is the view that good performance in these objectives also brings benefits of 
reduced costs and times. A distinction is made between relative (Hinze and Raboud 
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1988) and absolute (Markku Matila et al 1994) measures of cost and time. Safety or 
quality performance is seen to worsen in line with poor relative (comparing planned 
with actual) cost/time performance. However, good management at the outset should 
reduce absolute costs and times and improve safety performance. 
Finally, some authors suggest avoiding managerial problems of the division of 
responsibility, control of changes and the like by the use of better planning. The 
indication here is that planning may be an overall factor linking these separate factors. 
4.4 INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND COLLECTIONS 
The interdisciplinary nature of the study of human error is illustrated by a number of 
reports and edited readers from a variety of backgrounds. Four such works are 
reviewed here, comprising a special report on safety of nuclear installations (ACSNI 
1993), a report on error in the US ship-building industry (Bea 1994), a UK 
Government report on the safety of concrete falsework (Health and Safety Executive 
1976) and a reader edited by an engineer (Blockley 1992). 
ACSNI (1993) 
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations Study Group on 
Human Factors (ACSNI 1993) report, Organising for Safety, makes several comments 
paralleling authors reviewed above. It notes that accidents are seldom caused by the 
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errors of a single individual and, conversely, that multiple measures are needed to 
reduce error. 
In noting a shift in accident analysis away from what it calls an "fEstorical" approach 
(which concentrates on preventing unsafe acts and unsafe conditions of work by 
introducing rules and changes to technical conditions) and towards an analysis of 
management of the underlying error process, the study group follows themes 
developed by technologists such as Petroski (1985) and Kletz (1985) and 
psychologists (Rasmussen 1987, Reason 1990). They quote a study of accident in high 
rise construction by Andriessen (1978): - 
"Management has the highest influence on the degree of safety of the work 
behaviour, the group somewhat less. Of least importance are the personality 
factors - at least as far as they are studied here (page 84) 
ACSNI (1993) point out several detailed managerial factors, which follow 
technological and other authors reviewed above. In particular they note the importance 
of the division of responsibilities, control of changes and good communications. They 
report research in the USA suggesting that the economic climate was among predictors 
of safety performance, but also point to other research, which indicates that a link may 
exist between a low error rate and increased economic efficigngy. This research 
suggests that there may be a common factor related to management style. Low 
accident rates and high economic efficiency are both correlated to job satisfaction, a 
democratic management style and increased worker responsibility. This closely follows 
comments by Oakland (1993) from a Total Quality Management perspective. 
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ACSNI also make considerable reference to the role of organisational culture in 
fostering safety. They emphasise the importance of developing a "safety culture" the 
elements of which include the internal climate and organisation of the system, the need 
for every individual to "own" the actions being taken to improve safety (rather than 
seeing them as imposed from outside) and the development of a "proactive safety 
management". They note research which indicates that accident rates are lower when: - 
e Resources are devoted to safety 
e Participative relations exist between staff 
* Visibility of senior management on the shop floor is high 
9 Production and safety is balanced 
9 There is a participative leadership style. 
They point to recent UK transportation and offihore oil industry disasters that indict 
senior managers and quote research (Rees (1988), which notes the success of 
voluntary self regulation in the context of US construction company safety. In 
conclusion, they propose a definition of safety culture: - 
"The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the conunitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation's health and safety management. Organisations with a positive 
safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by 
shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy 
of preventative measures" (page 23) 
The emphasis on communications and participation in this definition has strong 
parallels with authors from total quality management (Oakland 1993) and sociology 
(Tumer 1978,1992). 
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Finally, ACSNI stress the "synergistic" nature of a safety culture, where cultural 
aspects have a beneficial effect disproportionate to the inputs required to produce 
them. Thus, orientation towards, in this case, safety is seen to have benefits in terms of 
better quality cost and time performance. 
BEA 0 994 
Bea reviews a wide range of literature in reporting, for the US Ship Structures 
Committee, the role of human error in the design, construction and reliability of marine 
structures. He repeats the view that human error predominates in failures (in this case, 
of marine structures) and quotes in support the UK P&I Club (1993) evidence that 
human error was responsible for 62% of major commercial shipping claims in 1993. He 
also quotes Sowers (1993) that only 12% of failures are due to "lack of technology" 
and succinctly surnmarised the point thus: - 
"The experience with non-marine structures indicates that the challenge of 
reducing human and organisational error in design and construction is not a 
problem of not knowing what to do. It is primarily a problem of not doing what 
we know we should not do" (page 80) 
Bea provides definitions, both for individua126 and organisational errorS27 and stresses 
the importance of the latter. He quotes Henriksen et al (1993), who, in relation to the 
"medical" socio-technical system, propose a four tier model of the error process. The 
tiers relate to individual characteristics,, the nature of work, the physical/social 
26 11 
.... a 
departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an individual that can result in 
unacceptable or undesirable results" (page 3) 
27 11 .... 
departure(s) from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of a group of individuals that can 
result in unacceptable or undesirable quality" (page 3) 
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environment and management factors. The first two tiers are labelled "active errors" 
and the latter two "latent" errors. Bea later develops his own hierarchy of 
organisational errors consisting of "upper level management errors", "front line 
management errors" and "design/construction/operating team errors". 
In reviewing Henriksen (1993), Bea notes the importance of a systems perspective, in 
particular, the causal nature of many errors. He quotes Henriksen: - 
"A systems perspective leads one to suspect that the difficult to recognise latent 
errors that are made upstream by systems designers and organisational policy 
makers permeate the system and contribute to the downstream active errors 
made by technologists" (page 76) 
Bea also comments on many of the detailed managerial reasons for error reported by 
other technologists including poor supervision, division of responsibilities, 
uncontrolled changes, poor communications, disregard of life-cycle costs and poor 
organisational culture. 
In connection with checking he echoes comments by Ellingwood (1987), that checking 
can be ineffective and that both error tolerance and directed checking should be used in 
the design of ship structures. He comments thus: - 
"It would be desirable that QA/QC be very stringent for the error intolerant 
elements. Also,, it would be desirable to configure or design the element or 
component so that it could be error tolerant for the highly likely types of 
design, construction and/or operators errors" (page 126) 
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With respect to the control of changes, Bea reviews a case study of Nfitsubishi Heavy 
Industries VLCC 28 designs where second generation VLCCs had to be re-called after 
cracks were found in the cargo tanks of one carrier. The cracks stemmed from un- 
controlled design changes - the decision to change from the use of mild steel to high 
tensile steel in some structural elements. 
Bea (1994) notes the importance of culture in interconnected series systems (such as 
ship-building or construction): - 
"The reliability of a multi-element series system can be improved by .... 
human 
factors such as a consistent set of high quality individual, organisation, 
hardware and procedures factors that are allowed to permeate the entire design 
process. Organisational culture is likely the most important (overall factor 
conditioning this reliability)" (page 166) 
Bea continues by suggesting that at the core of many organisation based errors lies a 
culture that does not promote quality and gives examples, related to failures of sea 
based drilling platforms, of a series of errors ofjudgement stemming from risk-prone 
management attitudes and a refusal to acknowledge mistakes. The parallels with 
Turner (1978) and Collingridge (1992), writing from a sociological perspective, are 
notable. 
28 Very Large Crude (oil) Carrier. 
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BEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (1976) 
The 1976 Health and Safety Executive report into the safety of falsework29, prompted 
by a series of engineering collapses earlier in that decade, was notable for its 
recognition of the role of managerial actions in errors, predating most of the authors 
reviewed above. The report notes that technical factors were of relatively minor 
importance in the failures they reviewed and that latent factors (labelled "procedural" 
in the report) were of importance. 
They also note that fraud was a relatively insignificant factor and that inspection and 
state regulation was of lin-ýited effectiveness in ensuring safety (Quoting in support the 
Robens Committee of Safety and Health at Work (Health and Safety Executive 1973)). 
They precede other authors (Kletz 1985, Ellingwood 1987) in pointing to the 
ineffectiveness of checking, suggesting that it is better to avoid error at the outset, and 
make several comments on detailed project management. 
They indict poor division of responsibilities for the design of permanent and temporary 
works, and suggest the appointment of a temporary works co-ordinator (to co- 
ordinate specialists and allocate responsibilities for the design/erection of falsework). 
They also suggest the approval of falsework designs by a qualified engineer, checking 
of novel falsework features by an independent assessor and submission of falsework 
design calculations to the designer of the permanent works for comment. 
29 Temporary work used to support concrete during the construction of engineering structures. 
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They combine comment on change control and poor communications by noting in their 
review that sometimes the need for changes are not communicated back to the 
designer and modifications are made on site which seriously weakened the structure. In 
this respect, the report recommends that modifications which introduce significant 
changes be referred back to the project engineer for acceptance (thus echoing 
comments by Feld (1968) and Karninetzky (1991) in suggesting that significant 
modifications should be made by issuing altered drawings and withdrawing the 
originals rather than by amendments to the originals on site). 
Regarding communications, the report notes: - 
"We are of the opinion that if adequate and proper attention were paid to 
communication of information which is already available somewhere, this could 
possibly be the greatest single contribution to improved standards of falsework 
construction" (page 38) 
BLOCKLEY (1222) 
Blockley brings together several authors (two of which (Turner 1992, Kletz 1992) 
have been mentioned above), writing under the general heading of Engineering Safety. 
Blockley's own contribution is one of combining separate monographs into a whole in 
the introduction and conclusions to the book. 
He makes two points, which strongly echo comments from other authors. Firstly that a 
distinction has to be made between technical and human error causes of failure and 
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secondly, that a distinction has to be made between individual mistakes and 
cc organisational matters". Regarding the former he contends that: - 
It 
.... we cannot talk in terms of engineering safety in technical terms only. Individuals, their organisations and groups and their cultures are all involved" 
(page 454) 
He later distinguishes two cultures of engineering, the "technical tradition" and 
"problems of professional activity and business", and points out the over-emphasis, in 
engineering education, of technical knowledge at the expense of managerial skills. 
Regarding the latter, he notes generally that there has been a tendency to attribute 
human error to individual mistakes and lapses, but that: - 
"Other writers, with other perspectives, have revealed that human factors in 
engineering failures are often much more subtle and relate to organisational 
matters" (page 7) 
Blockley follows the widely reported distinction between latent and active errors in 
proposing a "balloon" model of latent pre-cursors to an accident, failure or disaster, 
corresponding to air being blown into a balloon. Subsequently, only a small trigger 
event, such as a pin or lighted match, would be needed to release the energy pent up in 
the system. 
Matousek (1992) also implies a hierarchy of errors in promoting the use of systematic 
quality assurance. This, he contends, is necessary because building workers are no 
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longer fully trained and cannot be relied on to produce careful workmanship in 
response to formal technical documents. 
Matousek. expands by indicating the sources of errors as including inadequate work 
specification, insufficient demarcation of areas of competence and responsibility, lack 
of information flow and insufficient co-operation. Blockley, in summarising this 
contribution, suggests: - 
"Quality assurance is a means by which we try to ensure that we reach our 
goals. An essential goal of any business is to satisfy clients and make a profit. It 
ought to follow therefore that quality assurance is good business. As safety is 
part of quality assurance then it should follow that the proper management of 
safety is good business too" (page 26) 
Blockley concludes by emphasising the importance of leadership in relation to 
organisational culture. He charges management with the duty to develop a good 
corporate safety culture and suggested that this will lead not only to cost savings, but 
also to increased quality and worker satisfaction. These points have clear parallels with 
other authors reviewed and support indications above that cost, time and error rates 
may be dependent on managerial factors rather than effectively in conflict. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORTS AND COLLECTIONS - CONCLUSIONS 
To a certain extent it is inevitable that these reports should echo the findings of earlier 
work reviewed, as the latter often forms the basis for the former. However, it is open 
to committees directing government sponsored reports to take a different approach. 
The fact that they do not take a different approach and the fact that an early report 
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(Health and Safety Executive 1976) contains many recommendations pre-dating 
modem research on human error gives strength to the links between the reports and 
other perspectives. 
This literature repeats findings from elsewhere, that failures have multiple causes and 
cures and that managerial and organisational causes are more important than both 
technical and individually based errors. Regarding the latter, the finding (Health and 
Safety Executive 1976) that fraud was not a significant factor in their investigations, is 
paralleled elsewhere. 
The view of errors having latent and active components and error induction exhibiting 
hierarchical characteristics is also repeated here. This view is shown to extend to 
industries as far from construction as ship-building and medical practice. Again, 
detailed managerial reasons for failures include poor supervision, division of 
responsibilities, control of change and communications. 
The role of organisational. culture is given some prominence and analysed as including 
components of participation, visible management and leadership. The possibility that a 
good organisational culture, as evidenced by appropriate levels of these components, 
will produce synergistic effects of superior cost, time and quality or safety 
performance, is promoted widely. This contention has echoes in both the I-Egh 
Reliability Organisation writings and Turner's (1978) work on UK disasters. 
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4.5 PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
Poor division of responsibilities, control of changes and control of concurrency are 
cited as causes of errors by many authors from technological, social science and 
management perspectives. Project management, although it does not directly 
concentrate on error as a subject, is a discipline concerned with improving these 
factors and it is interesting that points made earlier are echoed by project management 
specialists. Archibald (1976) in an early project management monograph stresses, 
amongst other factors, the importance of proper division of the project manager's 
responsibilities in noting that: - 
...... division of the project manager's responsibilities is probably the most 
common cause of projects not achieving their objectives" (page 39) 
He further stresses the importance of continuity of role for project management, which 
should-- 
"avoid the practice of'passing the baton'for project responsibility as the project 
passes from phase to phase" (page 37) 
The use of the expression 'passing the baton' is exactly the same as used 10 years 
earlier in the Tavistock Institute report on communications in the U. K. building 
industry (Tavistock Institute, 1966). Archibald also comments on the need to control 
changes and concurrency. Regarding the latter, he advocates a "design freeze point" 
corresponding to the "baseline design". Curtin et al (1991) follow Archibald's 
criticism of concurrency in noting that many clients consider it counter-productive to 
begin construction work too early and then have to accept variations. They further 
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note problems of allocating responsibilities for design defects where management 
contracting is used. Their solution is for the client to allocate full responsibility for the 
design to a single organisation, which may be the architect or a management 
contractor. The points echo those from both a safety (Whittington et al (1992) and 
technological (Kaminetzky 1991) perspective. 
Morris (1994) in reviewing the history of the management of projects, notes a number 
of project failures. Some of the case studies he reviews also show clear parallels with 
problems identified by other authors. For example, in referring to the failures of the 
channel tunnel project,, Morris notes a key cause as: - 
"... that old problem of concurrency - of starting construction before the design 
is properly worked out" (page 176) 
Morris attempts to define a theoretical base for project management and, in common 
with Kerzner (1995) and Walker (1989) (in a construction project management 
context), invokes general systems theory (Von Bertalanffy (1971) - see below). 
Stallworthy and Kharbanda (1983), imply a similar overall philosophy in stressing the 
need for a total view of the project management process. Several project management 
authors (Keller 1995, Archibald 1976, Kertzner 1995) imply a systems approach in 
stressing that the objectives of project management include the integration of time 
cost and quality. This is in sharp contrast to the "construction" quality assurance 
writers reviewed above, who concentrate solely on the management of quality. 
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The techniques of project management, covered in the above works and several other 
publications (Harrison FL 1992, Lock 1996, Meredith and Mantel 1995) provide 
detailed guidelines for controlling the problems which continually recur in the 
literature. Particular stress is placed on the division of responsibilities and planning and 
control to avoid the problems of concurrency and change. Morris (1994) describes the 
classic project management approach as including the techniques of work breakdown 
structure, organisational breakdown structure and task responsibility matrices (to plan 
and control the division of responsibilities between project participants), the use of 
resourced plans, prepared using critical path analysis techniques (to plan time, but also 
to allocate responsibilities), the use of earned value analysis to control both costs and 
progress, the use of milestone planning, design reviews and design freeze points to 
control concurrency and the use of change control. He summarises the approach thus. - 
"Careful definition, comprehensive planning, thorough risk analysis, better use 
of prototypes, careful progressing of development, thorough early testing, 
great care in managing concurrency/simultaneous development, stable but 
challenging relationships with suppliers, good communications, conflict 
managed as a source of ideas and development - all these painfully learned 
lessons are now generally accepted strategies for managing technology 
effectively" (page 228) 
Managing the development of the project definition, in a timely cost effective 
way, with minimum changes, towards ends that reflect the customer's real 
needs, is central to the management of projects" (page 230). 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT - CONCLUSIONS 
As a recently emerging discipline, project management is still struggling to identify its 
theoretical base and boundaries. It has adopted general systems theory, but still 
appears to concentrate on the detailed process of project management and the 
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structures of project organisations, rather than taking a wider view and encompassing 
either sociological or psychological perspectives. Attempts are being made, by writers 
in the forefront of the discipline, to address this imbalance and Morris (1994), in 
particular, reveals links between detailed project management techniques and a wider 
view. Morris expressly makes links with three authors from a sociological perspective 
(Turner 1978, Perrow 1984 and Collingridge 1992) in indicating that,. - 
"The lesson of all three authors are of a piece with those of this study; keep 
projects as small and modular as possible, fully assess the risk in advance, test 
before implementing, and have management attuned to the size and complexity 
of the system and the degree of turbulence associated with it" (page 228) 
However, Morris is an exception and project management, as a discipline, does not 
generally acknowledge the sociological perspective. Project management's strength 
appears to be in providing a link between, on the one hand, the disjointed set of 
problems identified by the technological and psychological writers and the system 
wide, but generally disengaged writings of sociologists. 
4.6 SYSTEMS THEORY 
GENERAL SYSTEMS TBEORY 
Project management writers are exceptional in referring to general systems theory, 
although several authors reviewed earlier make passing reference to "systems" and 
explore systemic interrelationships between factors influencing error outcomes. 
Systems theory holds that certain phenomena, whether natural or artificial, cannot be 
explained by reductive scientific analysis. Von Bertalanffy (1971), an original 
proponent of the theory and referred to in project management literature (Morris 
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1994), gives examples (drawn from disciplines including biology, sociology, history 
and management) of tangible and intangible items, the operation of which cannot be 
explained by examining the individual components from which they are formed. An 
example of a systems view of history is noted by Von Bertalanffy thus: - 
"Earlier periods of history may have consoled themselves by blaming atrocities 
and stupidities on bad kings, wicked dictators, ignorance, superstition, material 
want and related factors. Consequently, history was of the 'who-did-what' kind 
-'idiographic', as it was technically known. Thus the Thirty Years War was a 
consequence of religious superstition and the rivalries of German princes; 
Napoleon overturned Europe because of his unbridled ambition; the Second 
World War could be blamed on the wickedness of f1itler and the warlike 
proclivity of the Germans. 
"We have lost this intellectual comfort. In a state of democracy, universal 
education and general affluence, these previous excuses for human atrocity fail 
miserably. Contemplating contemporary history in the making, it is difficult to 
ascribe its irrationality and bestiality solely to individuals (unless we grant them 
a super-human - or subhuman - capacity for malice and stupidity). Rather, we 
seem to be victims of 'historical forces' - whatever this may mean". (page 6). 
Interestingly, this theme is repeated by an historian, Travers (1994), in a re-appraisal. of 
the 1915 Gallipoli campaign'o. He argues that the blame for this disaster should not be 
laid at the feet of any one individual, rather the reasons for failure were systemic and 
structural. Two short quotations illustrate Travers's approach to the history- 
64 ... most of the previous 
historiography has over-emphasised the role of 
Gallipoli personalities - whether Hamilton, Hunter-Weston, Birdwood, 
Stopford or Sitwell - rather than focusing on structural problems. All these 
individuals and their staffs were 'locked in' to a system that allowed little 
flexibility" (page 433) 
"Perhaps one other form of analysis of command at Gallipoli (and the Western 
Front) may be useful. A recent proposal for understanding large-scale industrial 
errors makes the distinction between active and latent errors. In the context of 
Gallipoli, there were latent errors in the rather rigid structure of the British 
30 A disastrous First World War attempt at landing troops in the Dardanelles. 
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army system, where social and organizational imperatives often took 
precedence over change and flexibility. These latent or in-built errors made 
possible the active errors of officers and commanders in HQs and in the front 
lines.... " (page 434) 
Thus, Travers links history, systems theory and modem views on error incubation in 
one paper. 
Von Bertalanffy contrasts the systems view with analytical procedures in science: - 
"The system problem is essentially the problem of the limitations of analytical 
procedures in science. This used to be expressed by half-metaphysical 
statements, such as emergent evolution or 'the whole is more than the sum of 
the parts', but has a clear operational meaning ..... 
Analytical procedure depends 
on two conditions. The first is that interactions between 'parts' be non-existent 
or weak enough to be neglected for certain research purposes .... the second 
condition is that the relations describing the behaviour of parts be linear.... 
"These conditions are not fulfilled in the entities called systems, i. e. consisting 
of parts 'in interaction'. " (page 17). 
This theme is again taken up, in an error context, by a writer reviewed earlier. Blockley 
(1992), in criticising engineering education, propounds: - 
"It is essential that the academic and intellectual scope of engineering is 
widened immediately to provide academic support to the so-called non- 
technical activities that all engineers find are part of their work. This is the 
"social science" of engineering and the "philosophy of engineering", both of 
which must be turned into active academic subjects. Although there is some 
indication of the development of research into these matters and into project 
and construction management, this research is minute in comparison with the 
efforts in the "applied physics of engineering". The amount of research into a 
topic such as quality assurance is small. Indeed, one could imagine many people 
questioning the fact that any research could indeed be performed on such a 
subject - so constrained are they in thinking in terms of research being only 
"applied physics". Perhaps the practical way of developing these disciplines is 
through the developing ideas of the "systems approach" (page 456) 
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"In simple terms a systems approach is the one that takes a broad view, tries to 
take all aspects into account and concentrates on the interactions between 
different parts of the problem. So what is the difference between the scientific 
method and the systems method and why is it relevant to engineering? The 
scientific method is an approach that characterises the world by assuming that 
natural phenomena are ordered, regular and not capricious. Following 
Descartes, it is a reductionist approach which takes a complex problem and 
breaks it down into component parts and tackles them separately. Systems 
thinking, alternatively, questions the assumption that the component parts are 
the same when separated out as when they are parts of the whole" (page 457) 
The development of systems theory has emphasised the concepts of closed and open 
systems, synergy, equifinality and teleology. A closed system is one, which does not 
interact with its wider environment. Within the closed system concept, the field of 
Cybernetics has developed feedback theories of wide application to engineering, 
management and biology. Open systems theories use, for example, the operation of life 
forms in biology, which continually interact with the environment in maintaining a 
"dynamic equilibrium". Synergy is the property of systems to amount to more than the 
sum of their parts. Equifinality stems from the observation that many biological and 
social entities can achieve the same ends from different processes" and teleology is the 
phenomena observed in many living and social systems of directedness or ordered 
actions. 
Thus, the reference to systems theory in project management and the critique of the 
reductionist approach in construction quality management can be related to systems 
31 Again, a point made by a writer in the literature review (Perrow 1984), without referring expressly 
to systems theory. 
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authors views that the sum is more than the parts and that the interactions between 
parts cannot be ignored. 
TBE OPEN SYSTEMS GROUP 
32 The systems view has been applied by the Open Systems Group , who study 
failures 
in a systems context. The Open Systems Group (1981) defines a system as: - 
"a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between 
their attributes connected or related to each other and to their environment in 
such a manner as to form an entirety or a whole" (page 12). 
They describe a system as an assembly of parts where: - 
I The parts or components are connected together in an organised way 
2 The parts or components are affected by being in the system and are 
changed by leaving it. 
3 The assembly does something 
The assembly has been identified by a person as being of special 
interest. 
Within the group, Watson and Fortune (1984) set out a series of "systems paradigms" 
as theoretical frameworks for studying systems failures. The paradigms are system, 
control, communications, engineering reliab Llity and human. Systems paradigms 
concepts include a view of systems as input- system-output mechanisms examined 
holistically by taking an overall view rather than following a reductionist approach. 
32 The Systems Group of the Technology Faculty at the Open University. 
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Systems are described as exhibiting hierarchical characteristics, where divisions can be 
made into (using progressively smaller units of analysis) systems, subsystems and 
elements, all existing in a wider system and thence the system environment. The system 
environment is distinguished from the wider system in that it consists of unconnected 
externalities". The authors consider that a systems paradigm applied to failures is 
valuable as it "points up: - 
9 Deficiencies in organisational structure 
* No clear statements of purpose from the wider system 
9 Performance deficiencies in sub-systems 
e Poor sub-systems communications 
e Poor sub-systems design 
* Lack of accounting for the environment 
e Imbalances in the systems - for example, between resources and quality 
assurance" (Page 21). 
Fortune (1984), applies the systems approach to specific studies of failure. She defines 
failure as dissatisfaction, goals unattained, undesired outputs and sets out the central 
objective of a systems approach to failure in perceiving systems in situations from 
which failures have been seen to emerge. The systems concepts used in failure analysis 
are defined as: - 
33 In the context of the preceding review of technological literature, these might include such factors 
as cost, time and societal constraints. 
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9A performance judgement of whether failure has occurred. 
9 Conflicts of objectives (for example costs versus safety) 
e Holism and emergent properties (for example synergy, negative synergy) 
o Multi-disciplinary study. 
Fortune considers the methodology in understanding systems failures to be exploratory 
and iterative, allowing objectives to be reviewed. A failure investigation methodolo 
involves considering and adopting one or several failure paradigms, comparing these 
with the specific situation and interpreting differences and similarities. 
Bignell and Fortune (1984) uncritically review several case studies of failures and the 
value of a systems approach to failure is noted: - 
44 ... one of the greatest values of using a systems framework to study failure is 
that it encourages a broad examination of both the failure itself and the context 
in which it occurred. Consideration of the systemic background of a particular 
failure will lead to a much greater understanding of all the influences and flows 
of both materials and information that existed in the situation. Of particular 
importance are the links between sub-systems and between the system and its 
environment, but even more than this, consideration of the whole system and 
its environment should prevent the narrow, blinkered approach, which has 
previously been a characteristic of many failure studies. Engineers have tended 
to look for technical problems, ergonomists have searched for human error or 
for mismatches between man and machine and, indeed, each expert has tried to 
seek justification for his own pet theory as to 'why things went wrong'.... The 
systems approach to failure is not only a multi-disciplined one, but also one that 
demands an open mind". (page 165). 
Fortune and Peters (1995) update much of the material covered above by examining 
several more recent case studies. They note points raised by other authors reviewed 
including a link between concurrency and failure and the reluctance of commercial 
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organisations to look forward towards the possibility of failure. Regarding failures in 
project management, the authors also note: - 
"There is a whole literature of sets of techniques and methods for project 
management and project planning, but projects remain highly vulnerable to 
failure". (Page 33) 
They quote research by Pinto and Slevin (1987) into the critical success factors for 
projects. These are categorised as: - 
Aims - project goals are clearly defined 
Organisation - 
e Resources are sufficient 
9 Control mechanisms are in place and used 
e Project has support of top management 
9 Communications channels are adequate 
o There is capability for feedback 
9 Contractors are responsive to clients 
People - 
e Project manager is competent 
e Project team is competent 
Fortune and Peters (1995) review basic systems concepts including a definition of 
system as an organised whole, holisrn, environment and boundary and closed and open 
systems. With regard to the distinction between system and environment, the authors 
point out that the environment influences the system, but in their definition, the system 
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cannot influence the environment. They formalise a systems failures method following 
Fortune (1984) and give some attention to failure analysis techniques. 
They set out an alternative concept, "vulnerabili&' to that of "interactive complexity" 
(Perrow 1984) and the "resident pathogen metaphor" (Reason 1990). People, 
populations, plant or systems are prone to failure because of physical states, location 
and the like, which make them vulnerable to failure: - 
"For the moment, the concept of vulnerability seems to have more mileage than 
the concepts associated with complexity. Elderly people or babies may not be 
accident prone, but their physical state may make them more vulnerable to 
events. Similarly, a chemical plant may be complex, but the state of its repair 
may be the factor which renders it vulnerable to failure" (page 245) 
The authors devote a section to failure avoidance, which can be directed to n-ýitigating 
the impact of failure, or to avoidance from the start and quote Brearley's (199 1) study 
of common themes in failure analysis: - 
* Failure to manage change 
9 Communications failures 
9 Performance monitoring failures 
* Failure to act on feedback information 
e Failure to learn from past lessons 
9 Complacency 
o Maintenance failures 
9 Manpower failures 
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9 Violations 
o Multiple failings 
e Extemal factors 
Fortune and Peters conclude by outlining three approaches to avoiding failure, the 
reliability approach (based on reliability engineering, not on high reliability organisation 
theory), a "learning" approach and a "quality assurance" approach. The last they 
conclude is suitable for "easily definable lower level problems, using, for example, 
statistical process control" (page 252). 
SYSTEMS THEORY - CONCLUSIONS. 
Systems theory concentrates on the links between parts of an entity rather than analysis 
of the parts themselves. Thus a "systems" views of events in history (Von Bertalanffy 
1970, Travers 1994) and failures (Watson and Fortune 1984, Fortune and Peters 
1995), claims to play down the role of individual actors and emphasise interactions. In 
this, the authors reviewed above are only partially successful as it appears inescapable 
that analysis of any problem will tend to reductionism. Thus, Watson and Fortune 
(1984) could not escape analysis into five "paradigms", which have the appearance of 
existing as separate entities. 
Nevertheless, the view of an entity as a system, or series of systems, appears useful. In 
the context of errors in construction projects, the "system" producing errors in 
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buildings fits the Open Systems Group (198 1) definition - it consists of connected 
parts, which are affected by being in the system and changed by leaving it. The system 
does something and is of interest in that it is this system which spawns defects and 
failures. However, the formal systems paradigm as propounded by Watson and 
Fortune (1984) does not fit easily with construction project work. It implies a single 
wider system (perhaps more suited to unified organisations), fails to integrate 
paradigms that the authors themselves identify and does not identify, or confuses 
factors relevant to project management. Thus, human relations factors are treated 
separately from control factors, even though other authors indicate that the two are 
related. 
The overriding benefit of a systems approach is in defining more general concepts, the 
distinctions between closed, open systems and the environment, synergy, equifinality 
and the models of control. It encourages a broad examination of failure and context 
and prevents a narrow and blinkered approach to the study of failure (Bignall and 
Fortune 1984). In suggesting an "element", "sub-system", "wider systenf' and 
ccenvironment" approach to systems, it provides a structure for the study of error, 
which could be focused on factors related to the individual, project and external 
pressures. Finally, several systems publications both identify factors (such as change, 
concurrency, communications and control) which have been reported by other authors, 
and give detailed guidance concerning how these factors operate. 
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The gap between systems theory as expounded in this section and applications in the 
current study lies in defining the exact components of the project as an error 
perpetrating system and in defining exactly how these components interact. 
The view of error influences and outcomes as being systems driven also holds out one 
further possibility - that of the whole error commission or avoidance process in project 
systems being encapsulated in a model. The following Chapter identifies common 
themes in the literature and proposes a model for use in further empirical study. 
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5 
INTEGRATING THE PERSPECTIVES 
5.1 COMMON THEMES 
Although at first sight it might seem that the wide range of perspectives reviewed in 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 are irreconcilable, there are a number of points of agreement. 
Differences, whilst apparent, appear to fit together to form a complementary mosaic 
rather than a contradictory mess. Clear areas of agreement exist and these are collated 
to form themes, representing current thought concerning the nature of error. The 
themes are summarised as follows: - 
THE RVIPORTANCE OF ERROR 
Widely expressed is the view that, in any technical failure, human error predominates. 
Figures for the percentage of failures which could be directly attributed to error causes 
vary, but 70-80% or more is usual. 
THE INEVITABILITY OF ERROR 
Writers from a background of psychology note that internal thinking processes are 
such as to make error commission inevitable and to a certain extent a necessary 
process. Other authors repeat this view or extend it to point out the beneficial role of 
error in learning. The implication from this view is that errors can not be entirely 
avoided, but rather should be managed. 
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MULTIPLE ERRORS 
Writers from technological, psychological and sociological backgrounds all point out 
that, particularly for major failures, several errors are involved. Some authors attempt 
to quantify the number of errors per failure, with 7- 10 being quoted in one instance 
(Whittington 1992). 
UNDERLYING ERRORS 
A number of independent sources make the distinction between latent and active 
causes of failure. In most instances, the latent causes of failure stem from errors by 
managers or external factors such as cost or time constraints. These causes predispose 
a system to failure, but would not normally directly induce failure. For that to happen, 
an active error would need to be made. Active errors are usually associated with 
people carrying out physical work and are conditioned by individually based factors 
such as knowledge, application and motivation. 
THE SYSTEMIC NATURE OF ERROR CAUSATION 
This view is gaining ground in writings from reliability engineering, sociology, quality 
assurance and historical analysis. Organisations conunitting errors leading to failure are 
considered socio-technical or organisational-technical systems, which have to be 
considered as a whole in analysing cause. 
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5.2 DIFFERENCES IN VIEW 
Beyond these common themes, differences in perspective lead to different emphases in 
analysing the exact cause of error. In particular, writers from the perspective of 
sociology take a detached view of failures as stemming from organisational 
inadequacy, whereas writers from the perspectives of technology, reliability 
engineering and quality management are more specific. Points of contact between 
perspectives occur in the writings of (inter alia) Turner (1978), Petroski (1985), 
ACSNI (1993), Whittington et a] (1992) and Harrison (1992). 
Writings from the perspective of psychology recognise most of the common themes 
listed above, but are also not specific concerning underlying causes. Again, points of 
contact are made in reports such as ACSNI (1993) and Bea (1994) where the editors 
combine psychological and managerial thought. The over-riding impression in 
examining both psychological and sociological writings is that they are largely 
inadequate, the psychology by indulging in "individualistic myopia" (Quintanilla 1987) 
and the sociology by being overly long-sighted in treating organisations as a whole. 
5.3 GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE 
Where authors from any perspective are specific as to cause, there is a consistent 
repetition of problems of lack of checking and supervision, poor control of changes 
and concurrent working, poor division of responsibilities, poor formal and informal 
communications and poor organisational culture. To this could be added the influence 
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of wider factors of cost, time and social pressures and the influence of factors internal 
to the individual related to knowledge acquisition and use. 
Managing these problems, in the context of construction projects, is seen to be the 
subject matter of project management. It is, therefore, in the project management arena 
that attention should be directed. Not only directed to the separate causes, but, in 
following the majority of all authors reviewed above, directed to how they interact 
systernically in causing the unwanted result. In so concentrating on that area of middle 
ground, between the direct application of technology and wider sociological 
considerations, it is not necessary to discard either the psychological or sociological 
perspective, but rather answer some of the questions that they expressly (Vaughan 
1990) or implicitly (Reason 1990) ask, but appear not to be able to answer - exactly 
what are the reasons for things going wrong. 
It might have been possible to focus directly on the management of projects in 
reviewing the literature, but to do so would have been to fall into the reductionist trap 
identified in the systems literature and implied in several other writings. In retrospect it 
appears that many perspectives emphasise project related causes. Having identified a 
clear area of interest, it becomes apparent that little work has been done linking error 
inducing factors to project performance and that most authors have stopped at 
identifying the cause of a particular failure, without attempting to draw general lessons. 
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There appears to be a clear gap in research and the literature filled only by such partial 
studies as I-Enze and Raboud (1988) covering a small portion of factors identified, 
studies of defects (Bentley 1981) not having a rigorous basis in error research, or case 
studies of failure (Watson and Fortune 1984) not specifically appropriate to 
construction project management. In order to direct efforts to the most effective 
methods of improving performance it is necessary to: - 
9 Confirm the importance of project related errors, in particular latent errors and 
to look behind obvious causes for further underlying factors. 
* To investigate interactions between errors. 
The literature reveals that this research has not, as yet, been done. 
5.4 A MODEL OF THE ERROR PROCESS 
CONTENT 
To expand on project related errors, the literature indicates that these are related to a 
series of factors associated with active individual errors, but wider than implicit in a 
purely psychological perspective, a series of factors related to the organisation of work 
(in the case of construction, the organisation of construction projects) but more 
specific and detailed than implicit in a purely sociological perspective, and a series of 
wider environmental factors acting as external pressures on projects and those 
responsible for their execution. 
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Taking factors associated with individual errors first, error commission in projects, 
although dependent on wider factors, appears at least in part to depend on the 
knowledge of the individual. Elements such as the level of training, skill, application, as 
well as effective selection for tasks are seen by many authors as part of that factor. 
Study of the influence of this factor alone, in order to determine its exact importance in 
defects and failures might repay the effort, but in this research it is felt more productive 
to take a much wider and comprehensive view rather than specialise. The justification 
for a wider view being the relatively investigative, rather than confirming, nature of the 
work and the reported influence in the literature review, not of factors alone, but of the 
links between factors - in other words, the systemic nature of error incubation (Morris 
1994, Kerzner 1995, Fortune and Peters 1995). 
The factors related to the organisation of project work consisted of those causes of 
failure mentioned above that are so widely cited as to begin to rank as categories. They 
involved failures of checking (the subject of detailed study by Stewart and Melchers in 
Australia), division of responsibilities, control of changes, control of concurrýýnqy, and 
communications. Again, it might have been possible to study the influence of any one 
of these factors on the performance of projects (Hinze and Raboud 1988), but this 
would ignore the systernic aspects of error fonnation. 
Wider factors related to pressures of cost, time and societ are also regularly cited as 
causes of defects, failures and accidents. Project management is required to respond to 
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these pressures and, additionally, project managers have to work within an 
organisational culture, however defined, which might influence performance. 
FORM 
Structuring of error influences has been attempted by several authors, starting from the 
basic division made by (amongst others) Petrosky (1985), Reason (1990) and Blockley 
(1992) of errors into active and latent. This distinction is developed by Hadipriono 
(1985), who considers enabling and triggering causes in detail and Eldukair and Ayyub 
(1991), who divide detailed causes into primaTy and secondaty factors. 
Those developing more complex models of error influences on several levels include 
Embrey (1992), who classify causes as actual errors, error inducing factors and higher 
level policy factors, Hurst et al (1991), who classify causes as Engineering and 
operator reliabili1y, Communications, information and feedback control, Organisation 
and management and Systenk climate, and Bea (1994), who classify causes as LJpper 
level management errors, Front line management errors and 
Desi, gn/Construction/OperatinR team errors. 
OPERATION 
The literature review indicates that multiple errors, active and latent are usually 
involved in both major and minor failures, but that these do not often act in isolation 
and are systemically linked. However, authors fail to demonstrate how the links 
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between errors operate. Thus, in many respect, their models represent lists of 
independent factors, rather than unified systems interacting in the manner described by 
Von Bertalanffy (1971). Furthermore, many lists of factors are not specific to 
construction project work, or are related to safety and accidents, rather than defects 
and failures. 
If the evidence from the literature is accepted, that the causes of error in projects are 
complex and not simply related to obvious individual failings, then some method, or 
framework for mapping causes and the links between them appears necessary in 
attempting to reduce their occurrence. In turn, this suggests a model of the nature of 
error in a project context, following authors mentioned above. Any model proposed at 
this stage would be tentative and subject to revision in the light of research, but a 
model of the nature of error in a project context, suitable for further testing, is 
proposed and is shown below. 
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5.5 MODEL OF THE NATURE OF ERROR IN A PROJECT CONTEXT 
(Based on the literature) 
GLOBALFACTORS 
Environmental factors 
Political pressures (Stix 1989, Brown and Maochen Yin 1988). 
Societal pressures (Pepperell 1987, Roberts et al 1980). 
Cost factors 
Intense competition (Robson 1978) 
Bidding based on cost alone (Jones and Nathan 1990, Hadipriono 
1985) 
Skimping (Bartholomew 1987). 
Time factors (Allen 1986) 
Organisational culture 
0 inappropriate organisational orientation (Turner 1978). 
Unresponsive and inflexible organisation (Clarke and Shorte 1993). 
Remote management (Turner 1978, Reason 1990, Oakland 1993). 
MANAGERIAL FACTORS 
Checking strategy 
Checking procedures are not implemented (Stewart 1993) 
Poor supervision (Kan-ýinetzky 1991) 
Responsibilities 
0 Split responsibilities for tasks are evidenced (Korman 1991B) 
Divisions between tasks are not clearly delineated (Scott 1976, Feld 
1968) 
Broken or loose links exist between initiation and performance 
(Kaminetzky 1991, Korman 1991A) 
Lack of "centralisation" of tasks exists (Robson 1978, Kaminetzky 
1991, Roberts et al 1980) 
Lack of chanze control 
Changes are not routed through responsible initiator (Feld 1968) 
Changed details are not checked (Sriskandan 1986) 
Excessive changes evidenced (Brown and Xiaochen Yin 1988) 
Discontinuities of personnel evidenced (Daoud and Hamdani 1988) 
Lack of written change control procedures evidenced (Chadwick 1986) 
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Coneurrenev 
No identifiable "control stops" to define stages in a project (Ellingwood 
1987) 
No "freeze" points (Chevin 1993) 
Poor communications 
0 Poorly detailed formal communication tools evidenced 
Unclear documents (Allen 1986, Brown and Xiaochen Yin 
1988) 
Excessive "noise" in documents (irrelevant/tangential material) 
(Rollings and Rollings 1991, Turner 1978) 
Conflicting documents (drawings/specification etc) (Korman 
1991B) 
0 Conflicting specialist documents (engineering/architectural/sub- 
contractor drawings etc) (overlay problems) (Kaminetzky 199 1, 
Mills, Denis and Associates 1988A) 
Lack of visibility in communications evidenced (Reason 1990, 
Norman 1988, Jones and Nathan 1990) 
No attempt made to explain details of documentation to 
construction personnel (Metz 1985, Lew 1984) 
PRIMARY FACTORS 
No strategy or policy exists for: - 
Systematic knowledge acquisition (Reason 1990, Ransom 1994) 
Selection of knowledgeable personnel (McKaig 1962, 
Sriskandan 1986) 
Self inspection of tasks (by requiring certification or 
confirmation etc) (Jones and Nathan 1990) 
These factors are summarised in figure 5.1 overleaf. 
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FIGURE 5.1 - MODEL OF THE NATURE OF ERROR IN PROJECTS 
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MODEL PROPERTIES IN RELATION TO STUDIES 
The three properties of the model, content, form and operation relate to the empirical 
studies reported in Chapters 7-10 in the form of specific questions as follows: - 
1) Form. 
Is the structure of the model supported by empirical research? 
2) Content 
What are the most important factors and are important factors 
represented at all levels? 
3) Operation 
Do factors in the model operate to form an inter-related system? 
The link between these questions and the studies is shown diagrammatically in figure 
5.2 overleaf 
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FIGURE 5.2 - MODEL PROPERTIES IN RELATION TO STUDIES 
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6 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter sets out the methodology and the underlying epistemology of the 
research. Methodologies in construction management have been vigorously debated in 
the recent past (1997-1998) and it is thus necessary to explicitly acknowledge the 
debate in detail. The first part of this Chapter, therefore, considers the debate within 
construction management research between the so called "rationalist" and 
"interpretivist" paradigms. It widens the debate to examine parallel arguments in the 
social science literature generally and it examines areas of agreement between the 
paradigms and routes to resolution of the rationalist/interpretive dichotomy. An 
alternative approach is proposed for applied technological problems, which is more 
relevant to the practical aims of this research, than either paradigm. 
The second part of the Chapter considers the research methodology adopted in some 
detail, (with further detail being given in the respective Chapters covering the field 
research). The Chapter concludes with a diagrammatic representation of the methods 
used for verifying the propositions generated in the research. 
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6.2 THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT DEBATE 
THE CRITIQUE 
In 1995, Seymour and Rooke of the School of Civil Engineering, University of 
Birmingham introduced the argument that methodological assumptions held by 
construction management researchers had the effect of endorsing the status quo 
(Seymour and Rooke, 1995). These methodological assumptions they labelled the 
"rationalist paradignf', which they contrasted with an "interpretivist" approach. The 
latter was presented as an alternative, more appropriate methodology for the study of 
construction management. The authors gave considerable attention to their perception 
of the assumptions of the rationalist paradigm, the chief of which was a distinction 
made between subjective experience and objective reality. This distinction was 
considered invalid for social research, where researchers were presented with a world 
in which meaning was already made. Researchers were seen to assert their own 
interpretations of reality rather than investigating the interpretations of others. 
Developing from the distinction made by researchers between subjective experience 
and objective reality, was a critique of the employment of causal models and 
explanations by researchers. These were seen as dwelling exclusively on tools of 
control, ignoring the conventions of everyday life. Further, the tools legitimated 
control of some people over others by providing scientific justification for courses of 
action. They considered that there was no objective, value free point of view from 
which the rationality of a culture n-ýight be judged. The interpretivist alternative 
involved employing "verstehen" (Weber 1933) - defined as the understanding of 
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another's point of view. Apart from Weber, three other sources of the interpretivist 
paradigm were identified, the Chicago School of Sociology, Blumer (1967) and 
Garfinkel (1967). The common theme of these sources was, again, the need to place 
the individual and his or her context at the centre of any research investigation. The 
authors took a polemical stance in their argument by supporting Garfinkel's methods 
as the only viable ones for social research. To them, the researcher's aim was to report 
the perspectives of the participants in particular settings, that is to reveal how people 
constructed their world, and not to report any single truth. 
The authors applied their critique to a study of the determinants of quality in 
construction, which has parallels to the present research. Researchers in that study 
monitored constructional elements for defects and categorised the causes into 
CC management controllable" and "operative controllable". The objective of the research 
was presumably to identify more commonly cited causes in order to direct future 
preventative action. The authors reported difficulties experienced in categorising 
causes in the research, where they identified ambiguities arising from the sequential 
nature of many construction tasks. These difficulties they interpreted as stemming from 
a need to apportion blame rather than merely identify the reasons for a defect arising. 
From these difficulties, the authors developed two criticisms, firstly, they asserted that 
the researchers were inappropriately required to take a normative stance in 
apportioning blame and categorising cause. This, they claimed, was not suited to a 
rationalist paradigm, which was ostensibly objective. Secondly, they concluded that a 
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technical inability to attribute cause could only be addressed by an assessment of the 
whole texture of informal arrangements and tacit agreements that characterised the 
construction project. This could only be performed by those actively engaged in the 
work or a conunitted ethnographic researcher rigorously applying "verstehen". Whilst 
also recognising that accurate categorisation was possible, the authors maintained their 
philosophical standpoint of not distinguishing subjective experience and objective 
reality in asserting that there was no single, objective or neutral account to be had in 
the research. 
In 1997, authors from the same source issued an express call for debate on the same 
research methodology theme (Seymour, Crook and Rooke, 1997). Little was added in 
this much shorter paper except that reference was made to grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1968), a theory which is directed towards generating abstract propositions. 
This was a modification of the philosophical position set out in the earlier paper. There 
was also some tentative recognition of the validity of causal research in that it was seen 
to have a subsidiary role compared with the primary role of defining meaning in 
interpretive investigations. 
The call for debate and the earlier paper generated a liýnited response, the key points of 
which are reported below. In their reply to that response, the original authors (Rooke 
et al, 1997) again took a polernical stand in criticising the advocacy of "methodological 
liberalism", where rationalist methodologies were combined with interpretive ones. 
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They considered that such an approach was not conducive to developing rigour in 
construction management research and attributed difficulties suffered in sociology 
generally to its prevalence. The authors repeated their contention that "verstehen" 
understandings (sic) rather than causal ones should be the aim of social research. They 
succinctly set out their position as follows: - 
"First, the explication of inter-subjectively established meaning is the aim of 
social research. Second, such explication requires the researcher to refrain from 
constructing theoretical explanations (including causal ones), since these 
impose the researcher's meanings at the expense of those of the subjects of the 
research. Third, therefore, the final test of the validity of an analysis is if it can 
be demonstrated that such an analysis is the analysis which is used by the 
subjects of the analysis in analysing their own situation. Fourth, there is a 
tension between these academic principles and the further principle that the 
findings of research should be useful to practitioners, in the sense that fulfilling 
the first cannot guarantee the second, and vice versa. Fifth, this tension can be 
managed on the basis that all findings are produced in specific circumstances, 
for specific purposes. Sixth, the research should be capable of communicating a 
knowledge of how others in the construction process see that process in a way 
that is useful to practitioners (that usefulness to be judged by the practitioners 
themselves). Seventh, in addition, research should enable practitioners to reflect 
upon their own practices in such a way as to facilitate their attempts to improve 
those practices" (page 493). 
This stance was again modified in a second reply (Seymour et al 1998) where the 
authors recognised that science "as it is understood by positivism" (page 112) was an 
academic discipline appropriate to the study of social conduct. However, they also 
wished to promote interpretivism as an equivalent academic tradition to positivistic 
science. The authors concluded that they did not wish to deny the possibility of causal 
explanations in social life, but saw such explanations as subsidiary. 
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TBE RESPONSES 
The responses to the call for debate noted above were of two types. Two papers 
(Raftery et al, 1997; Chau et al. 1998) presented a conciliatory stance. The first paper, 
in particular, largely interpreted the debate as a technical issue and advocated the 
multi-methodological approach later criticised by Rooke et al. Chau et al also 
attempted to reconcile the two paradigms by suggesting that interpretive methods 
could be used to provide information for identification and conceptualisation of 
problems, which were subsequently theorised for further rationalistic investigation. 
However, they also engaged the philosophical discussion by positing that there was a 
knowable order in nature, thus clearly distinguishing themselves from Seymour and 
Rooke. Likewise, their references to the need to understand the "real world", the need 
to formulate hypotheses and the need for generally applicable theory showed a 
philosophical standpoint that recognised objective reality. They criticised the 
interpretive approach which produced local situated knowledge on the grounds that, 
logically, it could only produce anecdotes relevant to the individual researcher. 
A more robust, polemical stance was taken in two other papers (Runeson, 1997 and 
Harriss, 1998). The main thrust of both papers was to uphold science as a means of 
advancing knowledge. Science was seen as the development of causal theory and the 
authors saw the rejection of the rationalistic paradigm by Seymour et al as the rejection 
of science. Runeson suggested that not searching for casual relationships, 
generalisation and verification removed the purpose of science and the possibility of 
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scientific progress. Harriss made a similar point that all scientific paradigms involved 
the production of theory. Drawing a distinction between inductivist and deductivist 
theory he noted the Popperian proposal (Popper 1959) of the development of theory 
through falsification. However, he contrasted theory development with the approach 
suggested by Seymour et al. He saw their approach as the rejection of theory and 
generalisation in favour of localised relevance. Although both authors strongly 
defended the view of scientific knowledge as the production of theory, both also 
acknowledged uses for an interpretivist approach. Runeson saw it as useful in adding 
valuable insights, building new theories and modifying existing theories and Harriss, 
whilst more dismissive of the paradigm, acknowledged its value in business 
consultancy. 
As a side issue, both Runeson and Harriss considered the problem of defining 
construction management theory. Seymour et al had suggested, as a prelude to their 
critique, that construction management was based in the social sciences, hence the 
interpretive paradigm was relevant. Runeson and Harriss did not accept that there was 
a single separate theory that covered construction management and preferred the view 
that construction management was informed by several relatively unrelated intellectual 
disciplines. However, Runeson noted that a lot of research in construction management 
was normative, directed towards finding better work practices and the like, and not 
"science .... 
in the positivist tradition" (page 300). As such, the measure of success for 
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construction management research was effectiveness - "It is judged on results, and 
results alone" (page 300) and need not be informed by scientific theory. 
Runeson's dismissal of practical research betrays a rather elitist view of science quite 
different from the rebuttal of interpretivism. A wider view might suggest that the 
unifying feature of construction management theory is its practical normative nature. 
This view might also suggest that construction management does use scientific theory 
(whether called positivistic or not), but its practical nature means that it is equally 
likely to draw on interpretivism. This view has not been aired and consequently the 
construction management debate remains both unresolved and shallow. However, 
before considering specifically the nature of construction management research and 
attempting to define construction management theory in relation to the current study, it 
is important to properly examine the actual and apparent differences between 
"rationalist" and "interpretive" paradigms. To do this, it is necessary to go beyond the 
construction management debate and examine similar discussions in related areas. For 
this purpose, the contention that construction management is a species of social 
science research can be accepted and the examination concentrated there. 
Appropriately, the discussion has also been most detailed in social research and, in 
particular, in sociology. Much of the following is drawn from this discipline. 
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6.3 THE WIDER DEBATE 
A NOTE ON TERMS 
The academics instigating the construction management debate introduced the terms 
"rationalist" and "interpretivist'" and drew a distinction based on the chief assumption 
concerning subjective experience and objective reality. They later referred to 
"positivistic science", a term also adopted by respondents to the debate. In a parallel 
debate concerning property research, Harris and Cundell (1995) issued a call without 
expressly collecting their criticisms under the umbrella of a single term, but Lizieri 
(1995) in response referred to "phenomenological", "reflexive", "feminist", "post- 
modernist" and "qualitative" approaches on the one hand, as opposed to "quantitative" 
approaches on the other. Green (1998), in a critique of construction process 
improvement, also referred to post modernism, but adopted a "critical perspective". 
When the debate is widened to directly include the social sciences, a similar plethora of 
terms is revealed. Thus, the "rationalist" approach is variously referred to as 
"positivist", "post-positivist", "realist". 'cc scientific", "quantitative" and "based on the 
natural sciences", whilst the "interpretivist" approach includes "hermeneutic", "anti- 
realist", "naturalistic", "constructivist", "critical theorist", "qualitative", "new 
paradigm" and "action" research as well as several other terms. Importantly, these 
respective sets of terms are not synonyms. There are major differences in the 
underlying epistemology and methodology within as well as between the two divisions. 
Some of these differences will become evident below as the debate between the 
1 Seymour and Rooke originally used the term "interpretativist" and this in itself generated a minor 
debate. They later changed the term to the more generally accepted "interpretivist" used here. 
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divisions unfolds, but in order to economise on the use of terms, it is necessary to 
clarify some commonly used distinctions. 
The term "rationalist" is little used in recent social science literature, the most 
commonly used alternative term being "positivist" or "positivistic science" and this 
term is generally used in the following discussion to label an epistemology based on a 
belief in the existence of objective reality outside the experience of interacting 
individuals. "Interpretivist" is a more widely used term and is generally taken to denote 
an epistemology based on a belief that reality is created by the interaction of individuals 
through the medium of language. Seymour et al identified this key distinction and 
much of the discussion in the social science literature is based on it. However, a 
distinction is also frequently made between quantitative and qualitative research in the 
same way. Thus, quantitative research is identified by many authors with a positivist 
and qualitative with an interpretivist epistemology. Logically, this distinction is less 
clear and this lack of clarity is reflected in the literature. The two ten'ns appear to also 
refer to techniques of inquiry rather than underlying epistemologies, with both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques being consistent with either epistemology. The 
terms "quantitative" and "qualitative" are therefore avoided, unless demanded by the 
context, in the following discussion. Where inevitable, the epistemological definitions 
are adopted. 
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POSITIVISTIC SCIENCE 
The roots of positivism in social science are found in the "positivistic philosophy" 
developed by Comte as a reaction to his perception of the negative aspects of the 
French Revolution and the anarchy pervading at that time (Ritzer 1996). Comte also 
founded "sociology" -a science based, according to him, on the systematic study of 
abstract laws which govern the social universe. These laws could be tested through the 
careful collection of data. The main "abstract law" that Comte developed was an 
evolutionary theory, which proposed that there were three intellectual stages through 
which the world has gone throughout history, culminating in the positivistic stage. In 
the positivistic stage, methods of science and empirical observation were the 
paramount means of advancing knowledge of the social world and only by the 
widespread adoptation of positivistic science would social harmony be achieved. This 
belief in "abstract laws governing the social universe" is still widely held among 
sociologists. Thus, Pugh (1983) expresses a "prior ontological belief that the 
organisational behaviourist universe is replete with regularities and a prior 
epistemological belief that we can manipulate our concepts so that the relevant data 
expose these" (page 47). Sin-fflarly, Hammersley (1992) reports that a "reality 
independent of the researcher whose nature can be known .... 
is a philosophical doctrine 
on which much ethnography is founded" (page 43). Bryman (1988) sets out in 
considerable detail the features of positivism, summarised as follows: - 
9 It considers the methods and procedures of the natural sciences to be appropriate to 
the social sciences. 
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* It entails a belief that only observable phenomena can be counted as knowledge. 
9 It involves the accumulation of verified facts building towards theoretical 
knowledge. 
* It involves the postulation of hypotheses as causal connections between entities, 
which are then submitted to empirical tests. 
e It purports to be "value free" in both denying the validity of normative statements as 
they cannot be verified and requiring the scientist to take a disinterested neutral 
stance to research. 
CRITIQUES OF POSITIVISM 
Positivism has been attacked from a variety of directions within the broad grouping of 
interpretivist scholars. From the perspective of symbolic interactionism (see below), 
positivistic sociology is unsure, over-ambitious metaphysics, inaccessible to intelligent 
examination and holds incorrect views of social structure. Traditional positivistic 
sociology is considered to reduce actors to mindless robots on the societal level (Ritzer 
1996). Denzin (1983) objects to positivism's use of the language of natural sciences 
and the search for causal paths, causal chains and causal antecedents, which he 
considers is detrimental to the study and understanding of lived experience. Guba and 
Lincoln (1998) provide a more detailed critique of the "conventional wisdom" of 
positivism, including that it strips data of its context, it excludes from consideration 
meaning and purpose, it inappropriately applies generalisations to individual cases, it 
fails to distinguish theories and facts and it fails to recognise the inter-relationship 
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between researcher and the researched. Reason and Rowan (198 1) criticise orthodox 
positivistic social science in a sin-fflar vein. Thus they see it as inappropriately treating 
people as isolable from their normal social contexts, as detaching the subjects of 
research from the underlying theory, as reifying the social world and as involving 
deception. Hammersley (1992) reports similar objections to ethnography based on 
survey and experimental research. This is seen as imposing the researchers' 
assumptions about the social world, as involving suspect generalisations from the 
experimental situation, as involving the inappropriate reliance on statements or 
observations, as invalidly reifying social phenomena and as inappropriately ignoring the 
creative role of cognition and group interaction. Miller and Crabtree (1998) in 
reporting clinical medical research attack "patriarchal positivism", which they see as a 
form of control through rationality involving inappropriate reductionism, emphasis on 
scientific rationality and the view of the body as a "biochemical machine" (page 294). 
Denzin (1998) makes a strong moral attack on positivism where he claims that 
"knowledge produced under the guise of objective science is too often used for 
purposes of social control" (page 315). 
Several of these criticisms relate to methodological considerations, in that they are 
concerned with the 3ýLqy that conventional positivistic research is carried out. Indeed, 
this is recognised by Guba and Lincoln (1998) in that they make what they call 
"internal critiques" of positivism (page 197). These, they suggest, can be eliminated by 
the greater use of qualitative data. However, several criticisms relate to the 
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inappropriate reification of social phenomena and are consistent with the views of 
Seymour et al concerning subjective experience and objective reality. If reification is 
seen to include the construction of theories and hypotheses, this appears to remove the 
scope for reconciliation between positivistic and interpretive epistemologies. 
INTERPRETIVISM 
The roots of interpretivism are less clearly defined that those of positivism. Schwandt 
(1998) groups the terms "constructivist" and interpretivist" as general descriptors of a 
"loosely coupled family of methodological and philosophical persuasions ... which share 
the goal of understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of 
view of those who live it" (page 221). One source of interpretivism is symbolic 
interactionism which is derived from the philosophy of George Herbert Mead (Ritzer 
1996). Mead's philosophy is based on pragmatism, which holds that reality does not 
exist in the world, rather is actively created during individual actions. Mead was also 
influenced by psychological behaviourism - the view of the organism as responding to 
extemal stimuli. However, he modified the psychological view of behaviourism to 
allow social processes to intervene through language. Mead believed that 
consciousness was not lodged in the brain, but was a characteristic of the environment. 
This gave rise to the concept of "mind", which is created by social interaction through 
the medium of symbols (in the form of language). Ritzer (1996) summarises the basic 
principles of symbolic interactionism which includes the following points: - 
e People can think and this differentiates them from the animals. 
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e Thought is shaped by social interaction 
9 Social interaction involves learning meanings and symbols used for human thought 
9 People are able to modify meanings and symbols on the basis of interpretation of the 
situation 
As a consequence of the belief that thinking is shaped by social interaction, symbolic 
interactionists hold a relativistic view of the world. Different objects have different 
meanings for different individuals. The differentiation between subjective experience 
and objective reality drawn by Seymour et al appears to derive, at least in part, from 
the underlying philosophy of symbolic interactionism and a parallel strain runs through 
much interpretivist literature. Consequently, Denzin and Lincoln (1998) stress the 
socially constructed nature of reality, which Guba and Lincoln (1998) consider to be 
incommensurable with a belief in objective reality. Schwandt (1998) reports 
constructivism's belief that "knowledge and truth are created in the mind" (page 235). 
Bryman (1988) reports a wider range of sources underlying the epistemology of 
qualitative research. These include the symbolic interactionism noted above, but also 
phenomenology, "verstehen", naturalism and ethnogenics, most of which treat social 
knowledge as a matter of understanding - "social action must be examined by the 
social scientist in terms of the actors own interpretations of his or her actions and its 
motivational background" (page 5 1). The key features of qualitative research involve: - 
9 Seeing research through the eyes of the participants 
e Providing detailed descriptions of social settings 
e Examining social entities as a whole 
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9 Taking a longitudinal (process) view of social life 
9 Adopting an unstructured, flexible approach 
* Avoiding theory and conceptualisation as it is reification of social phenomena. 
The underlying philosophy of interpretivism has consequences for methodology. This 
has been comprehensively illustrated in the approach to method advocated in "new 
paradigm" research (Reason 198 1, Hammersley 1992). New paradigm research 
methods are directed to serving the needs of practitioners, which is the only means of 
ensuring relevant, valid findings not susceptible to unethical manipulation by 
researchers, or users of the findings. 
CRITIQUES OF INTERPRETIVISM 
Interpretivism, broadly defined, has been criticised from both within and without the 
paradigm on technical and philosophical grounds. In particular, withi the paradigm, a 
number of authors have taken issue at a philosophical level with more literal 
interpretations in the form of radical deconstructionist or similar perspectives (Reason 
1998, Greene 1998). To deal with technical issues first, several authors mention 
problems of ensuring internal and external validity, reliability and generalisability where 
techniques based on interpretivism are used (Hammersley 1992, Greene 1998, Bryman 
1988). These problems range from the inability to generalise from single case studies to 
problems of validity where the participants also engage in the research. Bryman (1988) 
in particular reports a number of subjectivist ethnographic studies of the same groups 
of people by different researchers, which come to widely differing conclusions-- 
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"Such sharp disparities should not be expected if ethnographers indeed base 
their accounts on native understandings and interpretations" (page 76) 
Ritzer (1996) reports criticisms of symbolic interactionism for having "too readily 
given up on conventional scientific techniques" (page 363) and for employing vague 
and imprecise concepts such as "mind", "self'. "I" and "me". He further notes 
criticisms of the paradigm for ignoring psychological and physiological factors such as 
the unconscious, emotions, needs, motives, aspirations and intentions, and for overly 
concentrating on everyday life. Greene (1998) from a generally sympathetic point of 
view criticises interpretivism for its inability to inform policy: - 
C4 qualitative evaluations as a genre ... are 
destined to remain .... 
beautifully 
responsive but, in being so, unable to assume a more proactive role in the social 
policy sphere. And so, because the evaluator as public scientist must be 
proactive, must him or herself become an active and accountable player in the 
policy arena, qualitative evaluation will not be enough" (page394) 
Miller and Crabtree (1998), also from within the interpretivist paradigm, charges 
qualitative researchers with producing incomprehensible reports, published in a 
language and in places that benefit researchers and not participants. Harnmersley 
(1992) points to the methodological inconsistency of qualitative researchers who reject 
realism at a philosophical level, but use a form of "nalve realism in assessing their own 
research" (page 125). Rose (1982) makes a similar point, with respect to the behaviour 
of researchers, thus: 
"All sociologists act as if they could apprehend and describe reality through the 
process of operationalisation and as if they could rely on absolute standards of 
scientific proof for their results to be evaluated .... From this position, the 
supposed strong relationship of epistemology to research practice is something 
of a myth" (page 154). 
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The critique at a philosophical level centres on the relativism implied by the belief that 
all knowledge is socially constructed. Relativism is seen, if carried to its logical 
conclusion, as leading to an inability to transmit knowledge, or conduct any meaningful 
research, as leading to solipsism and as leading to an amoral outlook, which leaves the 
researcher unable to do more than reflect the views of participants whatever the views 
may be. Several of these points are made from within the broadly defined interpretivist 
paradigm (Schwandt 1998, Stanfield 1998, Kincheloe and McLaren 1998, Reason 
1998), or from those sympathetic to the interpretivist approach (Atkinson and 
Hammersley, 1998, Greene 1998, Gill and Johnson 1997). Schwandt (1998) explains 
the problems of solipsism and relativism as follows: - 
"What is an adequate warrant for a subjectively mediated account of 
intersubjective meaning? In the absence of some set of criteria, such accounts 
are subject to the charges of solipsism (they are only my accounts) and 
relativism (all accounts are equally good or bad, worthy or unworthy, true or 
false, and so on)" (page 246) 
This leaves the researcher "unable to critique the very accounts they produce" (page 
246). Schwandt. continues by arguing that the psychological claim that knowledge is 
socially constructed and is not simply the product of sense data on the mind is not 
problematical, but there are logical problems in holding to the epistemological claim 
that knowledge does not discover a pre-existing world outside the knower. He poses 
the question that if knowledge is only in the mind of the knower how is it that 
knowledge is available to individuals and is shared and transmitted. Similarly, Atkinson 
and Hammersley (1998) point to recent post modernist challenges to the objectivity of 
research in ethnography. These challenges have developed towards questioning the 
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possibility of social science knowledge and suggesting that the accounts produced by 
researchers are themselves constructions. They describe these challenges as leading to 
scepticism, relativism and hence "debilitating nihilism" (page 252). 
Bryman (1988) reports the problems posed by simply reflecting the views of 
participants when these views may be overtly immoral or marginalist (fascists or 'Jesus 
Freaks' are the two examples he gives). Greene (1998) notes that "Interpretivism 
justifies values in inquiry, but does not justify any particular ones" (page 3 94). 
Hammersley (1992) expands the critique to include problems of 'value relativism', 
which theoretically could render "us unable to conderan, or to justify action against the 
perpetrators of genocide" (page 77). A similar problem is reported, within the 
interpretivist paradigm, by the critical theorists Kincheloe and McLaren (1998), who 
suggest that critical theory is distinguished from interpretivism by providing "the post- 
modem critique with a normative foundation .... Without such a 
foundation the post- 
modem critique is ever vulnerable to nihilism and inaction" (page 272). This theme is 
echoed by Reason (1998) in his critique of radical deconstructionalism. He considers 
the approach to be: - 
ccover-intellectualised and thus both nihilistic and oppressive. Voices are just 
voices; they have no claim to truth, so the search for voice is seen as being the 
search for any old voice. And given current power relations on the planet, the 
first voices likely to be "deconstructed" are those of people already oppressed, 
the voices of the poor, of women, but also the voices of the body and of the 
earth itself " (page 28 1) 
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Consequently, Reason (although an instigator of 'new paradigm research') rejects a 
relativist ontology in favour of a more subtle combination of objective and subjective 
reality. This compromise seems to be inconsistent with the basic epistemological 
differences between positivism and interpretivism. Although the possibilities of 
rapprochement are held out at a technical level, with the exception of Reason and 
Hammersley, few authors reviewed consider this at the philosophical level. 
Nevertheless, Harnmersley presents a persuasive argument for "subtle realismý' and 
suggests that the apparent dichotomy between the two paradigms can be closed to the 
benefit of both. This argument is reviewed below in considering ways in which the 
debate can be resolved. 
6.4 RESOLUTIONS, 
There is an large body of social science literature calling for the resolution of the 
dichotomy, showing how this can be and is being achieved, or pointing out that the 
dichotomy is false and that the two "paradigms" are not paradigms at all in the sense 
meant by Kuhn (1970). As with the arguments presented above, resolutions can be 
divided into methodological and philosophical (Bryman 1988), with the 
methodological being more easily illustrated. Accordingly, the arguments for resolution 
at this level are considered first. 
Bryman (1988), in pointing out the difference between epistemological and 
methodological versions of the qualitative/quantitative debate notes that "The tendency 
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to associate particular methods with particular epistemological positions is little more 
than a convention which took root in the 1960s" (page 125). From this point, Bryman 
goes on to illustrate that qualitative and quantitative approaches (methodologically 
defined) can be combined in any way that gives valid results. The point is taken up by 
Atkinson and Hammersley (1998), who note that participant observation is claimed by 
interpretivists, but is also used by positivists. Nfiller and Crabtree (1998) also advocate 
mixing and matching of methods, whilst noting interpretivists' fears of mixing on the 
grounds of not wanting to be seen to acknowledge a subservience of qualitative to 
quantitative paradigms. The authors, in overcoming their fear, expand on multi method 
approaches including concurrent, nested, sequential and combined designs. Fontana 
and Frey (1998), Gill and Johnson (1997) and Robson (1993) similarly support various 
combinations of methods to achieve required ends. Robson, in particular parallels 
Runeson and Chau et al in advocating inductive/interpretive research for theory 
building and deductive/quantitative research for theory testing. 
Authors coming from an interpretivist background and advocating mixed 
methodologies, have also implicitly accepted some form of realist ontology, because 
the use of some methods necessarily requires the testing of abstract theory. It is this 
implication which appears to be behind the "purist" comments of Seymour et al and it 
is for this reason that mixing and matching may not be acceptable to all interpretivists. 
However, this dichotornization in itself leads to a resolution in the form of the two 
paradigms having clearly different subject areas of study. This resolution, which can 
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best be described as the "horses for courses" argument, is both widely expressed and 
widely implied. For example, Hammersley (1992), in a critique of practitioner research, 
draws a distinction between, on the one hand, more general scientific research, carried 
out by specialist researchers and producing research of indirect and general relevance 
and on the other hand problem-solving and reflective inquiry, producing information 
that is of more specific and direct relevance to practice. He considers both forms of 
research valid, but require different methods of managing subject matter. Denzin 
(1998) also notes that positivist and interpretivist paradigms have different aims and 
gives details of what those aims are, with positivistic research being concerned with the 
"world of causes and effects" and constructivist/interpretivist research being involved 
in "interpretation of the subject matter at hand" (page 502). Greene (1998) takes a 
range of philosophical standpoints including post-positivism, pragmatisn-ý 
interpretivism and critical theory and fits different research questions to each. For 
example, she fits questions concerning policy and macro decision making to positivism, 
whereas she fits questions concerning staff welfare and empowerment to 
interpretivism. Guba and Lincoln (1998), whilst generally critical of positivism, also 
acknowledge the differing aims of positivistic, constructivist and critical theorist 
research. Positivism is concerned with prediction and control of phenomena, 
constructivism with understanding and reconstruction and critical theory with critique 
and transformation. Rose (1982) notes the particular successes of participant 
observation and field work based on interpretivism thus: - 
"the major success of the (interpretive) approach seems to be in research on 
social organisations and on looser-knit social groups, where the focus of the 
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inquiry is the 'here and now' of group dynan&s, the ideology or the world 
view of the group, or a specific process or experience" (page 129) 
There is also a de facto correspondence between epistemological beliefs and subjects 
of study in much interpretivist literature (Schwantz 1998, Smithgate 198 1, Torbert 
1981A, 1981B, 1981C, Janesick 1998, Reason 1998, Nfiller and Crabtree 1998, 
Fontana and Frey 1998 Adler and Adler 1998, Hodder 1998, Harper 1998, Clandinin 
and Connelly 1998, Rist 1998, Checkland 1981,1989). An example of the "horses for 
courses" argument is provided by Checkland (198 1), who illustrates the specialist 
application of systems theory to "soft systems methodology" (a type of operational 
research based on interpretivism) as follows: - 
Study of 
Systems as 
Such 
The 
Systems 
Movement 
Applications of 
Systems Theory 
to other 
DisciDlines 
Theory of 
Systems 
Problem 
Solving - 
Applications to 
"Real World 
Problems" 
Hard Systems 
to Decision 
Soft Systems, 
Soft Systems 
Methodology etc. 
FIGURE 6.1 THE APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS THEORY TO SOFT 
SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY (Source - Checkland (1981) page 95) 
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Checkland applies soft systems methodology to problem solving applications "bounded 
by the organisational setting" (page 154) and not to the more general scientific 
research mentioned by Hammersley (1992). 
With respect to the philosophical debate, Morgan (1983), in introducing a reader 
presenting both positivistic and interpretivist views, makes the same point as Thomas 
Kuhn (1970); that the propositions within a particular paradigm cannot be "proved, 
disproved, or evaluated on the basis of axioms within the (paradigm)" (page 15). Thus, 
conversion or consensus is required if the dichotomy is to be resolved at the 
paradigmatic level. Consensus has been appearing for several years, but the call for 
reconciliation by the interpretivist George Marcus (1998) shows that it has largely been 
achieved. Marcus comments on the over-reaches of interpretative science: - 
"I believe the major fear in the general reception to the now decade-long 
radicalization of tendencies .... that have been present from the very 
inception of 
qualitative social science is that of transgression, of excessive skepticism, and 
of a paralyzing relativism - of a crossing of limits beyond which "anything 
goes".... and where even the possibility of communitas - of a shared discourse - 
among scholars has become imperilled" (page 403) 
Marcus continues by citing with approval examples of ethnographic research which 
display a commitment to a return to objective knowledge in order to "re-invigorate a 
current exhaustion with the explicit rhetoric of the post-modem debates" (page 403). 
A similar call for consensus is made by Lincoln and Denzin (1998), who note that 
continual inter-paradigmatic criticism is of little relevance to active researchers. 
fEstorically, even where largely interpretivist methods have been advocated, forms of 
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theorising have not been eschewed. Thus, even though Weber's "verstehen" is much 
quoted as the correct approach to social research, Weber himself de-emphasised 
methodological issues and was prepared to compromise between nomothetic and 
ideographic methods. To Weber, theories in the form of concepts never completely 
captured the empirical world, but could be used as heuristic tools for gaining a better 
understanding of reality (Ritzer 1996). Berger and Luckmann (1967) also expressly 
stated that they did not have a polemic intent in writing "The Social Construction of 
Reality", and they supported both positivistic science and the use of theory in 
pragmatic applications. 
Three attempts to combine realist and anti-realist ontologies are Huberman and Miles's 
(1998) "transcendental realism", Reason's (1981) "perspective" and Hammersley's 
(1992) "subtle realism". It is difficult to see how Huberman and Miles's conception 
differs from any other "realism" given their belief that "social phenomena exist not only 
in the mind, but in the objective world as well" (page 433). Reason also implies prior 
knowledge in the mind in defining perspective as "a personal view from some distance" 
(page 241), which appears little different from outright realism. However, Hammersley 
gives considerable detail in promoting subtle realism. He considers that it is consistent 
to believe in the existence of phenomena independent of claims about them and to not 
assume unmediated contact with them. Consequently, "knowledge is belief of which 
we are reasonably confident" (page 50) and phenomena can exist independently of 
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claims made about them. The aim of social research is the representation (not 
reproduction) of reality and it can accommodate different points of view: - 
"the fact that we have no direct access to reality, and thereby to knowledge 
that can provide a foundation of certainty for our understanding of the world, 
does not necessarily imply rejection of truth as correspondence. Nor does it 
undermine the idea that some methods are more effective than others in 
producing knowledge of reality, or the ideal that there are criteria by which we 
can judge empirical claims. These conclusions only follow if we assume that for 
claims to be called knowledge they must be known with absolute certainty, that 
to be of any value methods must ensure true findings and that criteria must 
produce assessments that are beyond all possible doubt .... there 
is no reason to 
make these very strong assumptions" (page 6 1). 
The validity of research is measured by its truth. It is true if it represents accurately the 
phenomena that it is intended to "describe, explain or theorise" (page 6 1). This is the 
"correspondence theory of truth" and Hammersley considers that adequate evidence of 
truth is not an absolute measure. In everyday life, it might be demonstrated "beyond 
reasonable doubt", or by use of "cost and value" calculations (page 69). For research 
seeking wider applicability, higher standards are required including submitting it to 
peer review among the specialist research community. These views on measures of 
truth correspond closely with both actual scientific practice and tests of authenticity 
demanded by interpretivist researchers. For example, Popper (1959) notes the 
uncertainty of science: - 
"the empirical basis of objective science has nothing 'absolute' about it. Science 
does not rest on rock bottom. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it 
were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven 
down ftom above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or given base, 
and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not 
because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied 
that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being" 
(page 179 in Losee 1993) 
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Popper recognises the possibility of competing theories and proposes "verisimilitude') 
as a process of approximating towards the truth. Interestingly, exactly the same test of 
validity (verisimilitude) is referred to by several interpretivists including Lincoln and 
Denzin (1998) and Adler and Adler (1998). Given the apparent reconciliation of 
paradigms, it is appropriate that methods should begin to show common features. 
Modern social science theory appears, therefore, to be able to accommodate both 
positivistic and interpretivist approaches. Some authors still take a "purist" 
interpretivist stand including Guba and Lincoln (1998)and an umnoderated positivist 
stand appears to be held by Harriss, but even these "extremists" appear prepared to 
recognise the value of the "opposite" paradigm in limited applications. 
Accommodation does not, however, necessarily mean that there are not substantial 
disagreements in detail and points related to, for example, unethical scientific study, or 
problems of generalisability with interpretivism, are well founded. Assuming that these 
problems can be adequately addressed by careful research design and execution, there 
is still the problem of correctly applying method to study objectives. Denzin (1998), 
Bryman (1988), Harnmersley (1992), Greene (1998), Rist (1998) and Reason (1998, 
198 1) as well as several other authors have clearly demonstrated that different research 
objectives require different methods. If cause is being investigated, then some form of 
propositional research is justified. In order to make such research generally applicable, 
beyond the research setting, a certain degree of separation between researcher and 
researched and some use of quantitative techniques might be justified. If understanding 
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is sought, or change from within desired, then a more inductivist approach following 
the interpretive pattern is appropriate. In relation to the current study, the choice of an 
applied research methodology, using a propositional approach will be argued in the 
following section. 
6.5 AN APPLIED RESEARCH APPROACH 
In his response to the call for debate in construction management, Runeson made 
reference to the heterogeneous grouping of subjects included under the banner of the 
discipline. Many of these he dismissed as "not science" in a manner which implied that 
the only "good" knowledge was a particular kind of scientific knowledge. Yet, even a 
cursory glance at the abstracts of papers in the major construction management 
journals, Construction Management and Economics, and Engineering Construction and 
Architectural Management, indicates that the majority of papers are of the applied type 
dismissed by Runeson. A further glance at active research programmes promoted 
through the United Kingdom Government also indicates that they are concerned to a 
large extent with applied research 2. The ground upon which Runeson rejects such 
research as science - that it is concerned with bettering work practices and the like is 
supported by Bryman's (1988) definition of positivistic science, which denies validity 
to normative statements as they cannot be verified. The problem with this view is that, 
not only does it reject much interpretive research as "respectable knowledge", but all 
applied propositional research with a normative content as well. Weber (1948) 
179 
6- Methodoloýy 
attempted to avoid the problem of normative values in research by advocating a clear 
separation of both politics and personal values from science. He supported science 
thus: - 
"To affirm the value of science is a presupposition for teaching (in the 
classroom). I personally by my very work answer in the affirmative, and I also 
do so from precisely the standpoint that hates intellectualism as the worst 
devil... " (page 152) 
Weber advocated the separation of values from science thus: - 
"I am ready to prove from the works of our historians that whenever the man 
of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the 
facts ceases" (page 146) 
However, Weber did not suggest that values had no place in the behaviour of 
scientists, merely that the normative questions relating to choice of subjects of study, 
the orientation towards "bettering work practices" and the like preceded the practice 
of science. Runeson's rejection as science practical management problems, and by 
implication his rejection as scientific the research methods of those working on such 
problems, betrays an un-necessarily strict positivist view that all research, including the 
selection of research topics must be strictly value neutral. This view was clearly not 
held by Weber. It also demands an examination of the nature of applied work in fields 
related more closely to construction management than economics or the natural 
sciences. 
2 For an example of such a research programme, see the Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions, DETR Construction Research and Innovation Programme: Compendium of Projects 
on the DETR Web site. 
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The first requirement in widening the debate towards applied knowledge is to examine 
forms of knowledge beyond scientific reasoning. It is interesting to note that Kuhn 
(1970) recognised both normative imperatives and different forms of knowledge in 
developing his paradigm theory- 
"in fields - like medicine, technology and law ... the principal raison d'etre is an 
external social need (and these fields are not driven by) paradigm change". 
(page 19) 
Further, Kuhn tested his own theory by the pragmatic standard of efficacy as follows-. - 
CC.... one set of reasons for taking the theory seriously is that scientists do in fact 
behave as the theory says they should" (page 208) 
In responding to a point raised by Runeson, that medicine depends upon positivistic 
science, Seymour et al also note the difference between science and medical practice: - 
"Apart from the scientific work that has gone into the formulation of the pills, 
the order of knowledge on which the doctor draws is entirely separate from the 
scientific. And what can we say about the surgeon's skill in wielding the 
scalpel? It represents more than the knowledge of anatomy" (page 110) 
Seymour et al differ from Kuhn in linking "non-scientific" knowledge to interpretivism; 
a link which is also made by Hamilton (1998). Hamilton draws a distinction, taken 
from Aristotle, between theoretical and practical knowledge. He links the former to 
science and the latter to interpretivism. However, there is no reason to suppose that 
practical knowledge is based solely on interpretivism. The flaw in Seymour et al's 
point is that the general practitioner and the surgeon are just as likely to use abstract 
propositional reasoning as the scientist developing the drugs they use. 
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Ferre (1995), in discussing the philosophical roots of technology, also gives 
considerable attention to the differences between the forms of intelligence which 
underlie practical and theoretical reasoning. Drawing on Whitehead (1929), he notes 
that practical reasoning is outcome oriented, judged by its applicability to a problem, is 
of instrumental value and does not require explicitness - it only needs to produce 
results. In contrast, theoretical intelligence is disinterested, focuses on depth and 
precision, is judged by its means, is explicit and relies on linguistic abstraction. The 
mode of progress of practical reason is through invention. In contrast the language of 
theoretical progress is discovery or understanding. An important use of practical 
knowledge is the development of valuable applied concepts to produce inventions and 
innovations which work. It is not primarily concerned with discovery or understanding 
per se, unless these achievements are directed towards practical improvements. As the 
capacity to achieve abstract propositions is central to practical reasoning, in contrast to 
Han-fflton, Ferre clearly adopts a realist position - objective reality is literally the 
"object" of invention or innovation. 
Knowledge in applied technological fields like construction management is likely to 
involve practical reasoning and use propositional research (for example, of the kind 
mentioned in Wes and Huberman, 1994). It relies for validity on corroborative 
evidence much as the detective or medical practitioner uses in determining cause 
(Nfiles and Huberman 1994, Creswell 1998, Nfintzberg 1973), but its over-riding 
imperative is, as Runeson correctly noted, that its products work. It is value neutral in 
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its application, but, in line with Weber. (1948) deals with values as a prelude (for 
example in the choice of topics of study). This model of reasoning finds support from 
the operation of the Law (Lloyd 1964, Farrar and Dugdale 1984, Holland and Webb 
1996) and from many social scientists who consider the practical applicability of theory 
of paramount importance. These include Robson (1993) (who expressly invokes both a 
technological and a quasi judicial model of analysis), Harnmersley (1992), Atkinson 
and Harnmersley (1998), Heron (198 1), Sanford (198 1) Rist (1998), Gill and Johnson 
(1997) and Checkland (1981). 
Keating (1997) articulates the approach (in relation to research into social work) thus: - 
"The test of theory is not only how well it explains what we are seeing, but also 
how well is serves particular interests and purposes" (page 7) 
Further support is provided by Gill and Johnson (1997), who adopt a "pragmatic 
epistemological position" based on "explicit recognition that social theory is 
interconnected with social practice" (page 149): - 
"the truthfulness of any methodologically corroborated explanation or account 
would be ultimately available, or testable, only through practice. This makes it 
incumbent upon the researcher to provide a clear guide to the practical 
ramifications of the theory and the subsequent practices that would 
pragmatically test that theory .... research should proceed at 
least to identify the 
practical ramifications of (an) account and, ideally, should also proceed to test 
that account through practical interventions into our world so as to get 
feedback from that external reality" (page 149) 
To conclude this section, therefore, construction management is a practical discipline. 
A research paradigm appropriate to construction management should use an applied 
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approach and be judged by the success of its discoveries as applied to practical 
inventions, whether abstract or physical. It uses all forms of knowledge, provided they 
are effective and these include both positivistic science and interpretivism. Its 
outcomes might be in the form of immediately applicable inventions, or in the form of 
more generally applicable guides to policy that in turn inform practical decisions. It is 
within this paradigm that the research presented in this thesis operates and accordingly 
adopts a multi-methodological design, but with a primarily applied propositional 
orientation. 
6.6 THE RESEARCH 
PREVIOUS STUDEES OF ERROR 
Many studies of error and its outcomes consist of documentary reviews. These fall into 
three broad classes. Authors such as Turner (1978), Perrow (1984), Vaughan (1990), 
Sagan (1993) and Jones and Nathan (1990), review the published reports of major 
disasters and attempt to synthesise general conclusions from these, authors such as 
Eldukair and Ayyub (1991) and Brown and Xiaochen Yin (1988) review large numbers 
of press reports of failure, analyse their cause and draw conclusions and several 
authors including McKaig (1962), Kaminetzki (199 1) and Feld (1968) anecdotally 
collect and analyse reports of failures. Some authors including Rollings and Rollings 
(1991), Doud and Hamdani (1988), Dea and Gans (1986) and Karninetzky (1991) 
extend their analysis to include lesser failures, as a series of case studies, often of a 
"forensic engineering" nature. The approach, however, is much the same as the 
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documentary reviewers listed above - to analyse past mistakes, to generalise and learn 
lessons. 
Field research is more limited, but includes the series of case studies of IFEgh Reliability 
Organisations reported by Roberts (1993). In these studies, the researchers attempt to 
get inside the organisations to observe their actions. Use is made of experiment by 
Mark Stewart (1993,1994) and his co-researchers at the University of Newcastle, 
Australia, in attempting to measure engineering design errors and several researchers 
including "ttington et al (1992) and Sani (1988) use field surveys of organisations in 
constructing models of the error process or of quality assurance. I-Enze and Raboud 
(1988) use a combination of the reported accident record of US contractors with an 
analysis of the method of construction planning used by those contractors to draw a 
conclusion that the better a site was planned, the lower was its accident record. Duff et 
al (1994) use field experiment in evaluating the effect of feedback and goal-setting 
techniques on the safety performance of construction operatives. 
The UK Building Research Establishment use surveys and observational studies for 
their research reported in Chapter 4. For a general study of the technical causes of 
defects, Griffin (1990) uses a postal survey of 116 Local Authorities, the survey 
instrument being a structured questionnaire form. Both Harrison (1993) and Bonshor 
and Harrison (1983A) use observational studies of housing projects. The studies 
involved the observation, recording and analysis of faults as they arose during 
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construction. Bentley (1981) uses a similar method of observation, but centres on two 
key personalities (the clerk of works and the site manager), rather than faults, in 
evaluating "quality related events". Bentley also supplements his numerical analysis of 
quality related events with interviews and detailed narration of case studies, which 
show both the pathology of error incubation and the ingredients that go into good 
quality construction. 
ACCOUNT OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Introduction 
The review of previous research gives the impression that it was possible to fully 
discover, document, analyse and criticise other researchers' attempts to improve the 
understanding of human error prior to commencing work. However, the research 
process was more organic, involving the discovery of literature (including that related 
to methodology) at the same time as some field work was carried out. The analogy 
proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) of a criminal investigation, where 
propositions in the form of hunches are floated by a detective, tentatively tested and 
later modified, more accurately reflects the path of the research. In order to save time 
and take advantage of opportunities offered and (to continue the detective analogy) 
not to let the trail go cold, several tasks were carried out concurrently. Although there 
was a risk that this would lead to mistakes in choices of methodology, inconsistencies 
between studies and, possibly, abortive work, the risk was considered worthwhile in 
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order to more comprehensively investigate the subject matter within a manageable 
timescale. 
The studies 
Literature review 
The starting point for the research was a review of the literature as reported in 
Chapters 2,3 and 4. The pgth of this review, commencing with the investigation of 
defects, was described in the Introduction. Much reviewing was conducted intuitively, 
based on the researcher's experience of investigating more specific construction 
problems. A deliberate attempt was made to widen the sources of information as far as 
possible - to consider all the possible leads that might have a bearing on the occurrence 
of defects. This "inclusive" approach involved the exan-ýination of several disciplines, 
but also involved looking at outcomes other than defects, such as accidents and 
business failures) and looking at the "success" side of outcomes, for example, in the 
quality assurance and safety literature (See figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). 
Model construction 
The process of integrating the various perspectives on human error reviewed in the 
literature led -to the emergence of common categories. Certain authors had also 
indicated that errors in complex organisations could not be treated in isolation and 
should be considered as systems. Many authors had structured the causes of error into 
hierarchical models and this led to the tentative proposition that errors in construction 
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could also be modelled. Drawing from literature related to errors in project based 
industries (for example, Whittington et al 1992), a model of error was proposed and is 
detailed in Chapter 5. 
Preliminary study 
Immediately the model had been formulated, a decision was made to attempt a 
preliminary verification in order to. more closely control the research and avoid setting 
off on false leads. The objective of the preliminary study was to investigate, primarily, 
whether the content and form of such a model was applicable to those most affected by 
construction errors - the participants in the construction process. This led to the 
decision to use a postal opinion survey and a largely closed question type 
questionnaire. The advantages of this type of instrument were seen as: - 
* It allowed a sample of a cross-section of the population, thus allowing for some 
generalisability of results. 
e It could be prepared and administered fairly quickly, thus providing rapid feedback 
in directing future work on errors. 
9 It comprehensively represented the model. 
The method of sampling (for detail see Chapter 7) involved an opportunistic sample of 
students at a university combined with a "snowball" element, where students were 
asked to pass questionnaires to colleagues. The method of analysis involved largely 
statistically based quantitative techniques drawn from standard texts in the area 
(Bryman 1989, Coolican 1994, Howell 1989, Kinnear and Gray 1994). Coding and 
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analysis of qualitative responses also followed standard texts in the area (Miles and 
Huberman 1994, Hamel 1993, Yin 1993,1994, Strauss and Corbin 1990). On 
completion of the preliminary study, feedback was sought by submitting a paper for 
publication (Atkinson 1998). 
Statistical study 
In order to strengthen and develop the results from the preliminary study, a method of 
relating the content of the model directly to the occurrence of defects was sought. 
Analysis of data from I-Egh Court records of litigation related to defects was 
considered, but was unavailable, as was data concerning defects from a building 
4gPiarantee company. Had such 
data been available, some form of documentary analysis ; I-- 
or field experiment might have been devised. In the event a statistical study was 
devised to compare aspects of the model with levels of defects on 23 ongoing house- 
building sites (for detail see Chapter 8). The advantages of this approach were: - 
* It attempted to relate the model directly to the level of defects. 
e It provided data suitable for statistical analysis, thus improving reliability. 
* Some information could be directly observed by the researcher 
* It allowed some generalisation within a limited population 
As with the preliminary study, techniques used in the statistical study relied on 
standard texts in the area. 
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Interview study 
An early decision was made to supplement statistical analysis with interviews. This was 
because not all aspects of the model were amenable to statistical analysis, particularly 
those related to systen-dc effects, where one error could lead to another in a different 
category. 
The collection of statistics involved a physical visit to sites and this provided an 
opportunity to combine the collection of statistics with an interview with the site 
manager. When combined with a further wider set of interviews of senior construction 
personnel and building guarantee company managers (for detail see Chapter 9) the 
responses could be used as corroborating evidence of the causes of errors and to 
provide information on factors not amenable to statistical analysis. It was at this point 
that it was realised that satisfactory investigation of all properties of the proposed 
model would rely on the totalit of findings from several studies. Thus, the 
triangulation methodolo encountered earlier in such works as Miles and Huberman 
(1994) was reviewed and became a conscious goal of the studies. The method used for 
the interview study was to conduct a largely undirected open interview as detailed in 
Chapter 9 following coding methods advocated in the standard qualitative texts 
mentioned above. The triangulation methodology also followed recognised writings on 
research methods (Nfiller and Crabtree 1998, Robson 1993, Bryman 1988, Winch 
1990) Gill and Johnson 1997). In addition, triangulation followed Koch (1993), who 
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specifically applied it to studies of error avoidance in High Reliability Organisations, 
illustrating the appropriateness of the technique in the current context. 
Observational study 
Researcher observation was used largely to complement the interviews and follow the 
pathology of errors as they arose. During the site visits and interviews detailed in 
Chapters 8 and 9, discussions were held on the possibility of closely observing one site 
in action. The advantages of such an observational study were-- 
e It allowed for assessment of the pathology of errors as they arose, including 
examining links between underlying and patent causes. 
e It allowed direct observation by the researcher rather than reliance on reporting by 
others in the Interview Study. 
e It allowed factors that could not be measured in the statistical study to be 
considered. 
Against these advantages is set the fact that any information would be local, from 
which it would be difficult to generalise beyond the situation. Research methods used 
again followed standard texts noted above (for detail see Chapter 10). 
The rationale for each method is summarised in table 6.1 overleaf. This table is based 
on Nfintzberg's (1973) justification for his research approaches as reported in Gill and 
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Johnson (1997) modified to suit the current work and with disadvantages drawn from 
the conclusions reported in Chapter II added. 
TABLE 6.1 - JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH APPROACH (AFTER 
MINTZBERG 1973) 
Method Applications Advantages Disadvantages Appropriate 
use 
Wide literature General Convenient Time Cover broad 
review consuming.. field of study. 
Model Whittington et al Allows for Involves Conceptualise 
Construction (1992), Embrey complexity preconceptions complex 
(1992), Bea (1994) interacting 
system. 
Questionnaire Grilfin (1990) Generalisable, Sample Provide early 
survey quick, limitations, feedback 
comprehensive constraining. 
Statistical field Hinze and Raboud Generalisable, Construct Provide link 
study (1988) reliable, direct validity, data between 
constraints propositions 
and defects 
Interviews Bentley (1981) Allows for Localised, Operation of 
probing of causal selective model, 
links and induction, including links 
pathology of interviewee bias between causes. 
errors. Complement 
statistical 
study.. 
Participant Bentley (1981), Direct, reveals Localised, time Examine causes 
observation Harrison (1993), detailed pathology consuming and pathology. 
Roberts (1993) 
Triangulation Robson 1993, Provides Requires Basis for 
Bryman 1988, Koch corroboration multiple studies overall 
(1993) findings. 
An investigative research methodology 
Table 6.1 shows a "methodological" precedent related to each of the field studies 
adopted. However, most precedents were "single studies" and were more vulnerable to 
methodological failings than multiple studies using a variety of methods. The current 
research, based on the use of multiple studies and triangulation, appears a more robust 
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method for investigative research 3. The key components of an investigative 
methodology arising from this research and suitable to applied research problems can 
be distilled, therefore, as follows: - 
1) A detailed search of literature using as wide a source of information as is consistent 
with the research problem(s). 
2) The formulation of propositions. In the current research this was in the form of a 
model 
3) Preliminary verification of propositions to test for general applicability 
4) Search for more detailed corroboration, refutation or modification of preliminary 
findings. 
5) Further studies until sufficient evidence is uncovered to support corroboration. The 
measure of sufficiency might be the "beyond reasonable doubt" criteria proposed by 
Hammersley (1992). 
6) Comparison of studies in a process of triangulation. 
This methodology, although derived largely intuitively, is supported by Rose's (1982) 
E-IL" A BCDE model of a suitable process for social science research. In constructing the 
3 Both the value of multiple studies and the need to allow subsequent studies to influence earlier ones 
is recognised by C Wright Nfills (1970) with respect to sociology: - 
"Good work in social science today is not, and usually cannot be, made up of one clear-cut empirical 
'research'. It is, rather, composed of a good many studies which at key points anchor general 
statements about the shape and the trend of the subject. So the decision - what are these anchor 
points? - cannot be made until existing materials are re-worked and general hypothetical statements 
constructed" (page 222) 
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model, Rose expressly recognises that theory is often reconsidered in the light of 
empirical findings, re-written and later re-tested in an iterative process: - 
"One important point is that, in most research reports which test theories, the 
author will normally reconsider the theory after the empirical findings have 
been described. The re-writing of theory (or at least parts of the theory) to take 
account of new findings is the most common result of theory-testing research: 
this comment applies whether the theory tested is confirmed or refuted" (page 
46) 
Rose's model involves five steps, A- generation of theory, B- generation of abstract 
propositions (in the current research the preliminary model), C- operationalisation of 
propositions, D- field work and E- results. Theory, propositions and 
operationalisation are linked to results with feedback links as follows: - 
IAI 
THEORY 
B 
PROPOSITIONS 
FEEDBACK 
FEEDBACK 
c FEEDBACK 
OPERATIONALISATION 
4 
D 
FIELD WORK 
E 
RESULTS 
FIGURE 6.2 THE ABCDE MODEL (ROSE 1982) 
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A similar model is proposed by Gill and Johnson (1997) more specifically related to 
practical interventions: - 
THEORYI J DETERMINE I INTERVENTION 
INTERVENTION 
EVALUATION REASSESS 
FIGURE 6.3 FEEDBACK MODEL OF RESEARCH - ADAPTED FROM 
GH, L AND JOHNSON (1997) 
The sequential nature of the studies in the current research allowed feedback and 
modification of the proposed model, much as envisaged by Rose, and Gill and 
Johnson. Applying Rose's ABCDE model (Figure 6.2) to the research process used 
gives a diagram similar to that shown in the Introduction (Figure 1.1), but with 
feedback links. This modification is shown in figure 6.4 overleaf. 
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DEFECT'S 
LITERATURE 
PROPOSITIONS 
(NIODEL) 
0 
Preliniiiian- 
study 
FEEDBACK 
Stafistic al 
stud), 
CONCLUSIONS' 
Int e r-%, -i e-w 
study 
Obseni-afional 
REFINED study 
AlODEL-4----\ 
FURTHER 
WORK 
FIGURE 6.4- THE RESEARCH PROCESS FOLLOWING ROSE (1 82) 
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7 
PRELIMINARY STUDY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This element of the research addresses the form and content of the model (the first 
and second questions identified on page 150 in Chapter 5) by conducting a survey of a 
representative sample of construction industry participants. Although presented as the 
first research question, examining the form of the model was easier after examining the 
content and, therefore the questions are reversed, with an analysis of content being 
conducted and presented first. 
DETAILED OBJECTIVES 
Related To The Content Of The Model 
In order to establish the relative importance of factors and their weighting between 
levels of the model two detailed questions were formulated, what was the relative 
weighting of factors in the model and were these factors applicable gene in the 
opinion of a cross-section of the population who would be expected to be familiar with 
the intricacies of building projects? 
With regard to the weighting of factors, the model placed emphasis on latent factors 
(classified as managerial and global) and confirmation of this emphasis was sought in 
the survey. If latent factors were emphasised in the survey, this would both act to 
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confirm the assumption in the model that the pathology of error requires consideration 
of the whole "Project system" rather than the most obvious active errors and give an 
opportunity to direct future research to elements within the model of greatest 
perceived importance. 
With regard to the applicability of factors, it was necessary, in order to construct a set 
of error inducing factors applicable to most construction projects, to check for general 
agreement within a cross-section of the construction industry. Should differences 
between groups be apparent the reasons for differences should be explored and could 
be used to expand, or strengthen the model by providing more than one perspective. 
Related To The Form Of The Model 
The model in common with similar models drawn from the literature adopted two 
untested structural dimensions. It categorised the sources of error and it layered those 
sources into a hierarchy (also a form of categorisation). The principles of 
categorisation were based on analysis and synthesis of the literature and this research 
sought to test the categorisation by empirical research. Two questions were, therefore, 
posed - were the range of factors comprehensive and was the hierarchical structure of 
the model (with three separate lUers - global, managerial and primary) a valid 
vertical cate,?, o-risation? 
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. 
7.2 METHOD 
An opinion survey of a representative quota of construction industry practitioners was 
conducted. 
TARGET POPULATION 
Target population requirements were that the respondents were drawn from three 
groups: - 
Commissioninz, brief-inp-, desip-n and desi2n checkin2 sectors of the construction 
industrv 
The construction industry is exceptional in that design and construction are normally 
separated, with design being carried out by consultants or experts acting "in-house" to 
the client organisation (Tavistock Institute 1966). Including in a survey those 
responsible for the briefing and design process was considered important. These 
individuals ri-ýight be expected to have a view both of their own role in construction 
projects and of the role of others, especially those in the construction side of the 
industry. 
Constructors 
Contracting and sub-contracting organisations are normally responsible for 
construction only, with design of all but minor details being performed by others. 
Managers within construction organisations have to avoid construction errors 
occurring, sometimes including design errors and they may well have views on other 
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parts of the process. Including representatives from construction was, therefore, 
considered an essential part of the survey. 
Neutral respondents 
It was envisaged that a survey of designers and constructors might give strongly 
polarised views. In order to test for this, it was desirable to include relatively neutral 
respondents. If views between designers, constructors and the neutral respondents 
were reasonably correlated, it might be concluded that responses were not unduly 
polarised. 
It was decided to target consultant or client based quantity surveyors as neutral 
respondents. It was recognised that consultant quantity surveyors are normally paid by 
the client (AQUA 1996) and are not strictly neutral, but they characteristically occupy 
a more detached position between the design and construction parts of projects than 
either the contractor or designer. In particular they: - 
* Are not involved directly in the design or construction process. Although they 
typically evaluate work in progress and at completion, they specifically do not 
normally make deductions for defects, leaving this task to the designer (JCT 1980). 
* Are required to take a neutral stance in matters of post-contract evaluation. This is 
also true, in traditional contracts of engineers, building surveyors and architects, but 
only for certain matters and their position is compromised elsewhere, where an 
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executive stance must be taken. Accordingly such designers were not thought to be 
as impartial as quantity surveyors'. 
SURVEY METHOD 
The method 
The sample consisted of construction industry participants recruited by and including 
final year students of quantity surveying, building surveying and construction 
management following day-release honours degree courses at the South Bank 
University. Also approached were a small number of other similar construction 
industry participants polled directly by the researcher. 
The method used was to ask students to distribute several copies of a pre-prepared 
questionnaire (see appendix 7a). This method would not draw responses from a strictly 
random sample of the industry, but replies from the three broad groups noted above 
were expected. The strengths and weaknesses of this survey method were as follows: - 
Strengths 
I Availability. 
The target group was readily available enabling a fast turnaround time for 
distribution and receipt of returns. 
The neutral role of the quantity surveyor is illustrated by Higgin and Jessop (1965) who describe the 
QS's position as being "St Christopher assisting in the passage of the developing project rather than 
being planted on either (the professional or the commercial) shore" (page 23). 
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Balance. 
A reasonably balanced return within the three groups identified above was 
expected. 
Return numbers. 
A relatively good return was expected. Normally returns of 10% or less are 
achieved with random postal questionnaires. This tends, in itself, to invalidate 
the "random" nature of the survey with only the "interested" responding. Here 
a return of 25% or more was expected and in the event achieved 
Weaknesses 
I Randomness 
The sample would only be drawn from representatives of the construction 
industry known to, or associated with, the students. This quota might be 
expected to be more concerned with education and "day release" than the 
average for the industry. Respondents were also likely to be drawn more from 
established professional, client and construction firms, engaged in providing 
systematic education for their staff. Geographically, most responses came from 
the South East of England and may not be representative of the UK as a whole, 
or other countries. The student population directly represented those following 
In support of this method, Barrett (1989) quotes Moser and Kalton (1971), who note that survey 
non-respondents typically differ from those that respond and that a response rate of 60% plus is 
most desirable. 
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building surveying, quantity surveying and construction management. 
Architecture and engineering students were not directly approached, but 
several architects and engineers were included in the returns as colleagues or 
associates of the students. Trades-people were not directly represented in the 
student body and the survey largely included only managerial and professional 
staff. Some ex-trades-people are included in the eventual returns, but the 
weight of views can not be said to represent operatives in the industry. The 
method of sampling (see below), by asking students to pass questionnaires to 
respondents and to collect them when completed, might have affected the 
independence of responses' 
Ethics 
Using students as the target population would involve ethical considerations. In 
particular, the target groups of students were following units being taught by 
the researcher. Thus it was necessary to make clear that taking part in the 
survey was voluntary and in no way related to performance on the courses. For 
this reason, students were not specifically identified in the distribution of survey 
forms. The forms were un-numbered and the only method of follow-up (in 
order to increase the return rate) was by general exhortation. These points 
were presented to the targeted students in an introductory letter (see below). 
3 The method is a variant of "snowball sampling" (Coolican 1994 page 40). Examination of the 
completed questionnaires indicated that they were completed independently. 
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Detail of the method 
Final year degree students (Year 5) of the part-time degree courses in building 
surveying, quantity surveying and construction management were targeted. Total 
numbers envisaged were approximately 125, but the eventual uptake was 105. The 
students were, as groups, initially solicited to help with the research and the general 
object of the survey was explained. They were told that they would be asked to 
complete a questionnaire and pass further blank copies to their work colleagues, 
superiors and other construction related acquaintances. 
At a later date 105 questionnaire packs were distributed to the students out of a total 
prepared of 125. A few additional packs were distributed directly by the researcher to 
practitioners in the construction industry (those personally known to the researcher, or 
directly expressing an interest in the research). Each pack contained-. - 
*A covering letter (Appendix 7b) explaining the research and pointing out the 
voluntary nature of participation. The letter requested that students recruit 3 or 
more colleagues in completing questionnaires and that they complete one 
themselves. 
* Four copies of the questionnaire. 
One example questionnaire showing how it should be completed, but emphasising 
that the actual scores were for illustration purposes only. 
A stamped addressed envelope for the return of questionnaires. 
204 
7- Preliminary study 
The numbers of questionnaire forms distributed and returned were as shown in table 
7.1. 
TABLE 7.1 - QUESTIONNAME RETURNS 
Prepared for distribution 500 
Distributed 420 
Returned 107 
Percentage return 25.5% 
Survey instrument (Questionnaire) 
The survey questionnaire is included at appendix 7a. It consisted of a 28 item three 
page "closed question" style instrument including fourteen questions asking for both a 
rating (out of 5) and a ranking of methods of avoiding errors leading to defects. 
Questions were generated directly from the model (pages 147-148) with minor 
changes of wording devised to simplify understanding. The respondent was asked to 
rate every method, but only rank the top five methods. The reasons for asking for both 
a rating and a ranking were to check for understanding of the questionnaire and to 
check for random completion (see below). The 14 questions covered the factors 
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identified in the model of the nature of error. However, the questions were not 
structured in any way to reflect the hierarchical nature of the model. 
In addition, one question invited the respondent to supply further factors he/she 
considered important in avoiding errors. Three blanks spaces were given for inserting 
factors and spaces for ranking/rating each additional factor. Other questions asked for 
information on roles and experience for use in analysis. 
To avoid primacy effectS4 in completing the questionnaire, questions logically relating 
to primary factors were placed towards the end (The expectation being that factors 
such as training and selection might be scored unduly highly if placed first). To avoid 
recency effects (i. e. the last questions being given undue weight), the last pre- 
formatted question (Question 14) was placed immediately before the open-ended 
supply question (Question 15). 
Primacy and recency effects were first identified by Ebbinghaus (1885). The primacy effect is 
where items presented early in a list are more likely to be recalled than those presented 
towards the middle. The recency effect is where items presented at the end of a list are more 
likely to be recalled than those towards the middle. 
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7.3 ANALYSIS 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Roles 
The roles of respondents, classified by their employing organisations are as shown in 
Table 7.2 (Returned under "Role of Organisation"): - 
TABLE 7.2 - ROLE OF RESPONDENT 
ROLE NUMBER PERCENT 
Architect 4 3.7 
Building surveyor 18 16.8 
Engineer 6 5.6 
Other designer etc. * 27 25.2 
Quantity surveyor 25 23.4 
Main contractor 21 19.6 
Sub-contractor 6 5.7 
TOTALS 107 100.0 
*"Other designer etc. " includes respondents classifying themselves as clients, clients 
representatives or project managers, or respondents having a general design or design checking 
role. 
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The roles of respondents were grouped for analysis purposes into three main 
categories as shown in Table 7.3 
TABLE 7.3 - ROLE OF RESPONDENT IN NIAIN GROUPS 
ROLE NUMBER PERCENT 
DESIGNER ETC. 55 51.4 
CONSTRUCTOR 27 25.2 
QUANTITY SURVIFYOR 25 23.4 
TOTAL 107 100.0 
Supervisorv Position 
Respondents were asked whether or not they supervised other staff within their 
organisation and 68% did so. The inclusion of a question allowing the division of the 
sample on the basis of supervisory position was made at a late stage in the 
development of the questionnaire and was not directly relevant to the model of the 
error process. The basis for including the question was that it rnight detect an 
"Attribution" or "Blame" effect. Attribution effects are drawn from psychology and 
suggests that the individual might blame external circumstances for his/her own 
failings, but blame the failings of others on their personal inadequacies (Lourens 
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1990)'. Blame effects are reported by Whittington et al (1992) in connection with 
construction industry accidents and might also distort the responses. Thus there could 
be a tendency to "hide" certain factors by deflecting blame elsewhere. A sufficiently 
large "blame" effect might have suggested modifications to the model. 
Experience 
Respondents had a mean of 5.8 years experience in their current role and 17.2 years in 
the construction industry. 
THE ERROR QUESTIONS 
The weii! htinz of factors 
Mean ratings 
Respondents were asked to rate 14 statements, corresponding with the factors in the 
model (Appendix 7a). Mean ratings for the fourteen questions, in descending order of 
magnitude, are as shown in Table 7.4 
5 Quoting Heider (1958) in defining attribution theory as "an overall tendency to attribute what 
happens to other people to their personal responsibility, but to place much more emphasis on the role 
of external circumstances, when explaining what has happened to oneself' (page 1257) 
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From table 7.4 it can be seen that all five managerial factors in the model (page 147- 
148) were within the top half of the ratings over the 14 questions, but, both the global 
factor, "time"'. and the primary factor, "education", were also highly rated. 
Of the low scoring factors, the three least supported were the political climate, client 
expectations and the economic climate. All are grouped in the model as "external 
factors" under Global Factors - respondents appeared to stop short of blarning errors 
on the government and the customer. 
Rankings 
In order to test for random responses and understanding of the questionnaire, 
respondents were asked to provide a ranking of their view of the top 5 methods of 
avoiding errors. The mean rank of each method was computed and compared with the 
rating of each method as shown in Table7.5: - 
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TABLE 7.5 - ERROR QUESTIONS MEAN RANKINGS 
(Compared With Ratings) 
FACTOR RANKING OF 
RATINGS 
RANKING 
Communications 1 1 
Time 2 2 
Concurrency 3 4 
Change control 4 7 
Education and training 5 5 
Checking 6 6 
Responsibility definition 7 3 
Selection 8 9 
Supervision 9 10 
Culture 10 8 
Self-Certifying 11 12 
Economics 12 11 
Client expectations 13 13 
Political influences 14 14 
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The two sets of rankings were compared using Pearson's r tests for the significance of 
correlation and the results were significant (p<0.01) 6. Thus, although there are some 
discrepancies, the ratings were well represented by the rankings and statistically 
provided highly significant correlations. The spread of highly rated factors over the 
three major divisions in the model (global, managerial and primary) is maintained in the 
rankings and the low ranking for external global factors is the same as in the ratings. 
Discrepancies can possibly be explained by some confusion evident in the returns and 
caused by the layout of the questionnaire, where ratings were presented alongside 
rankings. In a piloting of the questionnaire, this confusion became evident and it was 
felt necessary to include a sample of a completed form for guidance. Nevertheless, 
some confusion may have remained and caused the inconsistencies noted above. 
Judging by the large number of returned forms containing comments appended in 
question 15 (the supply question), showing that respondents had given some thought 
to its completion, it is thought unlikely that random completion was widespread. 
The Applicability Of Factors 
The rating returns were analysed in order to determine the extent of agreement 
between the main groups of respondent. Two sets of groups were identified at the 
outset. Firstly occupational groups of designer etc., constructor and quantily surveyor, 
separately identified for reasons outlined above. Examination of the returns was 
' Also significant (p<0.01) using Spearman's Rho. 
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directed towards ensuring a reasonable level of correlation between these groups. 
Where this was not found, the reasons for differences were investigated. Secondly, two 
groups, those supervising and those supervised were also separately identified. This 
split allowed for any significant differences between the individual and the supervisor 
to be identified. The expectation was that each group might "attribute" errors to the 
other group by the supervised stressing managerial factors at the expense of primary 
and the supervisors stressing the opposite, primary factors at the expense of 
managerial. The formal hypotheses were that there would be no significant correlations 
(p<0.05) between the two groups of respondents. 
Pairwise correlations between groups were based on the mean rating scores for each 
group for the 14 questions and the results are shown in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Using 
Pearson's r tests for the significance of correlation, all results were significant at 
p<0.05 7. The formal null hypotheses of no correlation can, therefore, be rejected (See 
appendix 7c for correlation charts). This indicates that, in responding to the 
questionnaire, a common view was taken of the relative importance of factors, both as 
between occupational groups and as between supervisory positions. These close 
correlations are, however, based on mean scores and they might disguise significant 
differences between groups of participants for particular factors. 
' Also significant (p<0.05) using Spearman's Rho. 
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TABLE 7.6 - PEARSON CORRELATIONS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP 
Designer QS Constructor 
Designer 1.000 0.941 0.930 
Correlation 
-Qs 
0.941 1.000 0.841 
Constructor 0.930 0.841 1.000 
Designer - 0.000 0.000 
Significance 
-Qs 
0.000 - 0.000 Constructor 0.000 0.000 - 
Number 14 14' 14' 
TABLE 7.7 - PEARSON CORRELATIONS BY SUPERVISORY POSITION 
Supervisor Non-supervisor 
Correlation Supervisor 1.000 0.904 
Non-supervisor 0.904 1.000 
Significance Supervisor - 0.000 
Non-supervisor 0.000 - 
Number 14 14 
Differences between groups on particular factors 
In order to detect differences between the two groups identified above on individual 
factors, two further sets of statistical tests were used. For the three-way occupational 
role split (Designer-Q S -Constructor) a one way analysis of variance test was run. For 
the two-way split on supervisory experience an independent samples t-test was used. 
The formal hypotheses were that there was no significant difference (p<0.05) between 
samples. 
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Occypational role 
Taking the occupational role variable of "Designer", "QS" and "Constructor" first, the 
results are as shown in Table 7.8 and 7.98 
TABLE 7.8 - DIEFFERENCES BY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE 
ONE-WAY ANOVA 
Sianificant results (D<O. 1) shown bold 
Variable Mean Between" 
groups sig 
Designe QS Constr 
Certifying (self) 2.96 3.21 2.85 0.459 
.... ... ... .. ... ........ .. X X::::: X X. * .... 
........... I 
............ ............ . 
...... 
.......... ý 
...... Checking 3.58 3.84 3.74 0.607 
4T 
% X.. -I 
Concurrency 3.66 3.80 4.15 0.142 
Culture 3.31 3.12 3.41 0.615 
. ........ ........ 
.. .............. ... .... ......... 
............ ........ 
...... ........... 4- 
. . .... . 4 ..... .... .............. ............ ........... ....... ....... ... 
Education 3.59 4.00 3.74 0.329 
Client expects 2.89 2.96 3.07 0.753 
Supervision 3.17 3.48 3.56 0.219 
Political infl 2.39 1.96 2 . 
48 0.196 
....... ... -4-6. 
01 . ........ ..... 
Selection 3.44 3.96 3.67 0.135 
'N ... ............ .................. .. ........... .................... ........ 
8A check was made using a Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric one,, A, ay ANOVA which also showed 
significant differences (p<0.05) for the factors "changes", "communications" and "economics" 
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TABLE 7.9 - DIFFERENCES BY OCCUPATIONAL ROLE 
ONE-WAY ANOVA 
Multiple Comparison Significance test (Games Howell) 
Variables with between aroun siL3, nificance hrK0_ 1) on1v 
Variable Role Role Significance- 
Change control Designer QS 0.774 
Designer Constr 0.020 
QS Constr 0.058 
Communications Designer QS 0.053 
Designer Constr 0.073 
QS Constr 0.983 
Economics D QS 0.613- 
Designer Constr 0.076 
QS Constr 0.030 
Responsibilities Designe QS 0.031 
Designer Constr 0.806 
QS Constr 0.200 
Time Designer QS 0.081_ 
D Constr 0.13 9_ 
QS Constr 0.875 
Superviso? y role 
Taking the division, between "supervisors" and "non-supervisors"(2), the results are as 
shown in Table 7.109. 
A check using a Mann-Whitney U non-parametric test confirmed this result 
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TABLE 7.10 - DIFFERENCES BY SUPERVISORY ROLE 
INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T-TEST 
Sijanificant results (D<O. 1) shown bold 
Variable Supervisor Non-Supervisor Sig- 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Certifying (self) 3.01 1.11 2.94 0.97 0.727 
Change control 3.90 0.96 3.61 1.17 0.222 
Checking 3.73 1.11 3.65 1.07 0.713 
Communications 4.04 1.23 4.32 1.12 0.254 
Concurrency 3.78 1.08 3.82 1.01 0.860 
Culture 3.40 1.01 3.06 1.20 0.164 
Econonucs 2.93 1.04 3.03 1.09 0.649 
Education 3.74 1.13 3.74 1.19 1.000 
1 
Client expects 3.00 1.01 2.88 1.09 0.601 
.... A M, 
Political infl 2.24 1.08 2.41 1.21 0.475 
Responsibilities 3.63 1.13 3.74 1.19 0.677 
Selection 3.72 1.09 3.47 1.05 0.267 
Time 3.78 1.18 4.03 1.11 0.299 
Discussion of the differences 
Between roles 
Differences of factor ratings between the roles of respondents was considered a 
possibility, but not predicted in the survey. Accordingly two-tailed tests of significance 
were used. The results confirm, firstly, the general agreement between groups revealed 
by the correlation tests. Little overall polarisation of views (expressed as a lack of 
significant differences) were evident between the three groups of respondent. Where 
significant (or near significant) differences were apparent, these were concentrated in 
the "managerial" and "global" areas of the model. The pattern of differences show that 
constructors rated all five significant (p<O. 10) factors in table 7.8 higher than 
did 
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designers, with significant (p<0.05) or near significant differences on three of those 
factors. 
The constructors' positions as commercial concerns (as opposed to the more 
consultant roles of designers) may account for different perceptions of the influence of 
global factors of "economics and "time". but, given current pressures on fee income 
and public client market testing of services, this difference is, perhaps, surprising. 
The constructors rating of managerial factors of "change control", "communications" 
and "responsibilities", more highly than designers could be because they place more 
emphasis on the management of projects. However, no corresponding significant 
emphasis by designers on other factors was noted. Constructors, as represented by 
contracting and sub-contracting firms, are much more involved than designers in the 
integration and control of diverse resources and it is this involvement that may account 
for higher ratings on significant factors. This might suggest that error management 
exhibits contingency features, where the importance of factors is dependent on the 
circumstances of the respondent. 
Differences between quantity surveyors and constructors were notable in only two 
areas, "changes" and "economics" also indicating that constructors consider these 
factors more important and, perhaps reflecting their commercial background. 
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Between apervisors and non-Mpervisors 
The highly significant difference between supervisors and non-supervisors on the factor 
"Supervision" was in the opposite direction to what might be expected. Supervisors 
rated this factor significantly higher than non-supervisors, tending to refute suggestions 
of a "blame" or "attribution" effect made in the literature. Similar differences were 
possible for primary factors of " education " and "selection ", where supervisors were 
expected to rate these factors higher than non-supervisors. These were not evident to 
the extent that there was an almost exact fit between distributions of scores for the 
groups on the factor "education". Factors relating to "external circumstances" 
(Lourens 1990) such as "communications" and "culture", might also have been scored 
more highly by those supervised, but this was not seen either. 
The Ranim Of Factors 
The questionnaire contained one question (15) asking the respondent to suggest 
further factors which they considered important in avoiding errors. In total 51 
respondents answered this question (from a total of 107), with 74 comments being 
made (several respondents made more than one comment). The responses were 
classified as follows: - 
A Responses suggesting a technological solution. 
These included comments such as "using feedback from past projects" and "careful, 
practical design, in particular with regard to the relationship between components". In 
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all, nine comments (from 74) of this type were made. Given the technological 
background of the respondents this was a very small number and indicated that the 
respondents were generally taking a "human error" approach in answering the 
question. 
B Responses citing factors outside the model 
Five respondents cited factors outside the direct control of participants in the building 
process (Briefing, design and construction). All were related to materials or 
components brought into the process and example comments were "introduce new 
materials very cautiously", "Careful selection of tried and tested materials for the 
building fabric" and "careful specification of components by the design team to ensure 
co-ordination and compatibility". 
Responses with no clear relationship to the research. 
Two responses could not be categorised and are ignored in the analysis. 
D Responses broadly fitting into the model. 
Most other points fitted within the scope of the model and were classified as-- 
I Primary factors 
2 Supervision and checking 
3 Responsibility definition, changes, concurrency. 
Communications 
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Organisational culture I 
6 Global factors (time, money and client expectations) 
I Prim! iry-factors 
Approximately eight comments were made concerning primary factors such as the 
selection and knowledge of the individual. Comments included "Use qualified and 
skilled operatives on site", and "Ensure individuals carry out (their) own quality 
checks" 
Su pervision and checki 
Four comments were made concerning this factor including "inspection of work before 
covering up" and "supervise all work". The relatively small number of comments 
corresponds with the modest ranking of checking and supervision in the rating survey. 
This contrasts strongly with the emphasis on checking and supervision revealed in the 
literature review. It appears that this factor was considered important by respondents, 
but only amongst others. 
ReMonsibilio! definition, chgpges, concurreaqL. 
Six respondents noted the importance of these factors, some by quoting the factor 
itself, others by mentioning planning or co-ordination. The latter two could be 
considered the means by which responsibilities are defined, changes controlled and 
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concurrency avoided'o. Combining managerial factors relating to defining 
responsibilities, controlling changes and controlling concurrency in one overall 
planning factor was adopted, for operational reasons, in the statistical study of house- 
building (see Chapter 8). Comments included "Having a statement of who is fully 
responsible for design" and "Carry out work in a planned logical sequence". 
Communications 
Eight comments were made in relation to communications including "Close liaison 
between design and construction staff', "Having contractor involvement at design" and 
"Good communications from client to his representative, to main contractor and 
through a system to the tradesmen (via supervisors etc. )". 
Orpanisational culture 
A few comments were made related to organisational culture including "Team culture - 
all working together as a project team", "Team building between contractor, client and 
professional team", "Having a good working relationship with all levels of site staff' 
and "Having a good project team". 
Global factors Ltime, cost and client gMectationjs 
Six respondents mentioned business factors of adequate time and cost to complete 
work. These included such comments as "Avoiding overloading staff with work", 
10 For a justification of this approach see Morris (1994) 
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"Executing work on a basis that gives emphasis on ability and track record rather than 
lowest-price-wins-job basis" and "adequate funding for project". Comments related to 
client expectations included "understanding customer requirements" and "clients being 
clear on standard required". 
Responses suggesting new categories, or modifications to the model. 
Some responses referred to factors not expressly acknowledged in the model. These 
centred on two considerations, "systems" and "leadership and motivation" 
Comments related to "systems" considerations included "Good user friendly 
management with regular review/systems updates", "A QA system properly followed 
and supported", "Implementing formal QA procedures" and "Using a QA system" - 
Comments related to "leadership and motivation" included "Leadership by making sure 
that staff are motivated by defining and giving appropriate responsibility and trusting 
them", "Giving staff a sense of responsibility", "Good motivation within the 
workplace" and "Job satisfaction". 
Although not expressed in the model, comments related to "systems" support the 
systetnic aspects identified in the literature review consistent with the views of ACSNI 
(1993), Turner (1978), Oakland (1993) and Blockley (1992). They do not relate to 
new categories within the model but to the links between categories. They are 
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recognised in the third research question, related to the operation of the model and 
considered in Chapter 8. 
Comments related to leadership and motivation refer to the abilities and qualities of 
individuals in the roles that they act, rather than the procedures that they follow. This 
follows ffirschhorn (1993), who criticises the depersonalisation of functions (in 
connection with f1igh Reliability Organisations), and several writing from a quality 
assurance perspective (Sioholt 1991, Meyer (1994, Barber 1992 and Seymour and 
Low 1990). Although not introducing new categories in the model, the comments 
suggest an alternative conceptualisation based on the identitY of the actors in the 
construction process, as opposed to the managerial functions performed by the actors. 
Conclusions from the consideration of "other factors" 
Most responses to the supply question (15) fell into the categories of the model. Of 
107 returns, 51 respondents made comment under this question and few made points 
that were not directly represented in the model. 
However, the emphasis placed by some respondents on leadership and motivation 
touch on a contradiction in the literature review and resulting model. The model 
follows many modem writers on human error (e. g. Reason 1990, Kletz 1985), who 
consider that blame for error outcomes should not be placed on the individual 
perpetrator and that wider managerial factors are involved. 
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Logically, however, it is obvious that "to err is human"" (e. g. see Petroski 1985). The 
writers appear to be apportioning blame by implication to individuals, the managers of 
organisations rather than operatives. Managers are charged with defining 
responsibilities, controlling changes, ensuring adequate motivation, training and 
selection and instilling a participative, supportive organisational culture. The errors are 
still "primary" in nature, but relate to a different set of individuals and a different set of 
tasks. Following writers such as Hirschhorn (1993) and Seymour and Low (1990), 
who criticise the depersonalisation of managerial functions, perhaps some managerial 
factors should specifically acknowledge "leadership" factors. The importance of this 
acknowledgement is that "leadership" is a primary factor - only it depends on the 
selection, training and education of individual managers not front line construction 
workers. 
The Structure of the Model 
The possibility of more fundamental factors being behind the categories identified in 
the model was hinted at in the responses to the open question (15), where terms such 
as -systems", "culture" and "leadership" were mentioned. It was also possible that the 
statistical correlations between respondents to the questionnaire and the 14 factors 
would group on other underlying, or latent factors corresponding with the three-level 
hierarchical structure of the model and provide statistical support for its 
conceptualisation. In order to try and detect such grouping, the statistical technique of 
11 Alexander Pope, 1688-1744, Essay on Criticism. 
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Factor Analysis employing the principal components method, was used. To allow for 
the possibility of latent factors "naturally" corresponding to the broad grouping factors 
in the model, the questionnaire intentionally did not include any indication of overall 
grouping of the questions. 
Factor analysis is a technique used largely in the study of psychology to detect 
underlying latent variables as displayed by scores on manifest variables. The process 
involves: - 
9 Producing sets of correlation coefficients in matrix form for all the variable 
combinations in a data set. In the present case the variables are formed from the 14 
factors as revealed in the main questions on the questionnaire. 
9 The extraction of latent factors, (known as principal components) represented by 
groups of correlations. 
* The rotation of principal component axes in order to maximise the relationships 
between the variables and some of the factors (Kinnear and Gray 1994). 
In order to avoid confusions between "factors" as used in the model of the error 
process and "latent factors" as used in the factor analysis procedures, the manipulated 
factors are called "variables" with the term "component" used for the underlying 
principal components. The analyses were carried out using SPSS for Windows 
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Following the a priori divisions of the model into primary, managerial and global 
levels, the analysis was restricted to three principal components and revealed loadings 
as shown in table 7.11 and illustrated in figure 7.1: - 
TABLE 7.11 - FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Element Component 
1 2 3 
Making individuals sign off work to certify that they have 
checked their own work 
718 
Controlling changes properly (e. g. variations) . 597 
Independently checking all work which might lead to 
defects . 
521 
Using clear conununications (Drawings/spec/BQs) . 835 
Completing tasks fully before releasing work (e. g. not 
starting construction until relevant drawings are complete). 
. 557 
Having a positive culture in the organisation. . 455 
Having an economic climate that ensures an adequate return 
for work 
. 831 
Improving the education and training of individuals . 728 
Having clients with reasonable expectations with regard to 
quality of work 
. 654 
Supervising/overseeing the work of junior staff . 509 
Having a steady political climate within which to operate . 703 
Clearly defining work responsibilities . 716 
Being careful in the selection of individuals . 617 
Having adequate time to carry out work . 758 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
Absolute values of less that 0.40 suppressed. 
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TABLE 7.12 - FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Total Variance Explained 
I nitial Eigen alues Rotation sum of squ res loadings 
Component Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.126 29.475 29.475 4.016 28.685 28.685 
2 1.794 12.813 42.288 1.812 12.945 1 41.630 
3 1.219 8.706 50.994 1.311 9.364 50.9,011 4 
FIGURE 7.1 - FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Scree Plot 
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Discussion of the Factor Analysis 
Examination of the rotated component matrix shows a fairly clear split between most 
variables in the set as one component, three global variables of "economics", 
"expectations" and "politics" as a second component and the variables "certifying" and 
"supervising/overseeing the work ofjunior staff' forming a further component. 
Some support is evident in this analysis for the division in the model between global 
elements and elements internal to the project (labelled in the model as managerial and 
prima respectively). The global variables of "economics", "expectations" and 
"politics" load on one fairly clearly defined component accounting for approximately 
13% of the variance. However, the loading excludes the variables "time" and 
ccorganisational culture", which are grouped with the first component. Thus, the "fit" 
between the analysis and the model is not exact. 
The division in the model between managerial and primary variables is not supported 
by the analysis in two respects. Firstly, both variables "education and training" and 
"selection" are grouped with the first component (containing mainly managerial 
variables) rather than forming a separate component. Secondly, the variable related to 
"self certification" is separately grouped in a third component with "supervising junior 
staff' 
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It is possible that the reason for the global variable "time" loading with managerial 
elements, was because respondents felt that the management of time was within their 
control (unlike other global elements). In this respect, it would be interesting whether 
re-presenting economic pressure as "cost pressures" would produce a similar re- 
grouping in that the latter would imply a more controllable element amenable to careful 
management. 
Organisational. culture is, perhaps, also grouped as a managerial element because it is 
considered within the control of managers. Some responses from question (15) 
supported this by emphasising the need to engende a positive culture, teamwork and 
co-operation. If organisational culture was wholly outside the influence of 
management, such manipulation would not be possible. 
The isolation of "certifying" and "supervising junior staff' as a separate third 
component does not follow any logical pattern. One relates to individual action in 
avoiding errors, but the other relates to managerial control. However, both variables 
were rated as relatively less important in the returns and the significance of the 
component should not be over emphasised. 
In conclusion, therefore, the factor analysis provides some support for a division in the 
model between managerial/primary and global components. The failure of factor 
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analysis to distinguish between managerial and primary components is compounded by 
the isolation of a third component containing both primary and managerial variables. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
To return to the objectives of this study, it sought to address the content and form of 
the model (the second and first research questions posed in Chapter 5) by considering 
four more detailed questions: - 
9 What was the relative weighting of factors in the model? 
9 Were the factors applicable generally? 
e Was the range of factors comprehensive? 
e Was the hierarchical structure of the model valid? 
CONTENT 
The Weighting Of Factors In The Model. 
Certain factors were rated by respondents as more important than others and, in line 
with the literature, the importance of "latent" managerial and global factors was 
confirmed in the survey. Greatest emphasis was placed on the managerial factor 
"communications", followed by the global factor "time", the managerial factors 
"concurrency" and "change control" and then the primary factor "education". 
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The Applicability Of Factors 
Significant (P<0.05) correlations on the mean of all 14 tested variables were found 
between the three main groups of respondent targeted in the survey. A similar 
significant correlation was noted between respondents supervising staff as opposed to 
those not supervising staff. This indicated that the model was reasonably representative 
of the construction industry as a whole (subject to the sampling reservations noted 
earlier). 
Within this general agreement, some significant differences were noted for particular 
variables. The differences suggest mildly polarised views between designers and 
constructors on the importance of some managerial and global factors. In particular, 
constructors rated the top ranked factor, "communications" as significantly more 
important than did designers. The differences between designers and constructors mgy 
have been due to the greater involvement in managerial tasks of contractors and sub- 
contractors. Differences might also suggest that the importance of various factors is 
dependent on the circumstances of the different categories of respondent. Constructors 
are more involved in controlling managerial factors than designers and thus are more 
likely to emphasise these. A significant difference was noted between those supervising 
and those not supervising staff on the ratings for the importance of "supervising the 
work ofluniors", but in the opposite direction to that predicted. This tends to refute a 
"blame" or "attribution" effect. 
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FORM 
The Rani! e Of Factors 
The open question (15) gave respondents the opportunity to identify other factors 
important in avoiding errors. Several took this opportunity, but completely new factors 
were not identified. However, some respondents emphasised factors, which suggested 
modifications to the model. Some emphasised systems aspects, which although not 
explicitly incorporated in the model, were reflected in the third research question and 
were considered in the studies of house-building. Others emphasised leadership and 
motivation, aspects related to the individual, but at least in the case of leadership, at a 
managerial level. This emphasis suggested that the distinction between prima and 
managerial factors was invalid. 
The Structure Of The Model 
Factor analysis suggested some grouping of factors on other latent factors. An 
approximate division between two components in the analysis containing, respectively, 
managerial/primaýy variables and global variables was detected, but no distinction 
between managerial and primary variables was evident. Rather, a third component 
contained two low rated variables "self certifying" and "supervising junior staff', which 
were categorised as primary and managerial respectively. 
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8 
STUDIES OF HOUSE-BUILDING I 
The Statistical Stu 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study addresses the content of the model (the second research question on page 
150) by investigating whether there is any statistically significant relationship between 
factors in the model and the performance of construction projects. The use of 
statistical analysis has been developed in fields of study, such as public health and 
psychology, where the direct cause of an influence cannot be easily determined because 
the mechanism is unknown or invisible. In this study, cause is more easily determined, 
but is often very specific to circumstances and not easily generalised. Statistical 
analysis was used in order to improve the general applicability of any findings. 
8.2 METHOD 
THE FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
Construction projects involve designing, assembling resources (materials, plant and 
labour), planning production, construction and commissioning. As any one part of the 
design-procurement-construction process might impinge on another, it is desirable to 
include the entire process in the study. However, the study concentrates on project 
rather than process industries. The materials supply industry and the early briefing and 
later use and maintenance parts of the process are, therefore, excluded. It also proved 
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difficult to study both the construction and design processes in detail and the study 
largely concentrates on the former. 
CONSTRUCTION OF A SANDLE 
The population under initial consideration was all construction projects, but, as full 
coverage was impossible, a limited sample was drawn. Initial restrictions were 
geographical, limiting the sample to the United Kingdom. The final sample was drawn 
from the South East and Midlands of England', thus further restricting the extent to 
which findings could be generalised. 
As the effect of the factors in the model could easily have been swamped by technical 
differences between construction projects, an early decision was made to attempt to 
control for 1ype and method of construction. Projects involving buildings of a similar 
scale using similar construction type were sought, and the group most readily available 
and fitting this criteria was housing. Speculative housing construction in the United 
Kingdom tends to use a relatively similar pattern of procurement with in-house 
designers working informally with in-house construction staff and sub-contract trades. 
Accordingly, housing type was further restricted to speculative, with a target of simple, 
two or three storey construction using standard house types. This target was largely 
achieved, with some exceptions in that a few projects involved more complex 
construction (later adjusted within the study). 
1 For details of location see appendix 8b 
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As the subject matter of the research was sensitive, involving data on defects, costs, 
construction timing and errors, it was also decided not to attempt to recruit a sample 
by using postal or other impersonal communication techniques. An alternative of direct 
contact with fairly large speculative house-builders was used. In all, four house- 
builders were approached and one region from each of two builders agreed to take part 
in the study. Participation was later increased (by using direct persuasion) to include 
one further region from each of the two builders. 
Both house-builders were well organised and involved in constructing a considerable 
number of units annually. They were both "premium" rated by building guarantee 
insurance companieS2 . Thus, they cannot 
be considered representative of house- 
builders as a whole and in particular of smaller, less formally organised companies. 
They do, however, represent the larger established house-building companies, which 
construct the bulk of speculative housing in Britain. 
DATA COLLECTION 
In order to use statistical analysis techniques, a sufficiently large sample of projects 
was required. Given the limitations on size of each of the regions within the two firms 
taking part in the study, it was possible to include 23 projects, representing all the on- 
going sites (autumn 1995) within the regions. The method of investigation chosen was, 
primarily, to use direct interview with the site manager for each of these projects and 
In the NHBC grading system (Using Al. to D4 classifications), both companies were graded as 
Al. 
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this involved visiting each site, conducting an inspection and a one to two hour 
interview. Details of the sites, interviewees and research programme are given in 
Appendices 8a, 8b and 8c. 
The reason for using the site manager as the primary target source was that much of 
the data required concerning the skills of site workers, managerial control of building 
production and the effects of such pressures as cost and time, in this type of 
construction, are available from this individual (speculative house-building projects 
being largely run from the site). Interviewing the site manager allowed economical 
extraction of most data required to complete the study. Other data collected in order to 
make sure sites were comparable were gathered by direct inspection, or from company 
managers. The advantages of a personal visit and interview (over less direct methods) 
were seen as: - 
* An improved number of returns. 
* Improved extraction of data because of face-to-face contact. 
9 The ability to extract qualitative as well as quantitative data as an a ternative 
approach to using statistical analysis. 
e The ability to corroborate/supplement returns from participants with 
researcher assessment of factors such as quality and complexity of 
construction and differences in specification. 
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The disadvantages of personal visits were the cost and time of visiting each site. These, 
and the resources of the organisations concerned, restricted the number of projects that 
could be included in the study. 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Data were collected by using a two-part structured interview form (appendices 8d and 
8e), the first part being completed in the presence of the site manager and the second 
part being completed at the end of the site visit by the researcher. 
The first part of the form gave assurances of confidentiality and asked for general 
information concerning the site manager, the company and the site. It then asked 
questions covering the factors in the model, a qualitative assessment and an 
opportunity for the manager to respond to the research with comments. 
IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
In constructing the survey instrument it was necessary to identify the exact variables 
for use in statistical analysis. A full explanation of these variables and their 
construction is given in appendices 8f and 8g, and the link between the variables and 
the model of the error process is documented below. For ease of cross-referencing, the 
variable numbers listed in Appendix 8f are given in the variable title. 
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Dependent Variables 
A measure for the level of error as revealed in the level of construction defects was 
sought as a dependent variable. However, quantifying either the level of underlying 
errors or the evidence in the form of the number of defects, gave rise to a number of 
problems as follows: - 
1) Temporal 
The errors causing defects occur during the construction phase of a building's history, 
but the defect may only manifest itself during occupation several months or years later. 
If measurements were taken during construction, only those detected would feature. 
Conversely, if measurements were taken during occupation, all those detected and 
corrected earlier would be excluded. A qualitative assessment was possible of the 
nature of post-occupation defects, but quantitative assessment was rejected as: - 
* Inaccurate because some defects would not be reported by occupiers, rather they 
would be put right without reference to the construction team, or the Company 
concemed. 
9 Difficult because it would involve either surveying occupiers or some other method 
of collecting data. 
* Incomplete because it would exclude pre and post occupation defects put right by 
the construction team. 
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e Time consuming because it would involve waiting for the construction and 
occupation of all units for all sites. This, in itself would lead to inaccuracies because 
of the time lag between commission of any errors and their appearance. 
2) Seriousness of error 
Numerical assessment of defects might not reflect the gravity of the underlying 
errors. A large number of defects related to a particular site or house might be of 
cosmetic significance only. Conversely, a small, low value mistake might have 
consequences which far outweigh either its numerical significance or the cost of its 
correction. Additionally, it was reported by some site managers and a building 
guarantee company inspector that recording of similar small defects could in some 
instances be treated individually, but in others, collectively. A trend was noted to 
record each defect for each unit individually in order to increase the "detection rate" of 
the building guarantee company. This could dramatically increase the recorded number 
of defects for some sites. Notwithstanding these reservations, it would be expected 
that differences would even out between sites provided that the sample size was 
sufficiently large. The limited number of sites in the study meant that any measure 
based on numerical assessment should be used with caution. 
3) Access to data. 
One Region of one Company was able to give cost data on post-construction defects, 
but this was extremely inaccurate as a result of lack of maturity of the data (some sites 
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had been completed more recently than others and therefore had lower rectification 
costs). Access to data from the other regions was difficult to obtain. 
4) Comparability of data. 
This is related to problems of gravity of data and the temporal problem noted above. 
The cost of correcting defects potentially could have acted as a good measure of error 
and all Regions had maintenance budgets on a "per unit" basis. However, the budgets 
might be exceeded or under-spent because of factors totally unrelated to any 
defects/errors made. Factors would include: - 
9 Whether units were sold early in the site's history and most defects were corrected 
(as a matter of Company policy) by the construction workers rather than post- 
completion "correct and charge back" procedures. 
9 Whether the occupier corrected the defect without recourse to the company as 
noted above. 
e Whether the defect was accepted as a Company problem or contra-charged to a 
"defaulting" sub-contractor. 
5) Recording of data 
Researcher observation of errors and defects as they occurred was not practical as it 
would have demanded an excessive amount of time and probably caused resentment 
from site workers. Some records of defects are kept by Building Guarantee 
Companies, but these are treated confidentially and are often incomplete (Open 
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interviewee number 17 in the Interview Study reported that the inspector will routinely 
remove records of corrected defects in order to avoid "clogging up the files"). These 
records also ignore the gravity of the defect. 
Measures used 
In conclusion, although a limited amount of objective quantitative data on number of 
defects, their cost post-occupation and their gravity were available it was decided not 
use data in this form. Alternative, more robust,, measures of the level of defects on each 
site were sought and eventually it was decided to make two assessments based on 
frequencies-. - 
1) Reported defects and error instances (variable 1) 
The site manager was asked to report any instances of defects found or errors 
committed on the site. These were weighted-- 
* To reflect the extent to which the site was complete. 
* To reflect differences in size and complexity of sites (by dividing numbers of 
instances by estimated total costs of the sites). 
Sites were divided into two categories (based on a split at the mean value), those with 
a high level of instances and those with a low level of instances. 
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2) Perceived quality (variable 2) 
The site manager was asked to subjectively rate the quality of each stage of the 
construction process on the site. The reason for requesting a "quality rating" rather 
than a rating for the level of defects was that it is easier to persuade site managers to 
talk about the positive assessment of "quality" rather than the more negative 
assessment of "defects". The rating of quality was subsequently scored for each site 
and sites were divided into two categories (based on a split at the mean score) - "high 
perceived quality" and "low perceived quality" respectively. 
Independent variables 
independent variables representing, as far as possible, the factors in the model of the 
nature of errors were constructed as follows: - 
Primary factors 
Relatinz to operatives 
Skills of trades-people (variable 3) 
The site manager was asked to rate the skills of individual trades-people and this rating 
was converted to an average score for the site. From this, sites were divided into two 
categories (based on a split at the mean score), "high skilled" and "low skilled" 
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Relatitzg to managers 
Variables related to the performance of the site manager as an individual were added as 
a result of responses in the preliminary study emphasising individual managerial 
qualities. Three variables were used: - 
Experience of manager (variable 4) 
Preliminary questions asked the site manager for an estimate of the number of years 
experience he/she had in the industry and as a site manager and sites were divided into 
two categories (based on a split at the mean value), those staffed by "experienced" as 
opposed to "inexperienced" managers. 
Background of manager (variable 5) 
The occupational background of the manager was recorded informally (i. e. there was 
no specific provision made for this in the questionnaire). and sites were divided into 
two categories, those staffed by managers from an operative background having later 
progressed into management (trades background) as opposed to those from a 
background as a managerial trainee or graduate manager (managerial background). 
Qualifications of manager (variable 6) 
The extent of formal qualifications of the manager was also recorded informally and 
sites were divided into two categories, those staffed by managers having formal as 
opposed to those not having formal qualifications. 
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Managerial factors 
Communications 
This was divided into two sub-factors, informal communications and formal 
communications, in line with comments from some authors in the literature review 
(Kaminetzky 1991, Kletz 1985, Tumer 1978). 
Informal communications (variable 7) 
The site manager was asked how many contacts (visits/verbal communications) were 
made by non-line staff per month. From this, sites were divided into two categories 
(based on a split at the mean value), sites with a high as opposed to those with a low 
level of communications. 
Formal communications (variable 8) 
The site manager was asked to rate the quality of the project documents 
(drawings/specification) in three respects, their volume, clarity and buildabili1y. The 
rating was later converted to a score and sites were divided into two categories (based 
on a split at the mean value), those with high quality and those with low quality formal 
communications. 
ftanisational culture ývariahle 9) 
On the basis of literature equating culture of organisations with the extent of 
managerial "participation" (Oakland 1993, ACSNI, 1993, Turner 1978), the site 
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manager was asked how many contacts (visits/verbal communications) were made by 
line managers. In addition, the site manager was asked how many formal company 
meetings he/she attended and how many sub-contractor meetings he/she held. The sum 
of contacts and meetings was used as a score representing the level of managerial 
participation. Sites were divided into two categories (based on a split at the mean 
value), those with a positive (high participation level) and those with a negative (low 
participation level) organisational culture. 
PlanniMlp-LqgrammiLig (RepresentiLig the division of reMonsibilities, control o 
concurrency and control of chgpge) Lvariable j-Qj 
On the basis of the findings of the preliminary study and literature on project 
management (Morris 1994, Archibald, 1976, Meredith and Mantel 1995, Lock 1996, 
Kerzner 1995), together with earlier research (Hinze and Raboud 1988), it was 
decided to combine the separately identified factors of "division of responsibilities", 
"control of concurrency" and "control of change" into one overall planning factor. 
I-Entz and Raboud had suggested that better project planning was linked to a lower 
construction accident rate and, similarly, better planning (representing better division 
of responsibilities, control of concurrency and control of change) might be linked to a 
lower error rate. The reason for combining the factors was operational in that it was 
considered easier to measure the level of planning than the levels of the three causes 
separately. 
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Site managers were asked how work was planned on three aspects, method of planning 
(Informally, bar chart or CPA), location of planning (central or local) and extent of 
updating. On the responses from these questions a5 category division of the sample 
was possible. This was later reduced to four divisions as no sites were completely un- 
planned. For analysis purposes sites were divided into two categories - "centrally 
planned" and "locally plus centrally planned" 
Checkigg 
The site manager was asked to indicate how he/she checked the work of each sub- 
contractor, in terms of frequency and level of formality (e. g. whether a formal check 
list was used). In the event, no usable objective data was obtained from this question 
and a statistical assessment of checking in the research project was not possible. This 
was because all site managers used very similar checking regimes - they tended to walk 
round the site several times per day, to check especially carefully at the end of tasks or 
before payment, to give particular attention to certain trades (for example bricklayers 
and carpenters) and to only formally check at the overall "snagging" stage (the end of 
construction). This infonnation gave very "flat" data, which could not be satisfactorily 
analysed. 
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Relatin to project manggement-factors genera 
Intensity ofproject management (variable 11) 
In order to assess the overall effect of the intensity of project management, as reflected 
in the weiphtinp, of factors, a combined score was constructed by taking the product of 
the raw scores for planning, informal and formal communications and culture. Sites 
were subsequently divided (based on a split at the mean score) into those with a high 
intensity of project management and those with a low intensity of project management 
respectively. 
External factors 
Cost pressure Lvariable 12) 
The site manager was asked whether the site was pressurised in terms of cost on three 
divisions - not tight-normal-tight. For analysis purposes sites were divided into two 
categories, tight/not tight. 
Time pressure (variablejýjj 
The site manager was asked whether the site was pressurised in terms of time on three 
divisions - slack-normal-tight. For analysis purposes sites were divided 
into two 
categories, tight/not tight. 
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Societal pressure 
The site manager was asked whether the quality of the project had been affected by the 
economic climate. In the interviews, all managers interpreted this question as the 
influence that customers were being able to exert on the project through market 
power. Additionaffy, most site managers commented on the pressures being exerted by 
increased market demands on sub-contractors. Thus, although the question was 
initially related to economic pressure, it was re-interpreted as less direct "societal 
pressure". In the event, no usable objective data was obtained from this question and 
an assessment of societal pressure in the research project could only be made 
qualitatively. The primary reason was that the data were too "flat" to allow a realistic 
division into categories. 
Summarv of dependent and independent variables 
The variables can be summarised therefore as shown in table 8.1 
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TABLE 8.1 SUMMARY OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARUBLES 
DEPENDENT VARUBLES 
No Variable Name Number in 
questionnaire 
I Reported defects and error instances 31 
2 Perceived quality 30 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
3 Skills of trades-people 15 
4 Experience of manager 7 
5 Background of manager 6 
6 Qualification of manager 6 
7 Informal communications 18,20,21 
8 Formal conummications 25 
9 Organisational Culture 19,22,23,24 
10 Planning/programming 17 
11 Intensity of project management 17-25 
12 Cost pressure 28 
13 Time pressure 29 
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8.3 ANALYSIS 
Each independent variable was compared with the two dependent variables for 
strength of association and tested using chi-square tests for significance computed with 
SPSS for Windows. The null hypotheses were that there would be no significant 
association between independent and dependent variables. Results are as shown in 
tables 8.2 and 8.3. 
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TABLE 8.2 - Cl-H-SQUARE ASSOCIATION - REPORTED DEFECTS 
p<O. I shown shaded 
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p=0.855 Level of informal communications 
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TABLE 8.3 - CFH-SOUARE ASSOCIATION - PERCEIVED QUALITY 
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From tables 8.2 and 8.3 it can be seen that the null hypothesis of no association 
between dependent and independent variable can be rejected for the following 
associations: - 
AtP<0.05 
* The background of the site manager and the reported level of defects (A managerial 
background is associated with a lower level of defects)(p=0.019) 
* The qualifications of the site manager and the reported level of defects (Qualified 
managers are associated with a lower level of defects)(p=0.033). 
* The level of planning and programming and the reported level of defects (More 
detailed planning is associated with a lower level of defects)(p=0.049) 
9 The intensity of project management and the reported level of defects (More intense 
management is associated with a lower level of defects)(p=0.007) 
AtP<0.10 
9 The quality of formal communications and the reported level of defects (Better 
quality formal communications are associated with a lower level of 
defects)(p=0.057) 
* The experience of the site manager and the reported level of defects (Inexperienced 
managers are associated with a lower level of defects)(p=0.059) 
The skills of trades-people and the level of perceived quality (More highly skilled 
operatives are associated with higher perceived quafity)(p=0.072) 
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DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
Overall 
The pattern of results overall gives some support to the findings in the preliminary 
study that managerial factors are influential in the avoidance or control of errors 
leading to defects. This support is clearly shown for the dependent variable measure of 
"reported defects", but is not repeated for the measure "perceived quality". Possible 
reasons for this discrepancy centre on differences in the level of objectivity of the two 
dependent variables. 
"Reported defecte' as a measure are subject to a certain amount of under and over J 
reporting by the informant, but are rooted in objective and numerically assessable 
events. However, "perceived quality", although assessed in detail for each stage of 
construction, is based on internal perceptions of quLli1y which might both differ from 
individual to individual and not be based on numerically quantifiable and objective 
events. Thus, differences in perception may confound the relationships between 
dependent and independent variables. An assessment of "perceived quality" could also 
(probably unintentionally) reflect factors other than the absence or presence of defects. 
Not only might this include an assessment of generally sub-standard work not 
amounting to defective, but it is also easy to include variations of business performance 
of the trade companies doing the work in the assessment. Thus, although guarded 
against in the design of the questionnaire, the skills of the operative become associated 
with the quality of his/her work and this, in turn, is reflected in a significant relationship 
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found between trade skills and perceived quality. That relationship should, therefore, 
be treated with caution and more reliance should be placed on findings related to 
reported defects. 
The pattern of results 
Significant results related to reported defects were both concentrated on managerial 
factors and, within this set of factors, on those of a more tangible nature - formal 
communications, planning/programming, the experience, background and qualifications 
of the site manager and the overall intensity of project management. In contrast, a lack 
of significance for the less tangible managerial factors of informal communications and 
organisational culture was evidenced. 
The measures used for these latter two factors may explain the lack of significance. 
These were based on a summation of contacts between non-line and line colleagues 
respectively and could be subject to the action of an intervening variable in the form of 
a contingency reaction to problems on the site. Thus, a greater degree of contact might 
have been needed where there were technical problems with the sites and the level of 
contact rose with the level of reported defects rather than falling. This phenomenon 
was referred to qualitatively by interviewees, who pointed out the need for more 
intense communications with difficult sites. Although technical complexity was 
controlled as far as possible in the selection of traditional speculative housing as the 
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subject of the study, control over such details as siting and ground conditions was not 
possible. 
Independent variables in the form of measures specifically related to the role of the site 
manager were added as a result of findings from the preliminary study and it is notable 
that these all had a significant association with the level of reported defects. The results 
show that the technically qualified manager and the manager from a managerial 
background was associated with a low level of reported defects. 
However, there was also a very strong association between lack of managerial 
experience measured in terms of time and a low level of reported defects. This is 
contrary to what one might expect and could merely indicate that more experienced 
managers were more likely to report defects. Relative verbosity was not control e in 
the study, but two related associations tend to refute this criticism. Firstly, senior 
managers interviewed in the following study informally identified a total of four "star" 
site managers (sites 3,4,21,22), who they considered of above average ability. Of 
these four managers, three were classified within the "inexperienced" group, 
suggesting that lack of experience was not a constraint on performance. Secondly, by 
comparing the two independent variables, "experience of manager" and "qualifications 
of manager" it is clear that a straight relationship between experience and performance 
is confounded by the fact that qualified managers are concentrated amongst the less 
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experienced (at p= 0.016). This is illustrated in table 8.4 and suggests that 
qualifications rather than experience determines performance on site. 
TABLE 8.4 - Cl-H-SQUARE ASSOCIATION 
EXPERIENCE/QUALIFICATIONS OF MANAGER 
-- .................................................... ................. ............ .......................................................................... ...................................................................................... ............................ .......................................................... 
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7d 
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Qualified Unqualif 
..................................... .................................... 
.................................. ...... Total 
Experience Experienced 1 11 12 
of Inexperienced 6 5 11 
manager Total 7 1 23 
The lack of significance noted for global factors of cost and time pressure also echoed 
the findings from the preliminary study. It appears that the relative performance of the 
sites in terms of either reported defects or perceived quality was not affected by these 
pressures. Less clear is the lack of significance attributed to skills of trades-people 
when measured against reported defects, but the near significant result when measured 
against perceived quality. The latter appears to support the indication from the ZD 
preliminary study that primary skills are important in avoiding error, but the limitations 
of the dependent variable "perceived quality" have already been mentioned and the 
result should be treated with caution. 
8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This study, in identifying links between factors in the model and measures of error, 
provided support for the findings in the preliminary study in answering the second 
research question (page 150). When relatively objective measures of error were used 
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(in the form of reported instances), it appeared that there was an overall relationship 
between a number of factors related to the management, of projects and the 
performance of sites. 
In isolation these results should be treated with caution. The sample upon which they 
are based is restricted geographically and in terms of type of project. The method of 
data collection related to both independent and dependent variables contains elements 
of subjectivity and the sample size itself is fairly small. 
However, when combined with the preliminary study a strongly consistent pattern 
begins to emerge. That study clearly indicated that managerial factors were considered 
important in the avoidance of errors leading to defects and this is, at least partially, 
replicated in this study. It also suggested that some "global" factors were less 
important and the lack of association noted in this study supports this view. 
Perhaps more important is the correspondence between views in the preliminary study 
emphasising the importance of individually based managerial factors and the significant 
associations in this study between levels of reported defects and the site managers' 
background, qualifications and experience. This supports the indication that underlying 
project management factors are the individual abilities and qualities of the manager. 
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This finding resonates with the literature, where some authors (e. g. Hirschhorn 1993) 
emphasise the importance of managerial roles rather than procedures in avoiding 
unwanted outcomes. It directs emphasis in avoiding error to improving the 
performance of the manager rather than by attempting to improve performance-by the 
imposition of procedures. Procedures are important and this is evidenced by the 
significant associations between levels of defects and such factors as fonnal 
communications and planning, but the means of implementing these should be through 
individually based measures related, perhaps, to education and training. Tl-ýs also has 
interesting parallels with comments in the literature in connection with the construction 
industry quality assurance movement, where quality management is often seen as an 
impractical imposition of procedures rather than a process of educating the workforce 
and its managers (Seymour and Low 1990, Barber 1992). 
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9 
STUDIES OF HOUSE-BUILDING 2 
The Interview Stu 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Interview Study provides an alternative method of investigation to the statistical 
study in addressing the content of the model (the second research question posed in 
Chapter 5 on page 150). The study is also specifically directed towards addressing the 
operation of the model (the third research question). In detail, the study examined: - 
9 The relative importance of factors identified in the model of the nature of error, 
with a check on the classifications adopted. 
* Any differences between sets of interviewees in order to confirm general agreement 
of this relative importance. 
e Linkages as displayed by the interaction of one factor in the model on another. 
9.2 METHOD 
The method used was to conduct largely unstructured interviews of members of the 
organisations used in the statistical study as well as one further set of independent 
agents within the house-building industry and to analyse the content of the responses. 
The coflection of interview data was conducted in two distinct parts. 
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In the first part, the site managers used for the supply of data for the statistical study 
(Chapter 8) were asked open questions at the end of the interview sessions (See 
questions 3 1,3 2 and 33 in the Questionnaire - Appendix 8d). Question 31 asked 
whether the site manager had experienced any particular quality problems relating to 
the project. The total number of instances recorded was used as a dependent variable 
in the statistical analysis (variable number I- reported defects and error instances). 
The content of these responses was further analysed in this study to enumerate all the 
identifiable causes of the defect, or error and to classify these causes in accordance 
with the model. Questions 32 and 33 prompted a more subjective response in that they 
asked the interviewee to give a general opinion of factors influencing the quality of the 
houses in the project (question 32) and for other general comments (question 33). The 
content of the responses to these questions was also analysed in tenns of the model. 
For both questions, detailed narration of the pathology of particular instances was used 
to iflustrate the_ interaction of one cause with another and so examine the systemic 
nature of error incubation (The third research question). 
In the second part of the study, more senior managers within the two house-building 
companies used for the statistical study were interviewed as well as a foreman for a 
bricklaying sub-contract company on one of the house-building sites. These interviews 
were open and did not involve particular pre-identified questions (See appendix 9b - 
Open Interview Questionnaire). The interviewees were prompted with similar 
questions to that posed to the site managers, but not specifically related to any 
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particular project. Responses revealed a similar mix of specific recollections of defects 
and error instances and more general comments, which were analysed in the same way 
as the site managers' responses. 
Using the same method, a third separate set of managers within building guarantee 
companies was interviewed. These companies provide building insurance for new 
houses. The personnel interviewed were responsible for assessing the risk and 
inspecting the construction of housing sites prior to issuing insurance policies. The 
object of these interviews was to provide an external view independent of the reports 
from within the two companies. Full details of interviewees in the second part of the 
study are give in appendix 9c. In all, 40 interviews were conducted as summarised in 
table 9.1. 
TABLE 9.1 - INTERVIEEWEES 
Source Number 
Site managers 23 
Senior managers, foreman subcontractor 12 
Building guarantee managers 5 
TOTAIL 40 
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Responses were recorded in detail and analysed in accordance with the model of the 
nature of errors in appendices 9a(i) to 9a(vii). The content of the responses was 
nutially analysed in two categories: - 
9 Specific narration of errors either leading to defects or detected and corrected 
beforehand (appendices 9a(i-iii) - Record of errors). 
9 Narration of more general problems leading to, or (based on the interviewee's 
experience) known to lead to errors (appendices 9a(iv-vi). 
The cause of each error or general problem was later identified using, where possible, 
the categories of the model. For many errors and problems, this involved the 
identification of more than one cause, a patent cause and one or more underlying 
causes. In the quantification of the causes of error, each identified cause was treated 
separately. A summary of this assessment is given in appendix 9a(vii). Text of 
narration was used later to examine the interaction between patent and underlying 
causes. 
9.3 ANALYSIS 
THE CAUSES OF ERRORS AND PROBLEMS 
In total 220 causes of errors or general problems were identified and they could be 
readily categorised into the broad grouping of the model as shown in figure 9.1. 
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FIGURE 9.1 - THE CAUSES OF ERRORS/PROBLEMS 
BROAD CATEGORIES 
Global 
Figure 9.1 shows that managerial causes predominated in responses from all 
interviewees, with much smaller attributions to both primary and global causes. This 
balance of causes followed the preliminary study, where managerial factors were 
generally rated by respondents as important. When managerial causes were examined 
in more detail the breakdown shown in figure 9.2 was revealed. 
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FIGURE 9.2 - MANAGERIAL CAUSES OF ERRORS/PROBLEMS 
System icfa cto is 
Again, the breakdown followed the model closely. It included three additional 
categories not explicitly shown in the model, "manager's ability", "systemic" and 
"planning". The classification "managers ability" followed the preliminary study, where 
it was suggested that the primary qualities of the manager might underlie managerial 
functions. The classification "systemic" also followed the preliminary study, where it 
was suggested that a "system" or "systems" linking factors were instrumental in 
avoiding errors. The classification "planning" followed the statistical study, where 
planning was identified (following Hinze and Raboud 1988) as the corollary of and 
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taken as a proxy for the division of responsibilities, control of change and control of 
concurrency. None of these factors, therefore, amount to wholly new categories. 
Errors and problems related to communications overwhelmingly predominated within 
the managerial group and responses within this factor were further subdivided, 
following the literature (Kaminetzky 1991, Kletz 1985, Turner 1978) and the statistical 
study (page 246), into formal and informal communications. The balance of this 
division is shown in figure 9.3 
FIGURIE 9.3 - COMMUNICATION CAUSES OF ERRORS/PROBLEMS 
268 
9- Interview Study 
Thus, it could be seen, that of the most significant factor, communications, errors and 
problems related to formal communications overwhelmingly predominated. This 
corresponded with findings from the statistical study, where a significant association 
between the quality of formal communications and the level of reported errors was 
noted. 
Taking the whole set of responses, ordered in term of frequency, a pattern was 
revealed as shown in figure 9.4. 
FIGURE 9.4 - CAUSES OF ERRORS/PROBLEMS (ALL CATEGO 
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This pattern followed closely, but not exactly, the ratings from the preliminary study 
(page 212). In that study, communications was also rated as the most important factor 
in avoiding errors and "time", "changes" and "checking" were, in common with this 
study, rated in the top six most important factors. Primary errors were represented in 
the preliminary study by (amongst others) "education and training", which was rated 
among the top six. 
The most notable discrepancy between the reports of errors/problems and the 
preliminary study rankings was in the importance given to "costs" in the reports (where 
the preliminary study equivalent of "economic climate" was not rated highly) and the 
lack of importance given to "concurrency" in the reports (where the preliminary study 
did rate this highly). 
DIFFERENCES IN VIEW BETWEEN SETS OF INTERVIEWEES 
General agreement was expected between the three sets of interviewees: - 
o site managers 
* senior managers and 
o insurers 
Analysis of the record of narratives was expected to show converging conclusions. 
However, an examination of the summaries of causes of errors and problems in 
appendix 9a(vii) shows some differences between the three sets of interviewee. 
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Differences might be caused by an attribution (Lourens 1990) or blame (Whittington et 
al 1992) effect. This was examined in the preliminary study (page 214/215), where the 
effect was not detected. As with the preliminary study, it was possible that reported 
errors or problems in this study might be distorted by the interviewee under-reporting 
factors where blame could be attributed to him or her and, correspondingly, over 
reporting factors where blame could be attributed elsewhere. Tbýs effect was most 
likely to occur in reporting primary as opposed to managerial errors, the expectation 
being that site managers would emphasise primary, but not managerial, errors. 
Interviewing more senior managers and insurers provided a check on this as these 
managers were unlikely to stress primary errors if they felt that the site management 
was responsible for the error/problem. 
To check for any such attributions a chi-square test of association was used 
comparing, respectively, site and senior managers' reports of errors classed as primary, 
or managerial. As the group "insurers" was small (5 No) they were combined with 
cc senior managers" in the analysis. The formal hypothesis was that there would be no 
significant association between the two groups. The results are as shown in Table 9.2. 
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TABLE 9.2 - CFH-SQUARE ASSOCIATION - SITE/SENIOR MANAGERS' 
REPORTS 
......................... . ................................. .......... ... ......... 
..... ... 
. 
................................................................... .............................. .......................... 
..... ........ ...................................................... ............ ........................................ ............................ 
........................ ....... ...... 
...................................... 
...... ............... .......................................................... ............ .............................. ...................................... .............. ......... .. 
.............. ................. 
............................... ...... 
................................................................... ........... .......... 
Site Senior Total 
Number Primary 25 11 36 
of Managerial 39 43 82 
errors_ Total 64 54 118 
............................................... ............ ............................................... . ........... ............. .............................................. ...................................... ......... - .................................................. ... ................................................................... .................................. ..................... 
............. ....... ......... *"*''**"* ....... ............ ................... ** ........ -- ..................... 
MA 
----- ............... ..... .......... .......................................... ............... .................... ...................................................................................... ........................................................... I .......................... ...................................................................................... ..................................................... ....................... Site Seni, or 
Total 
Number Primary 4 7 11 
of Managerial 37 17 54 
problems Total 41 24 65 
From table 9.2 it can be seen that the null hypothesis of no association between 
dependent and independent variable can be rejected for the two associations: - 
* The locus of the manager as site or senior and the classification of reported errors 
as primary or managerial (A higher frequency of reports of primary errors is 
associated with site managers and a higher frequency of reports of management 
errors is associated with senior managers)(p=0.028) 
e The locus of the manager as site or senior and the classification of general problems 
as primary or management (A higher frequency of reports of primary problems is 
associated with senior managers and a higher frequency of reports of management 
problems is associated with site managers)(p=0.044) 
However, the table reveals that, although site managers reported significantly more 
primary errors than senior managers, senior managers reported significantly more 
general related to primary factors than site managers. The effect of sunu-ning 
both errors and problems is that one measure almost completely cancels out the other 
as shown in table 9.3 
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TABLE 9.3 - CI-H-SQUARE ASSOCIATION - SITE/SENIOR MANAGERS' 
REPORTS (Both CategonLes) 
p=0.487 Manager 
1 
site Senior Total 
Sum Primary 29 18 47 
of Managerial 76 60 136 
1 errors and problems Total 
T 105 78 1 
It can be concluded from this that, although differences in detail existed between 
reports from site and senior managers, overall this was not significant. 
SYSTEMIC INTERACTIONS 
A considerable volume of literature (for example, Morris 1994, Blockley 1992, Bea 
1994) has considered the systemic aspects of errors. The need for "systems" was 
referred to by some respondents in the preliminary study, and included in the model, 
but that study did not include a detailed examination of whether and how errors 
leading to defects involved systernic interactions. An object of this study and the 
following Observational Study (Chapter 10) was to conduct this examination by 
analysing the causes of the more obvious patent errors. 
Tvves of interaction 
Analysis of the reports of errors and more general problems in Appendix 9a revealed 
several types of interaction, which could be categorised into one of three types of error 
cause as follows: - 
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* Self contained errors 
* Simple two-way interactions between causes 
* Complex interactions between causes 
I Self contained errors 
This type of error predominated in all reports and related mainly to formal 
communications (approximately 45 instances)and primary errors (approximately 35 
instances). The next most frequent cited single cause related to changes, which 
occurred relatively infrequently (approximately 8 instances). 
Simple primary errors were often related to the operative and presented as the cause of 
an actual defect. For example the site manager for site I cited poor quality brickwork 
involving missing wall ties, leaning piers and lack of frame ties and the site manager for 
site 5 cited an instance where a landscaper "turfed" over the top of manholes. In 
contrast, where formal communications or changes were cited as the single cause it 
was not always clear whether the error had actually caused a defect. For example, the 
citing by the site manager for site 3 of expansion joints in brickwork which did not 
match internal wall layouts did not make clear whether the work was actually built as 
designed and later corrected, or corrected in advance of construction. Where it was 
clear that a defect had arisen, for example in the instance quoted by the site manager 
for site 5 of an error in the design of floor joists resulting in post-construction 
274 
9- Interview Study 
strengthening, it was also clear that the operative constructing the work was not in 
error, but merely correctly following a detail. 
The instance cited by the manager for site 13 of an error in positioning a window on a 
drawing being picked up by the bricklayers before being built into the work indicates 
that one difference between simple primary and simple managerial errors is that the 
former give no chance for prior correction, whereas the latter are sometimes capable of 
being checked and coffected by operatives and their supervisors. This suggests that, 
even where instances are presented as being from a single cause, the likelihood of 
errors actually materialising as defects depends on an interaction between different 
specialists. 
This suggestion was supported by instances of primary operative error being cited, 
when the real cause could have been poor formal communications or even more 
remote global factors. Thus, the site manager for site 7 recorded the instance of 
operatives nailing pipes and causing house floods, where it was not clear whether 
drawings showing the location of the pipes were provided, or even whether the pipes 
were live and the leaks were immediately obvious (and capable of quick rectification). 
The site manager for site 12 noted that bricklayers incorrectly quoined the jambs on a 
knapped flint faced house. This error was classified as primary, but some architects 
provide drawings of elevational treatment and it was not clear whether this was the 
case here. A third example of such a disguised cause occurred in the report from the 
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site manager for site 16, who cited the omission by operatives of carpentry details that, 
perhaps, should have been shown on drawings or in a specification. 
These errors not only raise questions of classification and identification of underlying 
causes, but also question the necessary limits of knowledge of operatives at the 
"primary" level. Modem construction, even of traditional housing, has become 
complex and trades trained operatives are often not capable of allowing for details 
where not expressly shown. This extends to traditional details, such as the quoining of 
knapped flint, which are now used infrequently. 
\ 
In summary, therefore, the reporting of an instance attributed to a single error may not 
have always been accurate or complete. Taking the two most frequently recorded 
single errors, primary errors and formal communications errors, the former directly 
resulted in defects, whereas the latter were modulated by the action of others, in one 
case cited, by an operative. Thus, even with apparently self-contained single errors, the 
eventual outcome appeared to depend on interactions of causes. 
2 Simple two-way interactions between errors 
In several narratives of errors and problems, the interaction of causes was expressly 
acknowledged and in most instances this interaction was simple, involving two errors 
or an error and a wider global or external factor. In all, 18 instances were recorded and 
classified as follows: - 
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9 Related to primary errors 
* Managerial -global 
* Managerial - external factors 
Related to primga errors 
Primary - checking 
Perhaps the most obvious interaction of errors leading to defects is that of the 
operative performing the work and the checker verifying the work. Three instances 
involved such an interaction. On site 3 it was reported that poor roofing was caused by 
insufficient trades supervision, which improved after threats from the NEBC (A 
building guarantee insurance company). Open interviewee 3 reported a notorious 
incident where a considerable number of houses were built without cement being used 
in the wall mortar. The causes cited were poor workmanship and lack of supervision. 
Open interviewee 17 also reported an incident of walls being built with insufficient 
mortar, attributing the defect to a "knowledge error by bricklAyers and lack of 
supervision)7. 
Primary -formal communications 
This interaction has previously been noted in connection with simple errors, but 
express interactions were also noted. Open interviewee 17 reported the instance of 
subsidence being caused by operatives not allowing for the effect of a nearby Oak tree 
in digging foundations. However, the depth and design of foundations would normally 
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be calculated by engineers in these circumstances and provided, either on drawings, or 
by direct instruction. 
The more general complaint of formal communications not being provided and 
decisions being left to operatives on site was made in other instances. On site 3 it was 
reported that design errors were not corrected and "left to construction to correct". On 
site 21 it was reported that drawings "lagged building production and hence too much 
was left for site to decide" and open interviewee 8 reported that formal 
communications often followed operative actions rather than preceding them and 
commented that it is "far better that the detail is there than it is got over on site" 
Primary - informal communications 
One incident was reported of an interaction between poor operative perfonnance and a 
failure in informal communications. On site 3 it was reported that poor brickwork 
quality was caused by the bricklaying firm operating at too great a distance from their 
office. The extended distance made communications difficult. Not expressly reported 
was the implication that this made control and checking of the operatives more 
difficult. Thus, this incident would probably have involved an interaction between three 
causes, communications, checking and primary factors. 
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Primary - change 
One incident was noted related to change, where the manager for site 19 suggested 
that "change orders (were) not always passed on in the bricklaying firnf'. This incident, 
however, probably also included an interaction of three factors, change, 
communicating the change and incorrect primaU action. In this respect, the operative 
is possibly the least culpable agent. 
Primwy - globalfactors (cost and time) 
The tension between the performance of operatives and cost pressures was illustrated 
by two reports. It was reported on site 5 that the performance of an electrician was not 
up to standard and pressure built for the electrical engineering firm to be replaced. This 
faced opposition from the company quantity surveyor (who was charged with 
controlling costs). The interaction was put more generally by the manager for site 20 
who complained that lack of money lead to "poor selection of trades and lack of 
quaHfied managers". 
One report (site 15) related to an interaction between operative standards and time 
pressure, where poor bricklaying was reported as being "partly caused by speed of 
workin ". 
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Mgýnaerial - zlobal 
The interaction of the global factor, time with managerial factors was illustrated by two 
reports. Open interviewee 5 noted generally that the fast pace demanded by modem 
construction "required good organisation of men7 and open interviewee 6 illustrated 
the interaction of time and concurrency by recounting problems related to the start up 
of site 23. Pressure of time, in turn caused by the demand for early sales of houses, 
meant that show houses were constructed in advance of site works leading to the 
situation where completed houses could not be occupied and piped/wired services 
were installed in houses, but could not be tested or commissioned. From this analysis it 
can be concluded that any primary errors in installing services would be greatly 
magnified by the inability to test them before covering up the work; a problem 
manifested as a primga error, but directly related to concurrent wgrking, and the 
demands of the sales programme causing time pressures. 
Managýerial - external-factors 
Three reports related to interactions between formal communications and factors 
external to the model. The manager for site 19 cited poor ground conditions leading to 
design difficulties. The manger for site 21 similarly cited subsidence of an existing 
building leading to re-design. Open interviewee II reported a problem with one house, 
where negative pressure on a chimney stack was causing down-draughts, in the flue and 
smoke to enter a room -a problem again not anticipated in the design. 
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These were not interactions within the model as such, but relate to the definition of 
"error". If such errors were completely unforeseeable (as was reported for the problem 
with the chimney stack), they would not come within the definition. However, designs 
should take account of existing conditions and it is harder to see how poor ground 
conditions or existing subsidence could be overlooked. These two interactions might, 
therefore, be hiding other causes, perhaps related to inadequate time and cost leading 
to skimping of pre-design investigations. 
Complex interactions between causes 
Although some reports of two-way interactions suggested more complex underlying 
causes, other reports expressly indicted these. Two types of interaction were 
illustrated, fairly specific instances of interactions within the building process caused by 
multiple errors and more general "systemic" problems driven "from the top" by senior 
managers. 
D^ 
Regarding the first type of interaction, open interviewee 16 reported two specific 
instances. On one site, parapet walls to gables of houses were built without damp- 
proof courses and poor mechanical fixings of coping bricks. This was reported as a 
design fault formal communications) overlooked by the site manager checking , 
but 
primary erro was also indicted in that the need for a damp-proof course at parapet 
level should be known by a skilled bricklayer. The interviewee's interpretation of the 
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causes of the defect was inadequately skilled operatives blindly following flawed 
formal communications and not being checked by the supervisor. 
The second incident reported by open interviewee 16 related to a claim to a building 
insurance company for floor joist failure. The pathology of this incident showed how 
multiple errors can compound to cause failure. A bricklayer built floor joist hangars 
into a unit at too high a level. This could have been a primary error, but was also 
compounded by poor design detailing (formal communications). To reduce the joists to 
the correct floor levels, the carpenter excessively notched the joists over the hangars. 
This would weaken the joists, but the problem was compounded by electricians further 
notching the joists to accommodate cabling. The defects were not detected by normal 
supervision (and the normal supervisor had also been on holiday for some time). 
Finally, the failure was further compounded in that it was repeated in several other 
units. The cause for the further lapse was cited as lack of clear instructions to 
carpenters after the initial failure. Thus, in this one incident, an interaction can be 
demonstrated between: - 
* Formal communications (poor design detailing) 
e Primary error (notching joists) 
* Checking error (supervision inadequate) 
4o Informal communications (failure to instruct carpenters) 
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More general "systemic" problems were illustrated by open interviewee 12, who 
reported problems with the show houses on site 11. These had "exhibited very high 
maintenance costs". The cause was attributed to too much haste in construction, with 
the comment that "we threw them up too quickly and reaped what we sowed". The 
reason for the excessively fast pace of construction was to consciously meet sales 
targets and the cause clearly indicates the systemic effect of some errors. The very high 
maintenance costs were caused by prima[y errors, driven by lack of time, compounded 
by a lack of checking and a management system that did not adequately plan for speed. 
In this instance, the primary errors were not really "errors" at all as the interviewee 
recognised and senior management planned for likely problems. 
A similar pathology of causation was reported by open interviewee 6, who noted that 
the managing director for his region, concerned with maximising sales and hence 
profits, always wanted to "build out" all sites in order to have a product to show 
customers. Thus the need for profits (gost related) produced time pressures,, which in 
turn caused primaEy and checking errors. 
9.4 CONCLUSIONS 
To return to the object of this study, it provided an alternative method to the 
Preliminary and Statistical Studies to addressing the content of the model and it 
addressed the operation of the model by investigating systemic effects. 
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TBE RELATIVE rMPORTANCE OF FACTORS 
'D gis Re, ponses from interviewees in the study were readily categorised into the model of 
the nature of error and the balance of causes underlying reports from interviewees 
closely followed the findings from the preliminary study. Both studies classed 
communications as the most important cause of errors leading to defects and, of the 
top six most highly rated factors in the preliminary study, five also featured as the most 
frequently cited causes of errors and problems in the Interview Study. The findings of 
the two studies are compared in Table 9.4. 
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TABLE 9.4 
COMPARISON OF PRELIMINARY STUDY RATINGS AND INTERVEEW 
STUDY RETURNS 
FACTOR PRELIMINARY 
STUDY 
RATINGS 
INTERVIEW 
STUDY RETURNS 
Communications 1 1 
Time 2 3 
Concurrency 3 
Change control 4 6 
Primary4 5 2 
Checking 6 4 
Responsibility definition 7 
Cost-6 5 
4 Education and training in the preliminary study. 
* Economics in the preliminary study. 
Communications were subdivided into "formal" and "informal" in this study and a 
preponderance of errors and problems related to formal communications followed the 
significant association noted in the statistical study between formal communications 
and error instances. 
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D RýTERVEEWEES 
As with the preliminary study, differences in view were examined in this study. In 
particular, it was possible that reports of errors from site managers might be distorted 
by a tendency to blame others rather than blame themselves. Thus, primary errors 
might be over-reported by site managers and errors attributable to site managers might 
be under-reported. This effect was detected when the frequency of errors classed as 
primary or managerial was analysed and compared with the locus of the manager (site 
or senior). However, the opposite effect was detected when the frequency of more 
general problems was analysed. The overall result was that, when errors and problems 
are taken as a whole there was no significant association between the classification of 
cause (primary/managerial) and the locus of the manager (site/senior). 
LINKAGES DEMONSTRATING SYSTENUC EFFECTS 
The Interview Study demonstrated the systemic aspects of error causation by 
identifying three types of interactions between causes: - 
9 Self contained errors, where the cause of a defect appeared to stem from a single 
error. However analysis of some of these errors suggested some interactions with 
other causes. Thus, primary errors might disguise "upstream" managerial errors and 
errors related to managers might be modulated by the actions of others 
"downstreanf' to the error. In the former set of errors, causes are likely to be 
inaccurately attributed as primary errors rather than managerial and in the latter set 
of errors, several might never reach the stage of becoming a defect, if "picked up" 
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by operatives and their supervisors. From this analysis, it seems that the operative is 
often the unsung hero of the building process - unjustly blamed for the mistakes of 
others, yet not credited when he/she detects these ýnistakes. 
9 Expressly noted two-way interactions of errors perpetrated by different actors in the 
project. Here, an operative might make a primary mistake, but his or her work 
might not be checked, a manager or operative might blindly follow poor formal 
communications, or the operative or manager might be pressured by time or cost 
considerations. 
* Complex interactions between errors. Two types of complex interactions were 
noted. Firstly, series of errors caused by a triggering primary error or error in formal 
communications, which was then carried through the construction sequence and 
later repeated because of poor communications. Secondly, series of errors driven 
"from the top", perhaps consciously, leading to a generally high rate of defects. For 
the latter type, the initial "errors" are "deliberate" and engendered by driving 
motivators, such as profit, sales, or the need to meet year-end accounts. 
Overall, this study corroborated the findings from the preliminary study and provided 
support for the content of the model. It showed that communications factors 
predominate in the pathology of errors leading to defects. That "communications" 
predominates does not mean that other factors are not important and highly rated 
factors were spread through all three levels of the model - "Primary" errors were 
ranked second in the frequency of citing of causes, followed by the "global" factor 
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"time". Detailed examination of causes indicated that all factors can, either singly or 
collectively, contribute to defects. Examination also revealed that interactions between 
factors are an important feature of many errors leading to defects, giving support for 
the operation of the model. Interactions may relate to site activities or the 
design/development process, but it has also been demonstrated that errors can be 
driven from the top by wider business factors. Thus, the "systems view" advocated by 
Blockley (1992) amongst others, is supported in this study. 
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10 
STUDIES OF HOUSE-BUILDING 3 
The Observational 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The observational study primarily addresses the operation of the model (the third 
research question on page 150), by focusing attention on errors and their pre-cursors 
as they actually arose during the performance of a specific project. Additionally, 
observations allowed some recording of error instances, which was used to 
complement the other studies in addressing the content of the model (the second 
research question). 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WERE TO: - 
I Document and classify errors as they happened in accordance with the model. 
2 Examine the links between causes by tracing the pathology of errors leading to 
potential or actual defects in buildings under construction. 
10.2 METHOD 
GENERALLY 
The method adopted was to use participant observation of a construction project. The 
site based operation of speculative house-building was chosen as the focus of the 
study, for the same reasons as the statistical study. Speculative house-buflding in the 
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United Kingdom is relatively uniform, simple and key operations are concentrated in 
one place, the site. It was considered that significant events related to incipient and 
actual errors would be visible from the vantage point of the site and the site office for 
this type of construction. In addition, using speculative house-building allowed the 
study to be drawn from previous work. The study was based on one of the 23 sites 
used in the statistical and interview studies. 
The time scale chosen for the study was one week. This was considered the minimum 
time for a cross-section of events to be evidenced sufficiently to complement the other 
parts of the research. It was considered that the project should be observed at a period 
where most construction activities were taking place (from excavating foundations to 
completing buildings). One of the advantages of traditional, two/three storey housing 
on green-field sites is that it is common for all phases to be under construction at the 
same time and this also influenced the choice of speculative house-building. 
CHOICE OF PROJECT 
The most convenient (in terms of daily access for the researcher) source of suitable 
projects within which to conduct the study was Region I of Company 1. Company 2 
sites were generally not available as the Company was withdrawing from house- 
building and the involvement of a researcher was not encouraged. Region 2 of 
Company I was more remote from the researcher's base (see appendix 8a). 
Accordingly, the managing director of Region 1, Company I was approached to 
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authorise access to a site. General authorisation was given and three sites were short- 
listed (9,16,23). Sites 9 and 16 were nearing completion, but site 23 was in a 
relatively early phase of construction, with all main activities being executed (with the 
exception of roads and sewers, which had been completed). This site was, therefore, 
chosen for detailed study. 
METHOD OF RESEARCHER INTEGRATION 
A visit was made to the site in the course of the statistical/interview study and the site 
manager was interviewed. At this stage the site was in the very early stages of 
construction with roads and sewers being installed. The site was thus identified as 
being suitable for the observational study, given that, by the time the study was to be 
carried out, construction was likely to span most activities'. The site manager's co- 
operation was sought and given and the nature and role of the researcher was 
explained as being one of observer. It was additionally stressed that the researcher 
would carry out any work tasks required by the site manager. As it was likely that the 
best vantage point to record the events of the site and those related to outside agencies 
was near the telephone, the researcher volunteered to carry out clerical tasks and 
answer the telephone, in addition to supporting the site manager and assistant site 
manager around the site. 
1 Activities on the site did, in fact, cover most normal construction stages. The site was divided into 
three parts. In one part, houses (including show houses) were nearing completion, in a second, houses 
were at "first lift" stages and in the third, footings were being excavated and concreted. One small part 
of the site had yet to be started. 
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Intep-ration was evidenced by: - 
The researcher being given clerical tasks and answering the telephone as planned 
(10.45 Monday). 
The researcher being accepted by some of the sub-contract operatives in that the 
ground-workers took time to show the use of a laser level (15.45 Thursday) and the 
excavator driver gave the researcher "lessons" in driving a 360 degree tracked 
excavator (14.15 Friday). 
e The researcher being asked to solve site-based problems in relation to changes in 
construction details (13.15 Thursday). 
METHOD OF RECORDING DATA 
Continuous recording using tapes or other mechanical means was rejected for two 
reasons, firstly it was felt to be too intrusive (causing resentment and withholding of 
infbrmation) and secondly it was considered that recording all information verbatim 
would include too much irrelevant data. Recording was, therefore, by writing timed 
entries in a rough note-book during, or as soon as possible after, the occurrence of an 
event 
2. 
2 The methodology followed Coolican's (1994) description of diary studies, with the diary being 
written up at the end of the day from notes "recorded where the opportunities have arisen" 
(page 102) 
292 
10 
- Observational Study 
The intention was to record all events, other than the trivial, but it was recognised that 
some unconscious selection may take place. This eventuality was not allowed for, 
because the observational study was not the sole source of information. All events 
were reviewed at the end of each day and contemporary notes were added. In addition, 
some researcher notes were added to events as they occurred - these are identified in 
the diary. The diary was transcribed verbatim and further notes were added at the 
transcription stage. The text of the diary and the accompanying notes are given in 
appendix 10a and the following analysis should be read in conjunction with the text. 
In order to maintain a chain of evidence from events as they occurred to the analysis 
reported here, times are given in brackets after the points considered. This fbHows 
literature (NEles and Huberman, 1994, Strauss and Corbin, 1990) on the method of 
presenting evi ence in qualitative research. 
10.3 ANALYSIS 
DOCUMENTATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF ERROR INSTANCES. 
The text of the diary was analysed into a number of "error related events"'. Such 
events were problems reported and discussed in the site office, instances of actual 
errors occurring on the site, or tactics used to avoid errors occurring. Coding of 
instances to particular factors in the model of the error process was then carried out 
and the results are given in Table 10.1 and illustrated in figures 10.1 and 10 - 2. 
3 Bentley (198 1) recorded "quality related events" in his observational study for the BRE (see page 47) 
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Problems were experienced in carrying out this process, particularly related to the fact 
that many instances could be linked to either multiple or underlying causes. The figures 
should, therefore, only be treated as indicative of the relative importance of the factors. 
Notwithstanding these problems, however, it was possible to categorise all instances in 
terms of the model and new categories were not revealed in this study. 
TABLE 10.1 - RECORD OF ERROR INSTANCES 
FACTOR IN THE MODEL RECORDED INSTANCE 
GLOBAL 
Time 2 
Cost 13 
Societal 6 
MANAGERIAL 
Checking 5 
Communications 22 
Concurrency 3 
Changes 12 
Responsibility division I 
Organisational Culture 6 
PRIMARY 8 
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FIGURE 10.1 - RECORDED ERROR INSTANCES SUMMARY 
Global 
26.9% 
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FIGURE 10.2 - RECORDED ERROR INSTANCES IN DETAIL 
In addition to the above analysis, two instances were related to external factors beyond 
the control of the organisation. 
It was apparent from this analysis that managerial factors predominated, followed by 
global then primary factors. The significance of managerial factors was in line with 
both the prefirninary and interview studies, but events related to global factors were 
more prevalent than expected. 
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Primarv factors 
Relatively few instances were related to primary factors. The most prominent of these 
related to the "witnessed" violation by concrete placers in adding water to the concrete 
mix under the eyes of the building guarantee company inspector (11.20 Thursday). 
Other instances could not be clearly attributed to primary error. For example, applying 
the wallpaper "the wrong way round" (exchanging the pattern/type for two rooms) to a 
show house (9.00 on Monday), could have been a primary operative error (by the 
decorator), but could equally have been an error in communications if clear drawings 
or instructions had not been given. 
In one instance, the "real" cause of an error may have been masked by a primary error, 
thus also making accurate attribution difficult. This instance was that of a carpenter 
cutting up the wrong sized floor joists for a unit (9.05 on Friday). However, this error 
was induced by changes to the unit in turn driven by economic forces and societal 
pressure. 
Examination of the Building Guarantee Company site file (13-05 Friday) revealed a 
similar ambiguity. Some defects could have been attributed to primary error 
(Brickwork bonding errors, laying foundations on slurry and adding water to 
concrete), but some could have been communications errors coupled with poor 
definition of responsibilities. Ambiguity arose because it was not clear whether the 
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worker was expected to know, without prompting by drawings or other instructions 
such details of modem construction as the need for weep-holes over openings, the 
number of under-floor vents per metre of wall length, or the need for suspended floor 
slabs over deep fill. These questions, related to the "knowledge expectations" of 
operatives, echoed comments in the interview study and such ambiguities, particularly 
between primary actions and formal communications were common in that study. 
A suspected instance of sabotage (8.01 Friday), where a WC pan may have been 
deliberately broken as an act of revenge, illustrated the limitations of some views of 
human error (Reason 1990, Kletz 1985). Most models of the error process based on 
psychology and some based on engineering ignore deliberate error. 
It became apparent during the study that the site manager was relatively impotent with 
regard to the selection of operatives. This was in line with literature (for example, 
Kletz 1985) suggesting that workers should, to a certain extent, be accepted "as they 
were". Two particular instances illustrated this impotence. The site manager was 
unable to have the electricians removed from the site (8.05 Thursday) for poor 
business performance and a similar problem with the fencing contractors remained 
unresolved (9.15 Tuesday, 9.50 Friday). Obtaining adequate workers appeared to have 
involved continual badgering of the sub-contractors' managers rather than removal of 
the firms. In contrast, the site manager had some power to employ general workers 
and used informal contacts to try and do this. This was illustrated in the approaches to 
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a fork-lift driver on an adjacent site (15.00 Wednesday), to whom the site manager had 
offered a job. 
Manazerial factors 
Communications 
Instances related to problems with formal and informal communications were common 
during the study. Examples included the circuitous routing of payment cheques at 
Company level (10.50 Monday), incorrect sizing of steel beams in schedules/drawings 
(16.30 Monday), incorrect levels between houses and paths (wrong drawings or a lack 
of drawings) (8.45 Tuesday), foundations layouts not matching superstructure layouts 
(11.40 Wednesday), wrong patio door sizes being left in brickwork (10.3 5,12.05 
Thursday) and lack of information concerning retaining walls (8.50 Friday). 
Change 
Change was also regularly implicated as a cause of potential and actual errors. The 
most pronunent agents inducing change during the week were "home-makers" - the 
facility given to purchasers to make adaptations to their prospective purchase. In some 
instances, the changes led to dismantling work. For example, changed door sizes 
(10.35 Thursday) required dismantling of brickwork. 
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Checking 
Checking errors were not expressly implicated during the study, but were implicit in 
some primary errors reported above. Rather, checking featured as instances of pre- 
emptive avoidance tactics. For example, the site manager used a "passing" exhortation 
to a ground-worker to use adequate concrete in the bases for lamp standards as the 
work was being performed (8.45 Tuesday). 
Concurrency 
Problems of concurrency were noted, but generally as a consequence of other failings. 
For example, problems related to the installation of electrical and water services caused 
by cost factors (10.50,15.00, Monday, 8.45,10.00 Tuesday, 15.30 Thursday) were 
leading to concurrent working. 
Organisational culture 
Instances related to organisational culture featured on several occasions. In meetings 
between site sales and construction staff (12.50 Monday, 16.00 Friday), a cultural 
"gap" between site and head office personnel was illustrated. A conflict of cultures was 
illustrated by the differing orientations of top management and construction managers 
over the organisation of and payment for services installations (10.50,15.00 Monday, 
9.50 Wednesday) and the re-siting of the office and show cabin (12.36 Monday). The 
conflict was between profitability, cash flow or survival objectives (at overall company 
level) and performance on site. 
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The link between poor organisational culture and lack of participation was indicated by 
such comments as the "head office only letting you know when there are problems" 
(12.50 Monday) and reported gaps in senior management knowledge related to the 
problems being experienced with the project (16.00 Friday). 
The organisational culture within the site appeared to be influenced by the actions of 
the site manager and assistant manager. The distinguishing features of this culture 
were: - 
High levels of parWcipation 
Both site manager and assistant would carry out tasks on site, by, for example, 
driving the fork-lift truck (15.15 Monday), or preparing working areas (15.30 
Wednesday). 
v Approach 
The approach of the site manager was direct and abrasive as was illustrated by 
his handling of the electricians (8.05 Thursday) and the fencers (9.50 Friday). 
The site manager appeared to have a series of "rows" with sub-contractors and 
subordinates (for example with the ground-worker foreman - 8.50 Friday), but 
was equally prepared to acknowledge good work - as with the carpentry work 
to plot 34 (10.22 Friday). The assistant manager adopted a more conciliatory 
attitude and was privately critical of an abrasive approach. The overall 
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impression given of the culture of the site was that of task-oriented, but active 
and participative management4. 
Global factors 
Factors of cost, time and societal demands were seen by site personnel as being 
behind many of the problems experienced with the project. This was particularly the 
case with the "home-maker" scheme, where the site personnel saw problems of a 
"tight" economic climate leading to purchasers demanding more in the way of changes, 
but the company failing to respond adequately (10.00 Tuesday). Similarly tight costs, 
driven by economic pressures, were perceived to underlie the lack of services 
installations (15.00 on Monday), where non-payment of the water services bill was 
linked to year-end cash flow requirements. 
The fact that both the site and assistant site managers frequently cited the home-maker 
co-ordinator in connection with home-maker induced changes suggests that labelling 
as global factors some economic or societal demands may be misleading. Both building 
and site manager reported (10.00 Tuesday) the need for better management of home- 
maker changes if they were to be allowed. Management would be in the form of a 
"technically qualified design/construction co-ordinator". 
4 One way of classifying this culture might be in accordance with the "managerial grid" of Blake and 
Mouton (1978), where it would fit somewhere between "team management' ' (9.9) and "authority- 
obedience" (9.1). 
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Similar ambiguities appear in the comments of the site manager concerning the 
problems with services (8.01 Friday). He implicated the "commercial director and 
surveyors" in the non-arrival of services rather than global factors. Global factors may 
therefore have been used to hide other causes of errors. The above comments suggest 
that the site management largely considered global factors a "given", beyond the 
control of the organisation, but which the organisation should "rise to" 
THE SYSTEMIC NATURE OF ERROR INFLUENCES 
The systen-k nature of error influences was evidenced in the observational study in 
several unrelated incidents including-- 
e Home-maker changes 
e Problems with the supply of services 
e Problems of lighting for decorators 
9 Problems with wallpaper paste 
e Problems with cleaners starting work 
o Problem of performance of electricians 
9 Problem of mis-positioned gutter outlets causing drainage revisions 
Systems effects related to these incidents are summansed as follows: - 
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1) Home-maker changes 
(8.00,15.45 Monday, 10.00 Tuesday, 9.40 Wednesday, 8.30,10.35 Thursday) 
The causal nature of error factors 
The provision of "home-makers" showed a "chain of cause" from economic influences 
leading to slow sales, through societal demands (purchasers were able to "pick and 
choose") to changes, concurrent working and prima errors leading to potential 
defects. Actual defects were not recorded in relation to home-makers, but changes 
increasing the span of floor joists and moving the position of internal load-bearing 
walls (plots 34-36) would predispose the construction to failure. 
The hidden or latent nature of some error factors 
Without a detailed knowledge of the history of a particular home-maker, it would be 
difficult in some cases, to look beyond the primary error to the underlying cause. This 
was illustrated by the problems experienced by the carpenter in cutting up the wrong 
floor joists for use in an altered unit (9.05 Friday). Likewise, should problems of over- 
spanning joists occur, it would be difficult at a later date, to trace cause back to 
economic influences or managerial ineptitude in handling the required changes. 
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2) Problems with the supply of services 
(15.00 Monday, 10.00 Tuesday, 9.50 Wednesday, 15.30 Thursday) 
Multiple causes of error 
Failure to provide an electrical supply illustrated several separate causes of error. 
Separate causes were the conflicting organisational and performance requirements 
related to payment, poor communications regarding payment and changes in the 
position of the sub-station. At the time of the study, no active errors had materialised 
from the services supply and further active errors would be needed for the latent errors 
noted here to have an effect in terms of defects. 
The causal nature of error factors 
Cost and time pressures, poor communications and changes had introduced the 
requirement for concurrent working for both water and electrical installations, which 
would, in turn, increase the impact of primary errors. 
3) Problems of lighting for decorators (for decorating internal bathrooms) 
(15.30 Mondav) 
Multiple separate causes 
Multiple causes were again illustrated in this example. Failure to provide a fixed 
electrical supply, failure to realise that the lack of windows in internal bathrooms 
should be communicated to the sub-contractor and tight pricing by the sub-contractor 
had all combined to cause a problem. 
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4) Problems with wallpaper paste for show houses. 
(14.00,14.45 Tuesday 
Multiple separate causes 
The fact that wallpaper required a ready-mixed paste was not communicated to the 
decorators and the decorators claimed that they had not priced or allowed for 
providing the paste. Obtaining paste was invoking difficult communications as local 
supply was prohibited by organisational procedures. 
5) Problems with cleaners starting work. 
(14.30 Tuesdav) 
The causal nature of error factors 
This attempt at pre-emptive action - to warn cleaners that power, lighting and hot 
water were not available for their task, again illustrated the influence of wider causes 
on individual performance. 
6) Problems of erformance of electricians 
(8.05,10.20 Thursdav, 10.00 Fridav) 
The causal nature of error influences 
The intransigence of electricians in not doing as required by the site manager and, 
eventually, taking suspected sabotage action was explained by the poor price that they 
received for second fix work. The out-turn event of damaging equipment may have 
been exacerbated by the abrasive attitude of the site manager -a cultural factor. 
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7) Problems Of MiS-DOSitioned gutter outlet 
(9.20 Fridav) 
The hidden nature of some errors 
The problem of "running outlets" to gutters on a block of houses being positioned 
incorrectly presented itself as a primary error by a plumber. However, it is likely that 
this problem was exacerbated by conflicting formal communications in that site and 
house-type drawings often do not correspond. House-type drawings would normally 
show the ideal position for gutter outlets, but site drawings, showing the drainage 
layout may show differing positions for the associated rainwater pipes, in order to 
allow for site characteristics (such as the fall of the ground in relation to the houses). 
The plumber possibly worked from house-type drawings rather than site drawings. In 
this case, two errors were made, one, a formal communications error at the design 
coordination stage and a more obvious primary error during construction. 
Multiple consequences 
The consequent revisions to drainage layout caused a more shallow fall to the drains 
than designed leading to a greater risk of blockages. In addition, the increased run of 
drains increased the cost and duration of construction. This provides an illustration of 
the inter-relatedness of the effects of error. 
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Further examples of systems effects 
Further examples were evidenced in the ambiguity of the cause of the mistake of using 
the wrong wallpaper in the show units, (where the wallpapers to bedrooms I and 2 
were reversed) and the mistake of fixing an extractor point in the wrong position (9.00 
Monday). In both instances, error could be attributed to poor communications, or 
primary error depending on the circumstances. 
The contingency response of the managers in matching checking strategy to type of 
task was also evidence of a systems approach to the handling of error. For some 
checking, continuous supervision was used (9.20 Thursday), elsewhere post- 
construction checking was used (10.22 Friday). The task involved with the first 
illustration was laying tarmac, a relatively irretrievable task. The latter task was fixing 
of upper floor joists, a task capable of easier later correction. 
Communications were also often mixed with checking. This was the case with the 
building managers' inspection visits to the site (10.00 Tuesday). Here, the building 
manager- 
* checked work by walking around the site with the site manager, 
* communicated information (for example concerning the Electricity Board 
"Wayleave" problems), 
9 planned the re-positioning of the sales unit and work to the first phase, 
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* pre-empted problems by giving a warning concerning the disposal of "muck" on 
the adjoining site. 
In addition to illustrating a systems effect, this instance also emphasised problems of 
categorisation in the model, where the manager was performing a number of functions 
simultaneously. 
10.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In addressing the content of the model, a numerical analysis of the diary indicated that 
most error related events concerned communications, cost pressures, changes and 
primary factors (in that order). This analysis echoed findings from the preliminary, 
statistical and interview studies. The numbers are, however, misleading because of 
ambiguity of cause, or multiple and inaccurate attributions. For example, the number of 
causes attributed to cost factors may be misleading, in that there were several 
indications during the study suggesting it was not the external factor alone that caused 
problems, but also an inadequate response from within the organisation. Thus, the 
need for a technical co-ordinator to handle changes in design and other factors was 
stressed by the site and building manager. 
This study addressed the operation of the model (the third question in Chapter 5) by 
illustrating inter-related and multiple causes of error, as well as inter-related effects in 
terms of quality, cost and time. It also illustrated "precursor" effects related to 
managerial or global factors. Some "active" defects arose during the study (such as the 
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sub-standard concrete arising from over-watering and defects noted in the Building 
Guarantee Company files), but latent and active components suggested by Petrosky 
(1994), Reason (1990) and Blockley (1992) were also evident as "incipient failures". 
For the latent precursors to have materialised as defects, a primary error would need to 
be committed (for example, in the case of lack of a water supply, a poorly jointed pipe 
by a plumber) and this would have to lead to a measurable defect. The reported 
"modulating" effect of the operative noted in the interview study was, therefore, 
demonstrated in this study, with the probability of several latent problems never 
materialising as consequences and thus never causing a defect. They did, however, 
increase the statistical probability of a defect occurring. 
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11 
CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research project was driven by the need to reduce defects in construction, by 
uncovering and investigating their underlying causes. The investigation was initially 
concentrated on an open review of literature which progressively pointed towards the 
role of error in failure. Literature covering errors from a wide range of sources 
indicated that: - 
9 Errors are behind most failures in industry. 
9 Errors are inevitable and therefore must be managed 
9 Failure often involves multiple errors 
e Failure often involves underlying latent errors as well as obvious active errors 
e Error causes are linked systemically 
Several authors offered models of error in complex systems, without systematically 
verifying or practically applying these. However, the desire to thoroughly follow the 
trail of cause behind errors which lead to defects, led to an approach which went 
further than simply constructing a model. A tentative model (figure 5.1) related to the 
occurrence of defects in construction projects was proposed based on a synthesis of 
the literature. Subsequent field research of both an investigative and confirmatory 
nature set out to examine the model as proposed, but also contemplated modifications. 
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Thus, feedback from the preliminary study influenced the direction of later work, 
adding to the sophistication of the model 
The empirical research involved four stages, a preliminary survey of practitioners in the 
construction industry and statistical, interview and observational studies of speculative 
house-building. These studies addressed the proposed model as illustrated in figure 5.2 
and repeated below as figure 11.1 
FIGURE 11.1 (5.2) - MODEL PROPERTIES IN RELATION TO STUDIES 
STUDY Preliminary House-building 
Statistical Interview Observational 
Property 
1) Form - the structure 
of the model 
2) Content - the 
........... ........... ............. 
importance of factors .............. ........... ....... ...... ..... . ............ ............ ... :.::. ............ ...... 
3) Operation - system 
effects 
The investigative methodology behind the research led to a search for corroborating 
evidence of causes by triangulating between the studies. 
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11.2 FINDINGS FROM THE STUDIES 
PRELEMINARY STUDY 
The preliminary study, in addressing the form and content of the model introduced 
four more detailed questions as follows: - 
Related to form 
* were the range of factors in the model comprehensive? 
e was the hierarchical structure of the model (with three separate layers - global, 
managerial and primary) a valid vertical categorisation? 
Related to content 
* what was the relative weighting of factors in the model? 
* were these factors applicable generally? 
Reference to a sample of construction industry participants gave some support to both 
the form and content of the model, but with modifications. With respect to the form, 
open responses indicated that the range of factors was reasonably comprehensive, but 
factors related to Ustems aspects and primaU characteristics at managerial level were 
also relevant. With respect to the hierarchical structure of the model, factor analysis 
gave some support to a division between global factors "external" to as opposed to 
managerial/primary factors "internal" to the project. However, this division was not 
exact and factor analysis also indicated a third principal component containing 
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variables representing the primary factor "self certifying" and the managerial factor 
cc supervising junior staff'. 
With respect to the content, survey responses emphasised factors across the model. 
"Communications" was the highest rated factor, followed by "time", "concurrency 
control", "change control" and "education and training". The emphasis on 
communications and managerial functions of concurrency and change control followed 
literature from several perspectives. There was a lack of emphasis on more remote 
global factors of the political, economic and social climate. General agreement on the 
most important factors was noted from groups of respondents drawn from the design 
and construction sectors of the industry. 
STUDIES OF HOUSE-BUILDING 
Statistical studv 
The statistical study, also addressed the content of the model by investigating whether 
there were any statistically significant links between measures of factors in the model 
and the performance of projects. In relation to 23 speculative house-building projects, 
significant associations were found between reported levels of defects and the 
background (p=0.019), qualifications (p=0.033) and experience (p=0.059) of the site 
manager. The findings indicated that qualified site managers from a managerial (as 
opposed to trades) background were associated with sites having a lower level of 
defects. Less experienced managers were also associated with sites having a lower 
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level of defects, but less experienced managers were also better qualified (p=0.016) 
suggesting that qualifications rather than experience determine performance on site. 
Significant associations were also found between the reported level of defects and the 
level of planning and programming (p=0.049), the intensity of project management 
generally (p=0.007) and the quality of formal communications (p=0.057). The findings 
indicated that more detailed planning, more intense project management and better 
quality formal communications were associated with sites having a lower level of 
defects. An association was noted between the level of perceived quality of the site and 
the skills of trades-people, with more highly skilled operatives being associated with 
better perceived quality (p=0.072) 
Whilst the size of the sample suggests that these results should be treated with caution, 
they correspond well with the preliminary study findings in supporting the content of 
the model. In particular, significant links between variables representing 
commumcations, planning and project management and levels of defects supports the 
emphasis placed in the preliminary study and much literature on managerial factors. 
The lack of a significant association between global factors and performance also 
echoes the low ratings for some of these factors in the preliminary study. 
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Factors related to the primary characteristics of the site manager were included in 
response to indications in the preliminary study that primary factors 
-at a mana. g-erial 
level might be important. The statistically significant associations between performance 
and the background, qualifications and experience of the site manager justify this 
inclusion. 
Interview studl 
The interview study addressed the content and operation of the model by 
interviewing 40 participants drawn from the house-building industry including the 23 
site managers involved in the statistical study, their more senior managers and 
personnel from two house-building guarantee insurance companies. Regarding the 
content of the model, numerical analysis of interviews indicated that most error 
incidents related to communications, primary factors, time, change control, and 
checking in that order. The emphasis on communications provides strong support for 
both preliminary and statistical studies, particularly in view of the different method 
used for this study. 
Regarding the operation of the model, analysis of the interviews revealed three 
"pathologies" of defect causation, self contained errors, two-wgy interactions of errors 
and complex interactions. It was notable that even for simple self contained errors, 
there was often an underlying cause effectively disguised by a more obvious patent 
error. For two-way interactions, the interplay of errors causing a defect was expressly 
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acknowledged. Analysis of complex interactions revealed two types of pathology. One 
type involved a simple error being carried through the construction sequence and 
compounded by subsequent errors. The other type was consciously "driven from the 
top" by motivations, such as profit and sales, not related to the quality of the work. 
Observational study 
The observational study also addressed the content and operation of the model, but 
focused on errors as they occurred on a single site over a short time period. Regarding 
the content of the model, numerical analysis of observations indicated that most errors 
related to communications, cost pressures, changes and primary factors in that 
order. Emphasis on communications replicated findings from the preliminary, statistical 
and interview studies. 
The operation of the model was illustrated by a series of incidents which emphasised 
the importance of links between errors and other driving forces. A causal chain was 
evident in some incidents showing how wider global factors, or managerial errors 
could drive and magnify primary errors. It was shown how the underlying errors could 
be disguised by the operation of a later active error and incidents having multiple 
causes and leading to multiple consequences were illustrated. 
317 
11 
- Conclusions 
11.3 TRIANGULATING FENDINGS 
By combining studies it is possible to triangulate findings. That is, converging findings 
are obtained from three or more sources before firm conclusions are drawn. In relation 
to the three research questions posed in Chapter 6, the clearest evidence of 
triangulated findings was in relation to the second and third questions related to the 
content and operation of the model and these are considered first. Findings related to 
the form of the model are less clear cut and are considered later. 
CONTENT 
The clearest finding from all studies was the importance attached to communications. 
This finding was supported by opinion in the preliminary study and by analysis of 
incidents in the interview and observational studies. The statistical study revealed an 
association (p=0.057) between high quality formal communications and low levels of 
reported defects. 
Apart from the importance attached to communications, opinion and analysis 
supported a range of factors spanning all levels of the model. Primary factors (or their 
equivalent expressed as "education/training", or "skills") were ranked within the top 
five factors in the preliminary, interview and observational studies and an association 
(p=0.072) was noted between high levels of trade skills and high perceived quality 
in 
the statistical study. The control of change was also ranked within the top five 
factors 
in the prelinunary, interview and observational studies and its proxy in the 
form of 
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good planning, was associated (p=0.049) with a lower level of reported defects in the 
statistical study. The global factor "time" was emphasised in the preliminary and 
interview studies and "cost" was emphasised in the observational study, but other 
global factors did not feature in any empirical study. 
Overall, analysis of the content of the model supports the emphasis placed by the 
literature on managerial factors and, correspondingly, a conceptualisation that 
expressly acknowledges these. 
OPERATION 
Both the interview and observational studies illustrated links between factors in the 
model which demonstrate that the model operates as a system. Three "pathologies" of 
causation were identified in the interview study, involving self contained errors, two 
way interactions between errors and complex interactions. Underlying errors disguised 
by subsequent primary errors were illustrated as well as outcomes involving multiple 
errors, or multiple consequences. 
The findings from these two studies are supported by the literature (including Turner 
1978, Reason 1991, Blockley 1992, Fortune and Peters 1995) which emphasises the 
cc systems" and "socio-technical" aspects of error causation. Demonstrating linkages 
between errors justifies the contention in the literature that systems have to be treated 
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as a whole in examining error causation and proposing remedial action in avoiding 
future errors. 
FORM 
Support for the division of the model into categories was evidenced in the preliminary 
study, where the range of factors was seen to be comprehensive. However, the 
categorisation was subject to two criticisms. Firstly some respondents in the 
preliminary study did stress factors (related to systems aspects and primary factors at 
managerial level) which were not expressly included in the model. Secondly, the 
observational study illustrated that several categories were "permeable" and not easily 
distinguished. Thus, there appeared a distinction, but no clear dividing line, between 
communications, checking and planning work. 
Some support for the hierarchical structure of the model was evidenced in the 
preliminary study factor analysis. However, only two clear principal components were 
revealed - those "internal" and those "external" to the project. A third minor principal 
component based on variables representing factors of "self certifying" and "supervising 
junior staff' was also identified. 
Some results from the statistical study also challenge the hierarchical distinction 
between primary and managerial factors in the model. In the statistical study, measures 
related to the prima qualities of the site manager were included and were found to be 
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associated (p=0.019, p=0.033, p=0.059) with levels of reported defects. This set of 
associations suggests that there should not be a distinction between prima and 
managerial factors. Primary factors are important at a managerial as well as operative 
level and, perhaps the distinction should be based on individual roles and specialisms in 
project organisations. The evidence for an alternative based on roles can be 
summarised as follows: - 
9 Preliminary study indications in the "supply" question that primary factors 
(leadership, motivation), but at a managerial level are important in avoiding errors. 
e Preliminary study indications in the factor analysis, where managerial and primary 
components were not clearly distinguished by separate principal components. 
Statistical study associations between primary factors (including the background, 
qualifications and experience of the site manager) and performance in relation to 
defects. 
11.4 A REFINED MODEL 
The research related to the form of the model indicates that a conceptualisation that 
categorises on the basis of a distinction between prima and managerial errors is not 
tenable. However, the distinction between active and latent errors widely made in the 
literature (Petroski 1985, Reason 1990, Blockley 1992) is supported by empirical 
research in the interview and observational study. Examining the linkages between 
causes in these studies has shown that some errors clearly predispose systems to 
failure,, without directly causing the failure themselves. Other errors, usually made at 
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the work-face, are necessary before an unwanted outcome will result. Thus, a division 
based on a split between active and latent errors can be maintained. As active errors 
are usually conunitted by operatives and as this research has shown that the individual 
characteristics of the manager are salient in performance in relation to defects, an 
alternative model might distinguish between the roles of those directly involved in 
performing physical work and the roles of the. supporting managerial cast. "Primary" 
errors thus become "operative" errors and "managerial" errors thus become "manager" 
errors. 
Apart from this re-conceptualisation, the strong emphasis placed in the literature and in 
all of the empirical studies on communications indicates that this factor should be 
given greater prominence and presented throughout the model. A distinction can be 
made between "operative" tasks and "management" tasks, but all are involved in 
communication and this should be more accurately illustrated. An illustration of a 
refined model based on the alternative conceptualisation is proposed below: - 
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FIGURE 11.2 - REFINED MODEL OF THE NATURE OF ERROR IN 
PROJECTS 
01- 
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Figure 11.2 cannot easily illustrate the operation of the model. The interview and 
observational studies illustrated the importance of links between categories of errors 
and a second conceptualisation of the model, shown in figure 11.3, illustrates how 
errors have been seen in this research to develop into actual or potential defects. Often 
driven by global pressures, unrelated to the project, managerial errors either combine 
with or supplement operative errors to cause defects. The figure shows how errors by 
managers may be "modulated" by the actions of the operative and the unwanted 
outcome may be avoided. The figure also shows that errors can arise at all levels of the 
model. The green line represents simple errors with the operative as the first and final 
cause. The blue line represents management errors, which could be followed by the 
operative to cause a defect, or which could be corrected by the operative. The red line 
represents wider global forces, which drive management errors and thence lead to 
operative errors. For these forces, there are two modulators, the manager and the 
operative. 
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FIGURE 11.3 - THE PATHOLOGY OF ERROR IN PROJECTS 
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11.5 ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE 
The question remains of whether the two conceptualisations of the refined model of 
the nature of error in projects represent an advance in understanding of the subject. 
Advances related to the current work can be summarised, under five headings as 
follows-- 
1) Empirical confirmation of previous work. The current work represents an 
advance of knowledge by subjecting a model similar to that proposed in much 
literature to field research. Research into models of error is, by and large, absent 
and such studies as there are primarily involve induction from published sources, 
without further theory testing. 
2) Application to construction projects. The method of categorisation of underlying 
causes of errors leading to defects in construction projects represents an advance of 
knowledge. Although other researchers in construction management have attempted 
categorisation, none have based their categories on a systematic review of literature 
or appear to have presented the detailed categories to review by survey or other 
research. 
3) Emphasis on the functions of project management. The literature conceming 
failure specifically related to construction projects indicted many project 
management functions (such as the division of responsibilities, control of changes 
and control of concurrency). The current research systematically models these 
functions. Other work has been linýted to either extracting one or other of these 
functions in isolation or broadly indicting management as a whole. 
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4) Consideration of systems effects. The model proposed fi7om the current research 
represents an advance on similar conceptualisations of errors in that the systems 
effects of the model were expressly addressed. The interview and observational 
studies expressly considered the linkages between error causes, showing that errors 
can be modulated by the actions of others. 
5) Methodological advances. The investigative method used for this research 
represents a methodology which is supported by recognised social science research 
(Rose 1982, Gill and Johnson 1997) and can form a pattern for future work in 
applied social science. The methodology involves six steps: - K- 
o Wide literature review 
e Formation of propositions 
9 Preliminary verification 
o Search for corroboration/refutation 
9 Further studies to support corroboration 
* Comparison of studies and triangulation. 
11.6 REFLECTION 
WITIHN APPLIED RESEARCH 
Generally 
The argument for an applied research approach, set out in Chapter 6, is based on the 
need to provide practical solutions to applied problems. The outcome is expected to be 
in the form of immediately applicable innovations, or in the form of guides to policy, 
327 
11 
- Conclusions 
which in turn inform practical decisions. In terms of an applied research approach, 
therefore, it can be seen that the conclusions from this research represent an 
intermediate step. 
However, the research does provide the basis for guidance. For example, a possible 
development from the work could be a guide to managing project work, which would 
concentrate on covering the key conclusions of the current work. Whether the guide 
produced acceptable and effective improvements in performance in relation to defects 
would form the basis of further research. The current work serves to give some 
confidence that the development of such a guide would be based on research rather 
than conjecture. 
On the methods used 
The overall approach of all four empirical studies was to develop and test the 
propositions represented in the model illustrated in figure 5.1 by using an investigative 
methodology. This involved an iterative pattern of sequential studies, which fed back 
into the model and led to modifications. An aim of the investigation, in line with a 
practical applied research methodology was a generalisable model having applicability 
over as wide a sample as was practically possible in a PhD study. All four studies were 
subject to limitations which affected the extent of generalisation possible, the internal 
validity and reliability of the findings. The main reflections associated with each study 
are summarised as follows: - 
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1) Preliminary study. 
The preliminary study sought to survey a fairly wide sample of the construction 
industry. However, it concentrated on managers and professionals and largely ignored 
the views of operatives. The method of sampling was not random, but limited 
geographically and to organisations related to a student population. Generalisation of 
the results from this study is, therefore, limited. Construct validity was affected by 
treating categories of the causes of errors as synonymous with categories of error 
avoidance measures. This could have affected ratings and rankings of causes. The 
study was not piloted, thus, within itself, the study was not checked for reliability. The 
questionnaire presented respondents with a pre-decided menu (a closed question 
questionnaire), which directed them to responses contained within the instrument. This 
was partially redressed by providing an open question, but the presentation of the 
questionnaire would nevertheless have restricted the range of responses. 
An underlying problem with the preliminary study, as it was carried out, was that it 
was attempting to achieve two objectives, which partially conflicted. Firstly, an 
element of theory testing (in the form of a preliminary confirmation of the model) was 
sought. Thus, the pre-decided format of the questionnaire represented deductively 
derived theory, which was to be subjected to testing. Secondly, novel causes of errors 
were being canvassed. This inductive element of the research was under-represented in 
that only one question was relevant to it. On reflection, it might have been an 
improvement to defer testing propositions at the preliminary stage and instead to 
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concentrate on inductive methods. A more open-ended investigation of the causes of 
error (perhaps by using focus groups, open interviews or unstructured questionnaires) 
could have been used before closing on a fairly defined model. 
2) Statistical study 
The limitations of the statistical study are documented in detail in Chapter 8, but to 
summarise, difficulties existed in particular in the form of the small sample size, 
difficulty in operationali sing variables and problems of intervening variables with this 
type of research. The use of speculative house-builders as the focus of the research and 
the concentration on the larger amongst these limited the generafisability of findings. 
Much data was relayed by the key manager for the respective projects and collection of 
data was also carried out by a single researcher. This could have given rise to the 
problem of "selective induction" reported by Schofield (1993), where the results are 
influenced by the expectations of the researcher. Problems of selective induction could 
have been reduced by using more than one researcher, or using external checks. 
Problems of construct validity in operationalising variables and in ensuring that 
measures were reliable could have been reduced by piloting the study. 
3) Interview study 
Three broad criticisms can be levelled at the interview study. Firstly, the problem of 
selective induction mentioned above also applies to this study. Secondly, the data 
could have been affected by the biases of the interviewee and causes, especially where 
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involving errors by the interviewee, might not be accurately reported. Thirdly, data 
was very local and generalisation was not possible beyond the experience of the 
interviewees. However, direct face-to-face questioning did allow the detailed 
pathology of error occurrence to be followed and this was instrumental in revealing the 
links between errors at different levels of project organisations. 
One criticism of the application of applied propositional research objectives to the 
interview method was that it under-used the potential of the method. This was 
apparent when the interviewees expounded on the nature of their occupation and how 
they handled the occurrence of errors. They were able to give considerable detail of the 
day-to-day working of their organisations, which was relevant to error research 
generally, but did not fit the causal objectives of the research. This problem of 
"throwing information away" because of prior theory construction is recognised by Gill 
and Johnson (1997 page 13 1). 
On reflection, the interview study was very valuable in revealing the pathology of 
errors in the fonn of the links between causes. It would also have been an effective 
form of early inductive research, perhaps in place of the broader preliminary study, 
where it would have allowed a less constrained collection of causes of errors than the 
pre-determined questionnaire used. An effective use of interview research would also 
be at the implementation phase of any practical intervention proposed from the current 
research. Implementing change in organisations is affected by local considerations and 
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understanding the detailed attitudes of participants are important in ensuring that 
propositions accurately reflect their needs (Checkland 198 1). 
4) Observational study 
The observational study involved the researcher following the construction of a 
housing site for a short period of time. Three main criticisms can be levelled at this 
study. Firstly, the period of one week was too short and on reflection a longer period 
would have been worthwhile. The time-scale chosen was largely dictated by the time 
available to the researcher and offered by the company concerned. It was sufficient to 
allow the pathology of a number of instances of errors leading to potential defects to 
be recorded, but a further period would have allowed the path of the errors to be 
followed to their outcome. Secondly, the information obtained from the study was 
local and not generalisable beyond the site studied. A third, more technical criticism 
was that the recording of data was carried out by a single researcher without checks in 
the form of using separate assessors. 
In common with the interview study, the observational study gave rise to a large 
amount of descriptive information concerning how the project was being carried out. 
Some of this information was recorded as background illustrative material in Chapter 
10, but, as with the interview study, the objectives of the research did not always 
coincide with the data offered and there was a feeling that some was wasted. 
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Summary of reservations 
Following Gill and Johnson's (1997) terminology for research evaluation criteria, the 
reservations of and possible improvements for each study are summarised in table 11.1. 
Gill and Johnson divide generalisability into two evaluation criteria, population and 
ecological validity. Population validity considers the extent to which findings can be 
generalised from the sample of people involved in the research to a wider, but defined 
population. Ecological validity considers the extent to which it is possible to generalise 
beyond the wider population, or the extent to which findings are typical of other 
contexts. The distinction between these two concepts is further discussed under the 
heading "generalisation" below. 
The combination of methods 
Whilst table 11.1 shows that all methods used are subject to some criticisms, the 
combination of methods, where conclusions point in the same direction, mitigates 
criticisms of individual studies. Returning to the detective analogy, corroboration 
arising from different sources, using different methodologies should give greater 
confidence in the reliability of individual conclusions. 
Concerning the choice of methods a greater use of observational and interview 
methods might have allowed a greater understanding of the subject matter of the 
research, particularly in the earlier stages, where constructs were defined. However, a 
combination of methods would still have been valuable, as this would allow the 
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methodological triangulation advocated by Winch (1990), Miller and Crabtree (1998) 
and Robson (1993). 
TABLE 11.1 FIELD RESEARCH - RESERVATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
(Evaluation criteria - Gill and Johnson 1997) 
Study Reservations Improvements 
PRELIMINARY 
Ecological validity Early closure on pre-decided More inductivist methods at early 
constructs stage of study 
Population validity Sampling reservations More careful sampling or 
" Managerial bias acceptance of limitations. 
" Geographical 
" Associated with students 
Internal validity Causes and avoidance of errors Tests for differences between causes 
treated as the same and avoidance measures. Focus on 
causes only. 
Reliability No pilot or duplication of study Pilot, re lication or triangulation 
STATISTICAL 
Ecological validity Affected by closure on pre-decided Open question or more inductivist 
constructs in previous study approach earlier 
Population validity Sampling reservations Use larger sample and more careful 
" Size of sample sampling or acceptance of 
" Geographical limitations. 
" Size of organisation 
" Type of organisation 
Internal validity Operationalisation of constructs and More detailed review of earlier 
some proxies, intervening variables, studies, closer control of variables, 
measures for defects use of complementary approaches 
(triangulation) 
Reliability No pilot use of single researcher, use Pilot, replication or triangulation. 
of key manager to relay data. Multiple raters, direct observation. 
INTERVIEW 
Ecological validity Depends on accounts of interviewees, Use other external checks on 
but relatively good. accounts, for example, observation 
study. 
Population validity Limited to accounts of interviewees - Accept limitations, use theoretical 
no attempt at sampling. saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1990) 
or triangulation. 
Internal validity Pre-closure could lead to selective Combine with other methods by 
induction. triangulation. 
Reliability Use of single researcher Multiple researchers, replication or 
triangulation. 
OBSERVATIONAIL 
Ecological validity Not problematic, but time period too Longer study 
short I 
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Population validity Limited to one situation Accept limitations, use 
triangulation. 
Internal validity Pre-closure could lead to selective Combine with other methods by 
induction. triangulation. 
Reliability Use of single researcher Multiple researchers, replication or 
I triangulation. 
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Generalisation 
The distinction made by Gill and Johnson (1997) between ecological and population 
validity touches on the problem of induction, first identified by Hume in the eighteenth 
century. Popper (1959) describes the problem of induction as an inability to generalise 
from a finite population to an infinite. In the observational study, conclusions induced 
from the study are only applicable to that study and there is no logical basis for 
assuming that results would be applicable elsewhere. In the interview study, 
conclusions can only be applied to the population actually interviewed. In the statistical 
study, conclusions can be applied to the 23 housing projects studied, but the ability to 
generalise to other projects, even of a similar type, is limited. In the preliminary study, 
the method of sampling, geographical restrictions and the method of organising returns 
limited findings to the sample itself with limited possibility of generalisation beyond. It 
is likely that most research in construction management is faced with such limitations 
on generalisability and all research faces the problem of induction (Hammersley 1992). 
The problem of induction led Popper to propose falsifiability, where no positive finding 
can be taken to conclusively prove scientific knowledge (Popper 1959). However, 
Popper did recognise that findings can achieve the status of provisional validity by a 
process of verisimilitude. Verisimilitude is a concept common to both positivist and 
interpretivist research (see Chapter 6) and is achieved when results repeatedly confirm 
expectations. As a relatively novel piece of work, the findings of the current research 
cannot claim verisimilitude. However, the combination of these findings and further 
336 
11 
- Conclusions 
work could start the process of verification leading to a measure of provisional 
validity. The replication methodology proposed by Yin (1993) for case study research 
is a form of verification that appears to rely on verisimilitude and, therefore, further 
studies in a similar area giving similar results are of value. Further studies are 
suggested below, partly in order to follow the replication methodology suggested by 
Yin. 
ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES 
Two alternative methodologies that could have been considered in the current research 
are a more positivistic approach based on the natural sciences and an interpretivist 
methodology. 
It is submitted that the reductionism implicit in a strictly positivistic methodology is not 
suitable for complicated problems involving multiple variables and interlinked systems. 
It may have been possible to isolate one cause of defects and carry out a closely 
controlled experiment and this approach could be valuable for further detailed research 
which follows one aspect of the findings. However, the current research has suggested 
that the links between error causes are important and this fact would have been lost in 
a reductionist positivisitic piece of research. 
The desire to concentrate on cause in the current research means that an interpretivist 
approach is not likely to be applicable either. This is well recognised in the 
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interpretivist literature (for example see Rooke et al 1997 and Guba and Lincoln 
1998). The desire, whether arising from a philosophical or methodological standpoint, 
to concentrate on situated understanding means that knowledge of a generally 
applicable nature of value beyond the research setting cannot be generated. Howeverý 
interpretivist approaches are appropriate complementary methodologies in two areas. 
Firstly, a greater use could have been made of them in the early inductivist phases of 
the current research (see above). Secondly, interpretivist approaches would be valuable 
in implementing changes proposed as a result of further work. 
11.7 FURTHER RESEARCH 
Three areas of study are suggested by the findings from this research. Firstly, the 
research concludes by proposing refined models of the nature of errors in projects. 
This model should be carried forward to some implementable solution (perhaps in the 
form of a guide to practice). In combination with implementation, further studies 
should be carried out on the effectiveness of the model as represented by the guide. 
Secondly, and notwithstanding the desirability of considering the model as a complete 
systern, communications should be separately investigated. It appeared as an 
important factor in all studies and was also regularly indicted in the literature. Patterns 
of communications and the reasons for communications failures would repay further 
study, updating the work by the Tavistock Institute (1966), but in the context of 
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human error. The method of investigation, possibly best suiting this type of study, 
would be by using more detailed observational studies. 
Finally, the importance of primary factors, but at a managerial level, indicated by the 
statistical study, suggest that the primary characteristics of managers should be further 
investigated. Of particular interest in this respect would be the interaction of 
qualifications with experience, two factors linked to project performance, but in a 
surprising way. Better performance in relation to errors was noted with better 
qualifications, but also with less experience. A more detailed statistical study could 
specifically target the education and formal training of the site manager, its affect on 
both experienced and inexperienced managers and performance within the industry. 
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The information provided in this questionnaire will be treated in the strictest confidence and not divulged to 
any other party. Unless you specifically note in the space below, neither your name or the name of your 
organisation will be used in any report, published or unpublished. If you wish to review any answers at a later 
date or discuss the completion of the questionnaire, you are invited to contact me, Andy Atkinson at South 
Bank University, Wandsworth Road, London, SW8 2JZ, telephone 0171 815 7253. 
Additionally, general queries concerning this research programme can be directed to Professor Victor 
Torrence, the London Master Builders Professor of Building at University College, London, Wates House, 22 
Gordon Street, London WC1, telephone 0171 387 7050. 
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE 
May I acknowledge your contribution to the research and use your name in a 
published report? 
May I acknowledge your organisation's contribution to the research and use its 
name in a published report? 
Would you like to receive a summary of the findings from the research? 
Your name 
Your position in the organisation 
Name and address of your 
organisation 
Telephone number of your 
organisation 
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For example: - 
Client 
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Consultant building surveyor, architect, structural engineer, services engineer, quantity surveyor. 
Main, management or design and build contractor, construction manager. 
Subcontractor. 
Other role (for example valuers, facilities 
managers, etc) 
YOUR EXPERIENCE 
In the construction industry 1! enerallv 
In Your current role 
SUPERVISORY EXPERIENCE 
r7777777" 
Do 
-you supervise staff within your orl! anisation 
ERROR QUESTIONS 
The following have been put forward as methods of avoiding errors leading to defects in projects. Using your 
knowledge and experience drawn from your occupation, rate the effectiveness of these error avoiding measures 
on a scale of five. Treat (1) as the lowest score (ineffective) and (5) as the highest score (very effective). 
Intermediate scores indicate that a measure is partially effective. 
After you have rated the above factors, rank the five most important factors in ascending order in the space 
provided (i. e. give rank (1) to the most important factor and the rank (2) to the next most important factor and 
so on. 
Errors leading to defects can be avoided by: RANK 
Mý 
Improving the education and training of individuals Li 
Being careful in the selection of individuals V777n Lj 
Making individuals sign off work to certify that they have r77" 
checked their own work Lj 
4 Independently checking all work which might lead to 
defects 
5 Supervising the work of junior staff 
r77" 
6 Clearly defining work responsibilities Lj 
7 Controlling changes properly (e. g. variations) M771 Lj 
8 Completing tasks fully before releasing work (e. g. not 
starting construction until relevant drawings are complete) 
Using clear communications (e. g. clear drawings, 
specifications and bills of quantities). 
Fill:: 444.3, 
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10 Having a positive "culture" in the organisation (i. e. 
partners, directors, managers or colleagues who keep in 
touch with the details of work and take a keen interest in LJ 
producing a good job) 
Having an economic climate that ensures an adequate r77" 
return for work 
Lj 
F77" 
12 Having adequate time to carry out work Li 
r77" 13 Having a steady political climate within which to operate Li 
14 Having clients with reasonable expectations with regard to r777" 
quality of work Li 
15 Are there any other factors that you feel are important in 
avoiding errors that can cause defects? If so, list them 
below and rate them from five. 
r7! 7" 
....................................................................... LLI 
....................................................................... EI 
....................................................................... EI 
Finally, if you are interested in this research and would be prepared 
to complete a further questionnaire or be interviewed as a follow up 
please tick the boxes 
I am prepared to complete a further questionnaire r77777777"" 
I am prepared to be interviewed M77777! 7! ý 
Thank you for your help in this research. if you have indicated that you would like a summary of the findings, 
I will contact you when the main study is complete. 
Andy Atkinson 
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PRELIMINARY STUDY QUESTIONNAHZE - OBJECTIVES 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
To confirm lack of confidentiality or otherwise. To engender support by offering 
feedback on the research 
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR ORGANISATION 
General information for possible follow up. Roles are required to see if there are any 
differences in response between respondents from different sections of the industry. 
They are also needed to show that the sample is balanced in the industry. 
Experience questions are to monitor the "authority" of the replies. 
ERROR QUESTIONS 
Questions I- 14 map on to the preliminary model of the nature of error in a project 
context. 
Question 15 seeks to extend the model to include other factors identified by the 
respondents 
Differences in response between sections of the industry are not expected, but the 
replies will examine for these. However, it is possible that there will be a difference 
between the perceived importance of some factors, as expressed in scores to certain 
measures in this survey and the observed importance of these factors in the house- 
building study. This difference could give an insight to the reasons for the recurrence 
of some errors leading to defects and accidents. 
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30 January 1995 
Dear Student, 
THE ERROR BASIS OF DEFECTS -A RESEARCH PROJECT BY ANDY ATKINSON 
Further to my request for help with my research into the error basis of defects, I enclose four copies 
of a questionnaire. If you can help, perhaps you could distribute the copies among your work 
colleagues and supervisors. I am interested in a good spread of responses from senior as well as 
junior staff and from a variety of specialists (including architecture, building surveying, quantity 
surveying, engineering, contracts management, tradespeople etc). You can also fill in one if you 
wish! 
I have included a stamped addressed envelope for the return of the questionnaires. Perhaps I could 
ask you to collate the returns and send them to me (If you wish you can give them to me by hand). 
To try and avoid confusions in filling in the questionnaires, I have included a sample completed one. 
This has been filled in "at random" and does not represent any view - correct or otherwise. If anyone 
has difficulty with filling in the questionnaire they can refer to the sample or phone me on 071 815 
7253. 
Finally, I would stress that you are under no obligation to help with the survey. I am not keeping 
records of who returns the questionnaires and I do not need names or addresses of individuals as part 
of the research. They are, however, useful in showing that the research is bona fide and that I have 
not cooked the returns! Additionally, I may remind you "as a group" to return questionnaires if you 
can. 
Thank you in advance for your help, 
Yours sincerely, 
A. R. ATKINSON 
encls 
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APPENDIX 7c 
PRELIMINARY STUDY CORRELATION SCATTERGRAMS 
ROLES AND SUPERVISORY POSITIONS 
4.01 
c3) 
3.5 
3.01 
2.5, 
2.01 
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
Constructor 
Figure I Designer/Constructor correlation 
4.51 
4.01 
3.51 
3.01 
2.51 
2.01 
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 
DESIGNER 
Figure 2- Designer/Quantity Surveyor correlation 
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4.51 
4.01 
3.51 
3.0 
2.51 
2.01 
1.5, 
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
COMTR 
Figure 3- Constructor/Quantity Surveyor correlation 
SUPERVISORY ROLE 
Scatter plot 
LN 4.5 
4.01 
3.5 
3.01 
2.51 
2.01 
2.0' 2.5 io 3.5 4.0 4.5 
Superisoty 
Figure 4- SupervisorNon-supervisor correlation 
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APPENDIX 8b 
PROJECTS AND SITES 
PROJECT NUMBER I 
SITE LOCATION - NORTHERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S SP9**3**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specification 
38 
2) 3) 4 Bed terraced and detached houses 
Childless couples/executive 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Good quality 
Plain concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 18 
Experience as site manager 12 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 2 
SITE LOCATION - NORTHERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S SP9**4**) 
Number of units 70 
Housing mix 2) 3. Bed terraced and semi-detached houses 
Target market First and second time buyers 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specification Bricks Cheap 
Tiles/slates Interlocking concrete 
Heating Gas fired wet central heating 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 9 
Experience as site manager 2 
Background Trade 
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PROJECT NUMBER 3 
SITE LOCATION - NORTH LONDON (O/S TQ2**9**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
26 
25 X2 Bed flats, Ix3 Bed penthouse 
Luxury market 
Block rendered traditional with pre-cast concrete floors 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber triple glazed 
Manager Experience in years 14 
Experience as site manager 10 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 4 
SITE LOCATION - NORTH-EASTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TL4**I**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
flats 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
102 
Terraced, semi-detached and detached houses, low rise 
Nfixed first/second time buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 18 
Experience as site manager 15 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 5 
SITE LOCATION - WEST MIDLANDS (O/S SJ9**3**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
42 
3 and 4 bedroom detached houses 
Second/third time buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
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Key specirication Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 
Experience as site manager 
Background 
12 
3 
Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 6 
SITE LOCATION - WEST MIDLANDS (O/S SKI I 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
36 
3ý 4 and 5 bedroom detached houses 
Second/third time and executive buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete mainly 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 26 
Experience as site manager 20 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 7 
SITE LOCATION - WEST MIDLANDS (O/S SKI 1 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specification 
24 
3 and 4 bedroom detached houses 
Second/third time and executive buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete mainly 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 30 
Experience as site manager 15 
Background Trades 
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PROJECT NUMBER 8 
SITE LOCATION - WEST MIDLANDS (O/S SK2**I**) 
Number of units 22 
Housing mix 2) 3 and 4 bedroom terraced and detached houses 
Target market Second/third time and executive buyers 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specification Bricks Good 
Tiles/slates Plain concrete 
Heating Gas fired wet central 
heating/electric 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 30 
Experience as site manager 15 
Background Trades 
PROJECT NUMBER 9 
SITE LOCATION - NORTHERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TL5**2**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specification 
28 
4 bedroom detached houses 
Second/third time buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 14 
Experience as site manager 5 
Background Trades 
PROJECT NUMBER 10 
SITE LOCATION - NORTH-EASTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TL4**I**) 
Number of units 26 
Housing mix Two and three bedroom terraced houses and flats 
Target market Second time buyers 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
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Key specirication Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 25 
Experience as site manager 18 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 11 
SITE LOCATION - NORTHERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TL3**l**) 
Number of units 77 
Housing mix Three and four bedroom detached houses 
Target market Second time buyers/executive 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specification Bricks Cheap 
Tiles/slates Interlocking concrete 
Heating Gas fired wet central heating 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 19 
Experience as site manager II 
Background Trades 
PROJECT NUMBER 12 
SITE LOCATION - EAST ANGLIA (O/S TL4**6**) 
Number of units 20 
Housing mix Four and five bedroom detached houses 
Target market Top of the market 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specification Bricks Medium 
Tiles/slates Interlocking/plain concrete (some 
slates) 
Heating Gas fired wet central heating 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 35 
Experience as site manager 15 
Background Trades 
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PROJECT NUMBER 13 
SITE LOCATION - NORTH-EASTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TQ7**9**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
houses 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specification 
82 
2) 3) 4 bedroom terraced, semi-detached and detached 
Mixed 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 31 
Experience as site manager 15 
Background Trades 
PROJECT NUMBER 14 
SITE LOCATION - GREATER LONDON (O/S TQ1**7**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
low-rise 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
185 
27 3ý 4 bedroom terraced and semi-detached houses and 
flats 
Housing association and first time buyers 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 28 
Experience as site manager 12 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 15 
SITE LOCATION - GREATER LONDON (O/S TQ5**8**) 
Number of units 65 
Housing mix 1) 2ý 3 bedroom terraced houses and low-rise flats 
Target market Housing association and first time buyers 
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Construction 
Key specirication 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 48 
Experience as site manager 27 
Background Trade 
PROJECT NUMBER 16 
SITE LOCATION - SOUTH-WESTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S SU9**6**) 
Number of units 69 
Housing mix 2) 3ý 4 and 5 bedroom mixed houses and low-rise flats 
Target market Mixed 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specirication Bricks Medium quality 
Tiles/slates Interlocking concrete 
Heating Gas fired wet central heating 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 33 
Experience as site manager 20 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 17 
SITE LOCATION - WESTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S SU9**7**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
57 
2) 3) 4 and 5 bedroom mixed houses 
Mixed 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
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Manager Experience in years 23 
Experience as site manager 18 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 18 
SITE LOCATION - WESTERN ROME COUNTIES (O/S SU6**6**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
heating/electric 
42 
1) 2 and 3 bedroom mixed houses and low-rise flats 
First, second time buyer and retirement 
Brick and timber framed 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Cheap 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 33 
Experience as site manager 18 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 19 
SITE LOCATION - SOUTH-WESTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S TQI**6**) 
Number of units 22 
Housing mix 4 and 5 bedroom detached houses 
Target market Executive 
Construction Brick and block traditional 
Key specification Bricks Medium quality 
Tiles/slates Interlocking concrete 
Heating Gas fired wet central 
heating/electric 
Windows/doors Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 36 
Experience as site manager 31 
Background Trade 
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PROJECT NUMBER 20 
SITE LOCATION - INNER LONDON (O/S TQ4**8**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
70 
1 and 2 bedroom flats in medium rise block 
Executive/investment 
Steel framed, brick clad, steel sheet roof 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Steel sheeting on purlins 
Electric 
UPVC double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 18 
Experience as site manager 8 
Background Managerial 
PROJECT NUMBER 21 
SITE LOCATION - INNER LONDON (O/S TQ3 8 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
block 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
25 
1 and 2 bedroom flats with medical centre in low-rise 
Executive/investment 
Un-framed masonry 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Good quality 
Interlocking concrete/sheet felt 
Gas fired wet central heating 
UPVC double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 27 
Experience as site manager 10 
Background Trade 
PROJECT NUMBER 22 
SITE LOCATION - INNER LONDON (O/S TQ3**8**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
112 
2 bedroom flats in low-rise blocks 
First-time buyers 
Un-framed masonry 
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Key specirication Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete 
Electric 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 10 
Experience as site manager 4 
Background Trade 
PROJECT NUMBER 23 
SITE LOCATION - SOUTH-WESTERN HOME COUNTIES (O/S SU9**6**) 
Number of units 
Housing mix 
Target market 
Construction 
Key specirication 
61 
2,4 and 5 bedroom terraced and detached houses 
First-time buyers and executive 
Brick and block traditional 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heating 
Windows/doors 
Medium quality 
Interlocking concrete 
Gas fired wet central heating 
Timber double glazed 
Manager Experience in years 26 
Experience as site manager 18 
Background Trade 
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APPENDIX 8c 
HOUSE-BUIELDING STUDY RESEARCH VISITS DIARY 
DATE LOCATION PERSON PURPOSE 
VISITED 
13/9/95 On site - site 18 Building manager, Preliminary meeting to 
Company 1, discuss purpose of study. 
Region 1 
21/9/95 Company 2, Region Production and Preliminary meeting to 
I Head Office commercial discuss the purpose of the 
managers for the research 
Region 
26/9/95 On site - site 22 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
28/9/95 On site - site 21 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
28/9/95 On site - site 20 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
29/9/95 On site - site 18 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
2/10/95 On site - site 17 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
2/10/95 On site - site 19 Site manager interview and site 
inspection 
4/10/95 Site tour, sites 1,2) 3 Site managers Interviews and site 
from Company 2 inspections 
Region I Head 
Office 
11/10/95 On site - site 16 Site manager 
Interview and site 
inspection 
12/10/95 On site - site 4 Building manager interview and site 
(acting site inspection 
manager) 
380 
Appendix 8c 
12/10/95 On site - site 15 Site manager Interview and site 
ction 
19/10/95 Company 2, Region Production Preliminary meeting to 
2 Head Office manager discuss the purpose of the 
research 
19/10/95 On site - site 14 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection 
30/10/95 Company 1, Region Deputy managing Open interview 
I Head Office director for the 
Region 
30/10/95 Company 1, Region Building manager Open interview 
I Head Office 
6/11/95 Site tour, sites 5.6) Site managers Interviews and site 
7,8 from Company inspections 
2, Region 2 Head 
Office 
6/12/95 Company 2, Region Commercial Open interview 
I Head Office manager 
19/12/95 Head Office, Technical and Preliminary meeting to 
Building Guarantee Underwriting discuss the purpose of the 
Company managers research 
19/12/95 Company 2 Head Company Open interviews 
Office Managing Director, 
Region 2 
Production and 
Commercial 
managers 
5/2/96 Head Office, Technical and Open interviews 
Building Guarantee Underwriting 
Company managers and 
senior surveyor 
5/2/96- Head Office, Two Building Preliminary meeting to 
Company 1, Region managers and discuss the purpose of the 
2 Commercial research 
manager 
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14/2/96 Site tour, sites 9.10) Site managers Interviews and site 
II from Company 1, inspections 
Region 2 Head 
Office 
21/2/96 Head Office, Building manager Open interview 
Company 1, Region 
2 
21/2/96 Head Office, Building manager Open interview 
Company 1, Region 
2 
21/2/96 Site tour, sites 12 Site managers Interviews and site 
and 13 inspections 
21/2/96 Head Office, Commercial Discuss site costings 
Company 1, Region manager 
2 
1/3/96 Head Office, Commercial Open interviews and 
Company 2, Region manager discuss site costings 
1 
8/3/96 Head Office, Customer care Open interview 
Company 1, Region manager 
1 
8/3/96 Head Office, Two Building Collect drawings and 
Company 1, Region managers programmes. General 
I discussion of regional 
problems 
8/3/96 On site - site 23 Site manager Interview and site 
inspection. Discuss setting 
up of diary study 
3/4/96 Head Office, Area surveyor and Open interview 
Building Guarantee inspector 
Company 
17/4/96 Head Office, Regional Open interviews 
Company 1, Region Construction 
2 director and 
customer care 
manager 
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22/4/96 On site - site 23 Site personnel Diary study for the week 
22-26/4/96 
8/5/96 On site - site 23 Building Guarantee Open interview 
Company inspector 
383 
ERS SHOWN IN 
BOXES ADDED LATER 
FOR CROSS- 
CING PURPOSES 
APPENDIX 8d - HOUSE-BUJILDING STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HOUSEBUILDING 
jýsfi: [=onNo- 
ASSURANCES 
ANDREW R. ATIUNSON 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Appendix 
The information provided in this questionnaire will be treated in the strictest confidence and not 
divulged to any other party. If you wish to review any answers at a later date or discuss the completion 
of the questionnaire, you are invited to contact me, Andy Atkinson at South Bank University, 
Wandsworth Road, London, SW8 2JZ, telephone 0171815 7253. 
Additionally, general queries concerning this research programme can be directed to Professor Victor 
Torrance, the London Master Builders Professor of Building at University College, London, Wates 
House, 22 Gordon Street, London WCIH OQB, telephone 0171387 7050. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
El Your name 
[ý2] Your position in your firm 
-3-1 Name of firm 
7 Name and Address of site 
Telephone number 
YOUR EXPERIENCE 
6'ý In the construction industry generally 
]7] 
In your current role 
I THE SITE 
a How many units are there on the site? 
VARUBLE 9* VARUBLE 10* II ýv 
I 
VARIABLE 81 
9: 1 b What is the housing mix (one bed, two bed, three bed, flats, 
houses etc) and how many of 
each? 
c What is the target market of the houses9 
1: 11 
c How complex are the houses/flats? 
* VARIABLE = No specific 
provision in questionnaire 
Very 
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EO d What is the construction? (e. g. "Traditional", "Timber frame" etc) 
91 
e Does the site require special foundations. If so, can you give details? 
S1 f Specification details for key materials (Bricks, Tiles, Heating, Windows/ex doors) 
Bricks 
Tiles/slates 
Heatin 
Windows and doors 
2 SKILLS OF TRADESPEOPLE 
VARIABLE 3 
How do you rate the skill of subcontractors working on this site? 
Trade Poor Average Good Excellent 
Groundworks 
Bricklayer 
Carpenter 
Roofer 
Glazer 
Plasterer or dryliner 
Joiner 
Plumber 
Electrician 
Tiler 
Decorator 
Other? 
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10 3 CHECKING 
How often, on average, do you check the work of subcontractors 
Trade Before payment Weekly Daily At end of task 
Groundworks 
Bricklayer 
Carpenter 
Roofer 
Glazer 
Joiner 
Plasterer/Dry liner 
Plumber 
Electrician 
Tiler 
Decorator 
How to you check work on site? 
Visual inspection? Standard form/checklist? Other? 
-E7 
4 HOW IS WORK PROGRAMMED? 
Informally 
Bar chart 
Using a CPA program 
Do you programme the work, or is it programmed by a central planning department? 
Programmed on site 
IVARIABLE 7 
Central planning department 
How often is the programme updated ? 
Not normally updated 
Occasionally IVARUBLE 7 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Other 
Who has copies of the programme? 
VARIABLE 11 
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COMMUNICATIONS 
Roughly gReaking. how regglarly do you talk to: -, 
Times/month 
a) Architects/engineers designing the project? 
IVARIABLE 4 
b) Other managers/accountants etc) 
IVARIABLE 6 
C) Other colleagues in the office(s) IVARIABLE 4 
(E. g. buyers, support staff 
IVARIABLE II 
Roughly §Reaking. how regular are site visits ? 
a) From the design stafP IVARIABLE 41 
b) From managers? IVARIABLE 61 
Are there formal coMpany meetings which the site management attends? 
How regularly? IVARIABLE 61 
Are there formal meetings between subcontractors/trades and the site management? 
72T4 
How regularly? IVARIABLE 61 
Who keeps the minutes of the subcontractor meetings? 
25 1 How good are the project documents for this proiect ? IVARILABLE 5 
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION Insufficient Too much Just right! 
a) Specification 
b) Drawings 
CLARITY Very clear Clear Unclear 
a) Specification 
b) Drawings 
PRACTICALITY Buildable Possible Unbuildable* 
* If possible, list difficult areas 
: 26] Wqe the desioers in-house or consultants? In-house 
a) Architects 
Engineers. 
Consultants 
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6 OTHER FACTORS 
In your opinion, has the current economic climate affected quality relating to the project? 
If so, in what way? 
In your opinion, was the project on a tight budget? 
Very tight Normal Not tight 
IVARIABLE 12- 
a] 
In your opinion was the project pressurised for time? 
Very, Normal Slack etc 
IVARIABLE 13 1 
50 1 
How do you view the overall quality of the houses (i. e. as perceived prior to snagging/handing over to sales): - 
Level of construction Poor Below ave Average Good Very good 
Foundations 
First floor joists_ 
Roof plate 
Roof carcase 
Structure complete 
First fix 
Second fix 
Decoration 
External works 
In Your recollection, were there any particular quality problems relating to the Project. 
VARIABLE 11 
If so, how were they n=aged? 
VARIABLE 2 
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: 321 Inyour view, what are the main factors that influence the quality of houses for this project. 
Dj] Do you have any other comments conceming this research? 
Would you take part in a further study? 
ARA/22 September 1995/Q. 4 
389 
TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
Appendix 
ppFNDIX 8e - HOUSE-BUELDING STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE PART 2 
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HOUSEBUILDING 
ANDREW R ATKINSON 
SITE VISIT CHECKLIST 
SITE 
IDMSS OF SITE 
TEDY NORMAL 
OMpLEXHY OF DWELLINGS 
COMPLEX AVERAGE 
)ECWICATION AND QUALITY 
SPECIFICATION 
GOOD AVE 
)OF 
TERNAL WALLS 
flMGS 
NERY 
UNTEDY 
SUAPLE 
QUALM 
POOR 
QuestioýnNo 
I 36 I 
I 37 I 
I 38 1 
OF CONSTRUCTION 
)PORTION OF HOUSES COMPLETED 
WEATHERTIGHT 
TO EAVES 
OUT OF GROUND 
SALES OFFICE SALES LITERATURE_ 
SALES RATE 
TARGET XURIKET 
IOGRApu! 
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APPENDIX 8f -CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT VARMBLES 
I 
NAME 
SPSS SHORT NAME 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
Reported defects and error instances 
faults 
31,39 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on error instances related to the 
site. 
REPRESENTING INT]HE MODEL 
Dependent variable - level of error 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, those with high as opposed to low levels of 
defects/errors based on calculating the product of the un-weighted total number of 
errors reported by the site manager (either leading to defects or detected and corrected 
beforehand) and the reciprocal of the proportion of the site completed (drawn from 
direct inspection and recorded on the questionnaire supplement) divided by the 
estimated construction cost of the site to give an error rate per L million per site. 
Multiplying the number of defects with the reciprocal of the proportion of the site 
completed controls for differences in the stage of construction reached on each site 
(the expectation being that more errors would be evidenced on sites nearing 
completion as opposed to those just starting). Dividing by the construction cost 
controls for differences in size and complexity between sites (the expectation being 
that bigger and/or more complex sites, as evidenced by higher construction costs, 
would have a higher number of errors). 
2 
NAME Perceived quality 
SPSS SHORT NAME quality 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 30 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the perceived quality of 
construction at the current stage. 
REPRESENTING IN TUE MODEL 
Dependent variable - quality of work/freedom from defects 
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CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, high as opposed to low quality, constructed 
from the returns of the site manager of the quality of work at each completed stage of 
construction to date. Each stage is scored on an arithmetical scale, summed and 
expressed as a mean score for the site. Sites are then divided into two categories, high 
and low scoring. Scores represent: - 
Interviewee rating Score 
Poor 1 
Below average 2 
Average 3 
Good 4 
Very good 5 
Nine stages are supplied in the questionnaire (giving a maximum of 45 points where all 
stages are or have been active). Taking the mean score allows for the situation where 
not all stages have started and scores are not yet available 
INDEPENDENT VARMBLES 
3 
NAME Skills of tradespeople 
SPSS SHORT NAME trades 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 15 - Skills of tradespeople 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the average skill level of the 
operatives on each site. 
REPRESENTING IN TBE MODEL 
Primary factors generally related to the knowledge of operatives. 
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CONSTRUCTION 
A categorical division constructed from the returns of the site manager of the skills of 
each trade active on each site to the date of the interview. Each trade is scored on an 
arithmetical scale, summed and expressed as a mean score for the site. Sites are then 
divided into two categories, high and low scoring. Scores represent-- 
Interviewee rating Score 
Poor I 
Average 2 
Good 3 
Excellent 4 
Eleven trades are supplied in the questionnaire (giving a maximum of 44 points where 
all trades are or have been active). There is a provision for the interviewee to supply 
other, less usual, trades (for example, lift installers), thus the maximum can increase 
above this. However, taking the mean score allows for this and for the situation where 
not all trades are yet active and scores are not yet available. 
4 
NAME Experience of manager 
SPSS SHORT NAME manager 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 7- Preliminary question 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the experience Of the site 
manager in a supervisory position. 
D-C 
REPRESENTING IN TBE MODEL 
The role of the project manager generally. 
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CONSTRUCTION 
A division of sites into two categories, those staffed by experienced as opposed to 
inexperienced managers, based on the number of years experience reported by the site 
manager in that role. 
5 
NAME 
SPSS SHORT NAME 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
Background of manager 
Qualsl 
6- Supplementary question 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the background of the manager 
(trades background or managerial background). 
REPRESENTING IN THE MODEL 
The role of the project manager generally. 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, those staffed by managers from a trades 
background as opposed to those staffed from a managerial background. 
6 
NAME Qualifications of manager 
SPSS SHORT NAME Quals2 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 6- Supplementary question 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the formal qualifications of 
manager (qualified or un-qualified) 
REPRESENTING IN THE MODEL 
The role of the project manager generally. 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, those staffed by managers with formal as 
opposed to those with no formal qualifications. 
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7 
NAME 
SPSS SHORT NAME 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
Informal communications 
commst 
18,20,21 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the level of communications 
between the site and other parts of the organisation and covering non-line activities 
(that is activities necessary to perform the task, but not between supervisors and the 
supervised - for example, to include communication with designers but not with line 
managers). "Communications" are distinguished from "Culture" (see below), in that 
the latter were taken as line communications between supervisors and the supervised. 
REPRESENTING INT]HE MODEL 
The managerial factor "communications". 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of sites into two categories, high as opposed to low communications levels, 
based on the un-weighted sum of the number of communication events per month 
(talk/visit) from non-line staff as reported by the site manager. 
8 
NAME Formal communications 
SPSS SHORT NAME comms2 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 25 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the quality of the formal 
communication tools (specification/drawings) used between the major elements of the 
construction process (design, specification, buying, surveying and construction). 
D 117 DESENTING REPRE IN TIHE MODEL 
The managerial factor "communications". 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, high as opposed to low quality formal 
communications, based on the total score of the quality of documents as perceived by 
the site manager and scored as follows (see also questionnaire): - 
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Ratings Amount of 
information 
Spec Drawings 
Clarity of 
information 
Spec Drawings 
Extent of 
buildab 
Insufficient/unclear/un-buHdable 1 1 1 1 1 
Too much/clear/possible 2 2 2 2 2 
Just right/very clear/buildable 3 3 3 3 3 
Maximum score achievable = 15 
9 
NAME 
SPSS SHORT NAME 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
OBJECT 
Organisational Culture 
culture 
19,22,23,24 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the quality of the organisational 
culture as represented by the level of contact between line managers, other managers, 
site managers and sub-contractors. 
REPRESENTING IN THE MODEL 
The managerial factor of "organisational culture". 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, positive as opposed to negative 
organisational culture, based on the sum of the number of communication events per 
month (talks/visits) from line managers plus the number of meetings between site 
management and superiors plus the number of meetings between site management and 
sub-contractors as reported by the site manager. 
396 
Appendix 8f 
10 
NANM 
SPSS SHORT NAME 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
OBJECT 
Planning/programming 
planning 
17 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the intensity of planning and 
programming of the works. 
REPRESENTING IN THE MODEL 
Managerial factors or division of responsibilities, change control and control of 
concurrency. 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories of the method of planning as follows: - 
No planning 
Central planning, not updated 
Central planning, updated 
Central plus local planning, not updated 
Central plus local planning, updated 
The categories were combined into two groups, "central" (the second and third 
categories) and "local" (the last two categories). There were no "un-planned" sites. 
11 
NAME Intensity of project management 
SPSS SHORT NAME project 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAME 17-25 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on the intensity of project 
management for the site. 
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REPRESENTING IN TIFIE MODEL 
Project management factors generally 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, high as opposed to low intensity of project 
management, based on the product of scores for planning, formal and informal 
communications and organisational culture. 
12 
NAME Cost pressure 
SPSS SHORT NAME costp 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 28 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on cost pressures 
REPRESENTING IN TUE MODEL 
Global factor of "cost pressure". 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, tight as opposed to not tight cost pressures, 
based on data provided by the site manager. Data were initially divided into three 
categories (tight, normal, not-tight) later reduced to two for analysis purposes. 
13 
NAME Time pressure 
SPSS SHORT NAME timep 
QUESTION IN QUESTIONNAIRE 29 
OBJECT 
To obtain a categorical division between sites based on time pressures. 
REPRESENTING IN THE MODEL 
Global factor of "time pressure". 
CONSTRUCTION 
A division of the sites into two categories, tight as opposed to not tight time pressures, 
based on data provided by the site manager. Data were initially divided into three 
categories (slack, normal, tight). 1ater reduced to two for analysis purposes 
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VARIABLE KEY 
Variable Variable name Level 1 Level 2 
number 
I Low I-Egh 
Recorded defects/errors 
2 I-Egh Low 
Perceived quality 
3 Low I-Egh 
Skill level 
4 Iffigh Low 
Informal communications 
5 I-Egh Low 
Formal communications 
6 Positive Negative 
Culture 
7 Low I-Egh 
Planning 
8 Inexperienced Experienced 
Experience of manager 
9 Trades Managerial 
Background of manager 
10 Unqualified Qualified 
Qualifications of manager 
II Less intensive Intensive 
Project management 
12 Less intensive Intensive 
Cost pressure 
13 Less intensive Intensive 
Time pressure 
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APPENDIX 9a - RECORDS OF ERRORS AND PROBLEMS 
9a(i) RECORD OF ERRORS REPORTED BY SITE MANAGERS 
SITE ERROR FACTOR 
1 Brickwork quality poor: - 
" Missed ties P 
" Leaning piers 
" No frame ties 
2 Brickwork defects: - 
" Small amount of poor work dismantled P 
" Odd dirty cavities 
Carpentry defects: - 
" Odd nail missing P 
" Odd tie-down strap missing 
3 Poor brickwork (general at first) - firm removed as they P 
could not operate at a distance from their office (60km) COMMS 
CHECK 
Poor roofing - insufficient trades supervision - improved after P 
threats from NHBC CHECK 
Plasterwork (unspecified) P 
Plumbing defects caused by variable performance of P 
alcoholic plumber. 
Expansion joints in brickwork did not match RWPs or FORMAL 
internal wall layouts. 
Too many expansion joints causing expense of extra stainless FORMAL 
steel ties. 
Late changes in drawings: - CHANGE 
" Ground details and drainage 
" Introduction of garages 
" Detailed requirements of town planning 
Lack of accurate drawn information FORMAL 
Insufficient pre-planning re drawings FORMAL 
PLAN 
Problems with trussed rafters (unspecified) P 
4 Odd "rogue labourer". P 
5 Poor electrician until firm was replaced (not specific) New P 
firm was dearer and there was a battle with the QS over COST 
prices. 
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Poor ground caused drainage re-design (drains had to be CHANGE 
supported on "needle piles") i. e. lack of pre-planning/late FORMAL 
changes caused problem. 
Landscaper turfed over the manholes P 
Floor joists over-spanned and had to be strengthened by steel FORMAL 
to halve the span (picked up by NHBQ (possibly also poor 
communications/checking) 
6 Half-timber fronts to houses "a cow to build" "keeps FORMAL 
scaffolding up for ever and a day". (possibly also poor 
communications) 
"Had to move a few drains". FORMAL 
Boundary fencing not provided initially. COST 
7 Poor time performance of landscapers. Company had no TIME 
leverage on landscapers as it was winding down. 
"Tudorbeathan" half-timber fronts have a "buildability/time FORMAL 
implication as their exterior has to be almost fully plastered 
before the scaffolding can be struck. 
Operatives nailed pipes twice and caused two house floods. P 
8 Drawing discrepancies (upstairs windows shown as 1200mm FORMAL 
deep on drawings and 1050mm deep on schedules) - windows 
ordered to the wrong sizes. 
Trusses pitched too steeply to garages, covering windows in FORMAL 
the flank walls. 
LPG tanks shown to the wrong properties (all-electric units! ) FORMAL 
9 Drawing problems: - FORMAL 
" Windows obstructed porch pillars 
" Garage personal door opened into neighbouring garden 
(Boundary had to be changed, door removed and opening 
bricked up! ) 
Boiler outlet ditto 
Rainwater gutters and downpipe also sited in neighbouring 
garden 
Water main shown running through house foundations 
10 Poor decorations caused by poor preparation lead to the P 
sacking of two painters 
11 Poor quality dry lining caused by untrained labour. P 
12 Window slightly mis-positioned by the bricklayers P 
Odd wrong joists hangar used. P 
One lintel under-sized on one unit (material schedule was FORMAL 
wrong). 
403 
Appendix 9a 
Staircase layouts did not match floor joist layouts. FORMAL 
Drains positioned in the wrong place on drawings (Soil and FORMAL 
ventilating pipes in the middle of bedrooms). 
External rendering requires that the scaffolding be kept up FORMAL 
too long. 
Precast concrete floor beam layouts do not match ground FORMAL 
floor architectural layouts (Drawings issued without proper 
pre-issue checks - "the technical department did not have 
I time"). 
Incorrectly quoined jambs on "one-and-only knapped flint P 
faced unit". 
13 Poor performance and delay caused by glazers (not cutting P 
I back putties and a "poor business performance"). 
Landing window positioned on drawings in a garage FORMAL 
roofspace (detected by the bricklayers and site manager). 
Pipe casing sizes incorrect. FORMAL 
14 Nothing reported 
15 Poor bricklaying generally ("partly caused by speed of P 
working"). TIME 
16 Carpentry omissions: - P 
" Sway bracing 
"S trapping 
" Nailing 
(Possibly also poor communications if details were not clear 
on drawings). 
Roof tiling - poor cutting to valleys and "wet work". P 
Brickwork problems: - P 
" Odd mortar splashes 
" Ties facing towards inner skin 
" Dirty cavities 
17 Drawing problems - tumble dryers and refrigerators do not fit FORMAL 
into the kitchen units in one house type. 
18 Timber frame assembly problems expressed as "teething FORMAL 
roblems" 
Some "oversailing" brickwork. P 
Poor paintwork preparation. 
19 Poor ground conditions. FORMAL 
Units too close together inhibiting the use of scaffolding. FORMAL 
Working hours restrictions - no evening or weekend working. TIME 
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Soil pipes shown on drawings as passing through the FORMAL 
windows 
Problems with customer bespoke changes. CHANGE 
" Partitions omitted at late stage 
" Colour scheme changed ditto. 
Late changes to front door sizes. CHANGE 
20_ No problems reported. _ 
21 Poor "U" values and fire protection to basement ceilings. FORMAL 
Lack of ventilation and poor routing of vents to medical FORMAL 
centre (including a disagreement with the gas board on the 
routing of vents). 
Subsidence of existing building. FORMAL 
22 Change of timber stairs to concrete (needed in 4-storey flats FORMAL 
to comply with Building Regulations). 
Bay window dropped during construction (temporary wedges P 
co apsed) and had to be re-propped) 
23 Window missed out of unit - not noticed as a "deviation" for COMMS 
this site. 
Levels of roads do not suit ground conditions. FORMAL 
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APPENDIX 9a(ii) 
RECORD OF ERRORS REPORTED BY SENIOR MANAGERS 
INT ERROR FACTOR 
NO 
3 Considerable number of Company built houses were found to P 
have no/trace cement in the wall mortar - exact cause of error CHECK has never been determined. 
6 Manager 18 failed to construct a rooflight in a unit because MAN 
"the detail was not there". Reported as a primary site FORMAL 
manager failing. 
Reported that manager 19 "couldn't handle the site" Oust MAN 
could not cope) and a replacement was brought in to 
assist/take over. Reported as a general management failure 
(encapsulating all the managerial level of the model). 
Manager 17 reported as a "poor finisher" and was moved to a MAN 
"starting site" to compensate. 
Manager 20 similarly reported. MAN 
Manager 16 reported as failing to carry out sufficiently MAN 
rigorous site checks in allowing carpenters to cut floor joists 
to fit joist hangars that were too small - manager was 
generally accused of being too office bound. 
Manager 23 reported as allowing groundworkers on a site to MAN 
lay wrong house drive tarmac, without checking specification 
or drawings. 
7 Problem on site 9 in that water board were paid CHANGE 
approximately E100 000 to divert a main running through the 
middle of the site. They failed to do so as agreed and this 
caused re-design of foundations and re-programming of site 
activities, with a claim of f, 20 000 being made against the 
water board. 
8 Piling on a site was set out of position. Set out in accordance FORMAL 
with engineer's layouts without proper tying up between 
architect's and engineer's drawings. 
Increased thickness of floor screeds on one site because the FORMAL 
standard staircase did not fit the storey heights. 
Garages sited on layout drawings 600mm from boundary with FORMAL 
700mm outward opening door in the side (i. e. either the door 
will not open, or it will hit the fencing). (Door had to be re- 
positioned and the opening bricked up). 
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On some units the kitchen fittings are "too tight" - the FORMAL 
drawers catch cupboard knobs and the cooker will not fit in 
the blank opening provided. 
9 General "materials degradation caused by site manager not PLAN 
planning deliveries properly (a general planning failure 
covering much of the managerial level of the model). 
Customer induced changes cause considerable problems. CHANGE 
A house settled on a raft and the raft broke its back on a gas FORMAL 
holder base below - reported as a design fault. 
11 Negative pressure on a chimney stack causing downdraughts FORMAL 
in the flue and smoke in the room of a unit - reported as un- 
foreseeable. 
12 On one (not case study) site poor quality joists in the finished COST 
work (warping, shrinking) reported as caused by poor site CHECK 
supervision. 
The show houses in site 11 have exhibited "very high TIME 
maintenance costs" as a result of too much haste in 
construction "We threw them up too quickly and reaped what 
we sowed". The interviewee took responsibility for this 
problem at board level i. e. the board planned for the 
problems. 
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APPENDIX 9a(iii) 
RECORD OF ERRORS REPORTED BY INSITREWS 
INT ERROR FACTOR 
NO 
13 Interviewee reported a "disaster site" (not one of the case 
studies) constructed by a 50-unit/annum mediocre builder in 
the North of England. Site was situated on a hill with the 
houses dug into the hill. Each unit was badly built with 
problems of basement leakage and several other technical 
defects. Problems were reported as: - 
" Technical - form of construction, site characteristics 
" Poor checking and supervision caused by departure of CHECK 
former site manager SYST 
" Lack of technical quality control (a more general project 
management failure 
" Lack of control of sub-contractors 
Overall this was seen by the interviewee as managerial MAN 
failings to be corrected by: - CHECK 
" Employing someone (at site management level) "who is 
qualified to do the work". 
" Permit the interviewee's company (a Building Guarantee 
Company) to place an inspector on the site for the 
construction duration. 
Interviewee reported a second "disaster site" in the North of SYST 
England where a dispute developed between the company 
manager and the owner and the company went into 
liquidation and was re-floated. The new company lacked a 
supervision structure - reported as a "lack of a system". This 
can generally be perceived as an overall project 
management/management failing. 
14 One one (non-case study) site, reported that bin-stores were CHECK 
placed on inadequate foundations. The builder had 
pressurised the interviewee's company's inspector (a Building 
Guarantee company) to accept the foundation depths. This 
later caused a claim against the Guarantee company. 
On one (non-case study) site, interviewee reported several 
problems including: - 
" Poor sound insulation between units caused by poor P 
workmanship and lack of knowledge SYST 
" Large number of other, unspecified, errors classed as 
multiple systemic errors 
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Interviewee (Building Guarantee Company underwriter) was P 
currently working on claim for re-plastering a unit where the 
plaster had de-bonded from the wall - use of wrong plaster. 
15 Interviewee reported technical problem where a detail of a 
wall incorporating an unusually wide cavity was used. 
Defects were caused by: - 
" Poor architectural details around windows and doors FORMAL 
" Inadequate wall ties. P 
Solutions were proposed by the interviewee's company 
(Building Guarantee company): - 
" Removal of gang of bricklayers and new gang employed, P 
who were to receive training before starting the work 
" Extremely vigorous supervision of bricklaying. Reported CHECK 
as "eventually, if the site manager walked around the site 
in the evening and could see the 'yellow of a cavity wall 
bat', then the bricklayers were off the site". 
A (non-case study) site of a single bungalow with a basement MAN 
had basement leaks. Reported as being caused by the builders 
lack of technical ability and experience. This primary failing 
was considered to be at the managerial/ supervision level. 
A (non-case study) site of 4 units had similar basement MAN 
ems for similar reasons. 
16 Frost affected ground floor suspended floor slab failed P 
because of poor supervision. CHECK 
Reported the case of a unit (on a non-case study site) FORMAL 
inadvertently built over a pond and had to be demolished 
after construction. This was the only instance in the 
interviewees experience (12 years) of a house which had 
become a physical danger to the occupants. 
Interviewee reported instance of one site (non-case study) FORMAL 
where parapet walls to gables of houses were built without CHECK 
damp-proof courses and poor mechanical fixings of coping 
bricks. Reported as partly a design fault and partly that the 
em was "overlooked by the site manager" - 
Interviewee reported instance of one site (non-case study) 
where steps in house terraces (i. e. changes in floor levels 
down the site) were constructed without proper damp 
proofing. Reported as being caused by: - 
" No architect's detailing involving "assuming too much FORMAL 
knowledge down the line" and the fact that the architect CHECK 
was "not responsible for the details". 
" Problem not being "picked up by the agent". 
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Interviewee reported site (non-case study) where there was a 
claim related to floor joist failure caused by: - 
" Bricklayer putting floor joists into a unit at too high a level P 
( possibly because of poor design detailing? ) FORMAL 
" Carpenter over-notched the joists to reduce them to the P 
correct floor levels. 
" Electrician over-notched the same joists to accommodate P 
cabling. 
" Not picked up by the acting agent (the main agent had CHECK 
been away from the site for some time). 
" Mistake was repeated in other units because clear COMMS 
instructions were not subsequently given to the carpenters 
not to notch the floor joists. 
Interviewee reported one 10-unit housing site which had an SYST 
extraordinary number of defects. On one unit 27 defects were 
recorded by the inspector for the interviewees Building 
Guarantee company (the average number of defects being 2-3 
per unit). The problem was reported as being one of lack of 
general building knowledge - an individual trades-person had 
set himself up as a builder, without a site agent. 
17 Interviewee reported instance of subsidence to a unit caused 0 
by workers digging foundations in a clay area ignoring a FORMAL 
nearby Oak tree (likely to cause clay drying shrinkage). COMMS 
Reported as a problem of a myopic workforce, but could be 
classed as a design or supervision failing. 
Interviewee reported instance of walls in two units on a (non- P 
case study) site being constructed with mortar containing "a CHECK 
minimal cement content". The technical remedy was to re- 
point the units. Cause was attributed to a knowledge error by 
the bricklayers and lack of supervision. 
Interviewee reported instance of one (non-case study) site CHECK 
where the foundations to several units were constructed to a 
V-shaped cross section and acted as "a knife" cutting into the 
sub-strata and causing subsidence. This error was attributed 
to lack of site supervision. 
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APPENDIX 9a(iv) 
RECORD OF GENERAL PROBLEMS REPORTED BY SITE MANAGERS 
SITE PROBLEM FACTOR 
3 Some design errors were not formally corrected and left to FORMAL 
construction and site managers to correct. 
Circuitous communications routing for design questions: - COMMS 
" Site manager > 
" building manager > 
" technical services > 
" consultant designer > 
" technical services > 
" building manager > 
" site manager. 
4 Buyers are "not very good" COMMS 
COST 
6 New house "teething problems". CHANGE 
7 New house type "teething problems". CHANGE 
8 Poor drawings for this more "ad hoc" site. . FORMAL 
Poor setting up of materials schedules FORMAL 
9 Problems of design/construction liaison "got over on site". COMMS 
"A lot of detailing left to site interpretation". FORMAL 
Budget constraints COSTS 
Time allotted to complete units. TIME 
12 Problems of CONCUR 
" concurrency, TIME 
" time constraints FORMAL 
" design left to site to interpret. 
13 Problems with drawings and communicating drawing FORMAL 
revisions in relation to new house types. CHANGE 
14 Lack of authority for site manager to select sub-contractors RESP 
and trades-people. P 
insufficient time. TIME 
15 "Faster the men work, the more quality suffers". TIME 
"Buidability a bit of a problem". FORMAL 
Lack of pre-planning of the site. PLAN 
16 Timescale too fast. TIME 
Lack of head-office pre-planning - "buying/scheduling all too PLAN 
rushed and buyer is over-worked". 
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"Building (industry) has been taken over by the QSs" - too 
much emphasis on cost/time at the expense of quality. 
COST 
Quote from painters on the job - "That's the standard you get for my price" and anecdote that painter is not making enough 
return to want to take on any more units on that site. 
COST 
Ordering/buying is all through the head office with no site 
float. 
RESP 
"Time" TIME 
"Too much paper-work" FORMAL 
"Too much QA and too many checkers". FORMAL 
Negative attitudes of senior managers. Tendency to set un- 
realistic targets and use "the sack" if these are not met. i. e. 
generally negative attitude. 
Seen by the site manager as no longer an effective sanction - 
"they can only sack you and even that is no longer easy. Not 
meeting un-realistic targets is no longer a good enough 
excuse. This is also true further down the line - it is not so 
easy to get rid of poor tradesmen or firms; but it can be 
donel. ". 
CULT 
"Performance targets always tend to rise". TIME 
18 Lack of money. COST 
Insufficient time causing site congestion. TIME 
Lack of management staff on site. COST 
Too much p er-work. FORMAL 
Too many meetings. COMMS 
Too much centralised control of ordering, firing, hiring. RESP 
"Can't get rid of useless sub-contractors" - i. e. lack of local 
authority for selection. 
P 
19 Odd drawing overlay problems FORMAL 
Lack of time TEME 
"Can't get rid of poor sub-contract firms". P 
Use of patronism (bricklaying sub-contractor manager knows 
the former managing director). 
CULT 
Change orders are not always passed on in the bricklaying 
firm. 
COMMS 
CHANGE 
Neg enior managers (Managing Director) CULT 
Too FORMAL 
Too much time filling in QA forms. FORMAL 
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AA 
Lack of money leading to poor selection of trades and lack of COST 
ed managers. 
21 Drawings lagging building production and hence too much FORMAL 
left for site to decide. 
Specification not concise enough. FORMAL 
Programming inadequate - does not allow for the PLAN 
complexities of site. More detailed planning, including pre- 
planning would help. 
Over-tight sub-contract tendering. COST 
Split responsibilities - two architects on a part speculative and RESP 
part JCT80 contract. 
Inadequate company culture with "no Laurie Barratt at the CU111T 
helm to direct operations". 
22 Too much time filling in forms for QA. FORMAL 
Variable standard of work (of sub-contractors). P 
even with good people, the standard of work "The trouble is , is so variable. One day a tradesman will turn out good work, 
the next, terrible work. Perhaps he just had a bad day! He 
knows its bad, we know its bad, its just one of those things". I 
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APPENDIX 9a(v) 
RECORD OF GENERAL PROBLEMS REPORTED BY OPEN 
INTERVEEWEES 
INT PROBLEM FACTOR 
1 Internal fights over sub-contract selection. QS and production P 
manager have to sit down and "slog it out". COST 
"Things go wrong when site manager is- MAN 
" Spending too much time in the office 
" Lazy 
e Too friendly with sub-contractors". 
3 Sub-contractor selection difficult. Previous work checks P 
always cover "good" sites offered by the interviewees. 
"Nomadic trades gangs" changing too much within sub- P 
contractor firms. 
5 Fast pace demanding good organisation of men, mortar etc. TIME 
Changes introduced late in the construction programme (e. g. CHANGE 
"home-maker changes). 
6 Main problem is a lack of checking. CHECK 
Excessive time pressure. e. g. new site is starting on day of TIME 
purchase of site. 
Conflict as a problem. CULT 
Managing director who wants to "build out" all sites in order TIME 
to have a product to show customers. He is, therefore always CULT 
wanting to cut lead times, but at the same time has a knack of 
timing the market and "producing the goods". 
Site 23 started with too little lead in e. g: - TIME 
" Show houses built without water services in place CONCUR 
" Roads, sewers, water mains, electric mains, gas mains still 
not installed - 
8 Lack of trades apprenticeship P 
Lack of site manager training in "man management" and MAN 
"safety aspects". 
Customers are demanding more and are more ready to sue. SOC 
Prices are too tight for workforce and many comers are cut. COST 
"Pushing for house numbers sometimes causes problems". - ----- L__ 
TIME 
414 
Appendix 9a 
"I spend quite a lot of time marking up problems on drawings FORMAL 
and returning them to (design head office): - 
" Section cross-referencing absent 
" Vague details e. g. fixings types and spacings not shown. 
"It is far better that the detail is there than it is got over on FORMAL 
site. We're often told to 'do it and tell us what you've done 
and we'll put it on paper". 
9 Time pressure to meet cash flow requirements and sales TIME 
targets. 
Cost pressure. COST 
"When things go wrong it is usually the plumbing and P 
electrical trades and this is caused by the design element 
present in their work". 
"Changes completely throw the whole thing out" - e. g. sales, CHANGE 
budgeting. 
10 Pressures mean that company is more money oriented leading COST 
to tight margins and importance of surveying function (in 
turn leading to tension and internal power struggles) 
"QS usually gets his way on selection as it is difficult to 
argue against taking the lowest price - you can end up being 
responsible for the performance of the sub-contractor that you 
have selected".. 
Lack of an apprenticeship system. P 
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APPENDIEX 9a(vi) 
RECORD OF GENERAL PROBLEMS REPORTED BY INSURERS 
INT PROBLEM FACTOR 
13 Smaller builders make bigger mistakes! SYST 
When things go seriously wrong (about I/year for SYST 
organisation) it usually involves a "catalogue of errors" rather 
than one major mistake - indicative of systemic errors. 
65 % of mistakes are caused by poor workmanship. P 
14 Recession related defects with house-builders having trading COST 
difficulties. 
Lack of control caused by companies having no directly RESP 
employed operatives. 
Becoming "human nature to screw the other party". SOC 
15 Crux of all defects is poor education and greater awareness, SYST 
supervision and checking on site.. CHECK 
17 Poor performance of a site is indicated by "the sub- CHECK 
contractors running the site" and starting to take short cuts to 
make money. 
Problems caused by conflict in many building companies CULT 
between head office and site (us and them) and relating to 
ordering plant, materials etc. I 
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APPENDIX 9b - OPEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FORM 
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HOUSEBUILDING 
ANDREW R ATIUNSON 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
OPEN INTERVIEW 
ASSURANCES 
The information provided in this questionnaire will be treated in the strictest confidence and not divulged to any 
other party. If you wish to review any answers at a later date or discuss the completion of the questionnaire, you are 
invited to contact me, Andy Atkinson at South Bank University, Wandsworth Road, London, SW8 2JZ, telephone 
0171815 7253. 
Additionally, general queries concerning this research progranune can be directed to Professor Victor Torrance, the 
London Master Builders Professor of Building at University College, London, Wates House, 22 Gordon Street, 
London WC1H OQB, telephone 0171387 7050. 
GENERAL MORMATION 
Your name 
Your position in your firm 
Nwne of firm 
Name and Address of finn 
Telephone munber 
YOUR EXPERIENCE 
In the construction industry generally 
hi your current role 
YOURBACKGROUND 
PhD6/qS 
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APPENDIX 9c 
OPEN INTERVIEWEES 
No ORGANISATION POSITION EXPERIENCE 
INDUST ROLE 
I Company 2, Region Production manager 39 10 
2. 
2 Company 2, Region Commercial manager 16 3 
2. 
3 Company 2, Region Commercial manager 20 5 
1 
4 Company 2 Company managing 24 7 
director 
5 Sub-contract Trade foreman 16 2 
company 
6 Company 1, Region Building manager 29 13 
1 
7 Company 1, Region Contracts manager 22 10 
2 (building manager) 
8 Company 1, Region Contracts manager 38 13 
2 (building manager) 
9 Company 1, Region Regional Construction 25 9 
2 director 
10 Company 1, Region Regional deputy managing 50 7 
1 director 
II Company 1, Region Customer care manager 12 1 
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No ORGANISATION POSITION EXPERIEENCE 
INDUST ROLE 
12 Company 1, Region Customer care manager u/k u/k 
2 
13 Building Guarantee Technical manager 33 8 
Company I 
14 Building Guarantee Senior Development 12 5 
1 
Company I Underwriter 
15 Building Guarantee Principal surveyor 17 2 
Comp I 
16 Building Guarantee Area surveyor 12 7 
Company I 
1 
17 Building Guarantee Building inspector 20 10 
Company 2 
Indust = Industrial 
Role = In current role 
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APPE ISERVATIONAL STUDY TRANSCRIPT INCLUDING 
CONTEMPORARY AND ADDED COMNMNTARY. 28 October 1996 
STUDY PERIOD 22 to 26 APY9 1996 
LOCATION 
Company 1, Region 1, 
Site 23, 
Surrey. 
POTENTUL 
OR 
ACTUAL 
CAUS 
OF 
PROBLEMS 
RESEARCH COMMENTARY 
ADDED 17 July 1996 AS 
PART OF THE MARY 
ANALYSIS 
Ordnance Survey Reference SU96*58* 
CONTEMPORARY TRANSCRIff 
INCLUDING RESEARCHER NOTES 
AND DAILY SUNMARIFES VMITTEN 
AT TIME OF RESEARCH. 
MONDAY 22" 
8.00 Arrive on site. Manager 
(SM) is on site already. Assistant manager 
(AM) arrives at same time as me. Site 
already very busy with a 7.30 start. 
Window cills have not arrived and SM is 
on phone to suppliers to expedite. 
AM has problems with door linings/stops 
deliveries for first five units (insufficient 
linings). 
Home-maker' problems to deal with on the 
4 five-bed detached units - move a 
Change 
Societal 
The problems of "home-maker" changes 
were to figure large during the week - they 
illustrated the potential for error caused by 
making uncontrolled changes late in the 
construction sequence. Many changes were 
made so late that completed work had to be 
pulled down (particularly on the more 
expensive detached houses under 
construction at the far side of the site - plots 
34-37). 
chimney, revise SVP position, change load pressure 
bearing internal walls, upgrade garage to 
habitable room (110 walls to become cavity 
walls). Instructions have been given too 
late without proper drawings. (Possibly 
also problems with planning permission as 
off-site parldng ratio is altered! ). 
1 Home-makers are bespoke modifications made 
by prospective purchasers of the company's houses. The facility to make such modifications 
are promoted as a sales incentive and offered 
by the site sales staff. A home-maker coordinator (RMQ agrees the modifications with purchasers, 
but without routine communications with 
the site or head office construction staff. IMe coordinator has an estate agency background and is not 
technically qualified to assess implications of modifications, some of which 
involve structural changes. 
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8.35 SM returns call re window 
cills. AM ditto re door linings. 
9.00 Walk round site with AM 
Onformal site inspection). Minor finishing 
problems etc: - 
Checking and inspection of work by the site 
staff (site manager and assistant) was to be 
exclusively informal during the week - direct 
observation, exhortation and complaint often 
delivered in a robust manner, particularly by 
the (bricklayer trained) site manager (SM). 
The assistant manager (AM) was more 
conciliatory and adopted a much more 
overtly "problem solving" approach. 
Wallpapering - Show house wallpaper to 
beds 1 and 2 reversed (1 unit only) - 
should be the other way round and will 
have to be changed! 
Point for extractor has been fixed in the 
wrong position and will have to be 
moved. 
10.00 Hard hat campaign. HSE (Health 
and Safety Executive) is putting pressure 
on sites generally, pressurising the site 
management, who, in turn, pressurise the 
workers. Workers (in this instance, 
Bricklayers) put hats on when 
agent/assistant walks round, but need to be 
Primary 
Comms 
(Ambiguity) 
Primary 
Comms 
With reference to the hard hat campaign, 
safety was taken seriously, but no evidence 
was revealed that safety considerations 
positively benefited productivity (as reported 
in some literature - ACSNI (1993 for 
example). 
continually reminded. 
10.45 Given task to perform - Complete 
materials received sheets - these reconcile 
materials delivered with suppliers' delivery 
notes. Basically, a routine clerical task 
which SM has to catch up on at home or in 
My task as a site clerk kept me occupied as I 
observed the site and helped me integrate 
with the staff. 
spare moments. 
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10.50 EB (Electricity board) co-ordinator 
phoned by SM. SM is requesting electricity 
supply to part of the site, but Electricity 
board need to check whether: - 
1 
lay a cable there 
2 
"They have a right to 
They have received 
payment (The board demand payment in 
advance) 
SM Follows up (2) immediately. He 
explains that large cheques, such as that 
involved here, are sent to head office for 
approval. Delay can occur there and it 
looks (to him) that the electricity board 
have yet to be paid. 
11.30 Ground-works sub-contractor on 
phone with problem with detached houses. 
11.40 AM supervising fork lift driver 
unloading materials. 
11.45 Starts raining heavily and workers External 
start covering up brick stacks and part 
completed work. 
The site office acted as a "communications 
hub" with several sub-contractors directly 
organising their operations through its 
telephone. 
2 The position of the sub-station 
has been changed to another part of this 3 firm "consortium" site (on one of the other firm's land! ) and a right 
to site the sub-station in the new position 
is not automatically available. WC, the Electricity Board "Way-leave Coordinator" has to check the legal 
details before any work can be carried out. 
Changes Long lines of communications and conflicting 
Costs Company objectives were illustrated by the 
Systemic utility company problems being experienced 
on the site. Large cheques were deliberately 
routed through very senior company 
management in order to give control. Senior 
mana ement were physically located 
separately from the Regional office and had 
objectives, which did not always match those 
at site level. Hence there was a delay in 
authorisation. 
comms 
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12.00 SM discussing problems of theft of 
materials over the week-end. People were, 
apparently, driving up and loading sand, 
bricks etc - "Treating the site like B and 
Q! " (B and Q is a large retail DIY store 
chain). SM decides to have entrance to the 
site blocked with heavy pre-cast concrete 
floor beams to stop cars entering in an 
attempt to reduce losses - action ordered 
from tonight. 
12.30 SM ordering materials for plots 42 
et seq. AM on phone to cleaners - need to 
have show houses cleaned and ready by the 
week-end. 
SocieW Influences completely external to the 
Extemal Company were limited to one very wet day 
and some minor materials problems, 
including theft noted here. 
12.36 SM on phone to arrange for show Costs 
cabin and huts to be moved to a new 
location at the week-end. There is a 
potential problem here as moving the huts 
requires a larger crane than available on 
site, but the head office surveyors do not 
want to authorise the cost of a larger crane. 
12.45 Bricklayers all stopped work - poor 
weather. 
12.45 Awaited cills for windows turn up 
and are ready for installation (4 units) 
tomorrow. 
SM reflects on importance of planning. He 
notes that AM can be forgetful at times 
with planning - "can't afford to be forgetful 
with planning" - 
A large element of the activity in the site hut 
consisted of very short term (1-8 days) 
planning on the telephone. Here the site 
manager was arranging for the site office to 
be moved to a new, more convenient, 
location on the site. The problem of needing 
a larger crane than was available on-site 
illustrated both the influence of cost on 
performance (and in this case, safety - too 
small a crane was dangerous) and conflict 
within the Company. Conflict between cost 
considerations (as personified by the 
influence of the Commercial Director and 
quantity surveyors) and performance/quality 
(as personified by the site management) 
featured quite strongly during the week 
Planning on the site was not evidenced by 
any form of written bar chart or CPA 
programme other than the use of the "white- 
board" noted below. Rather, it was evidenced 
as an ability within the site manager. An 
important element of that ability appeared to 
be a very good short/medium term memory - 
referred to here in the site manager's 
comment about the assistant. The use of 
memory in planning is shown in the study, 
particularly at the end of the week. 
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12.50 Sales meeting with site sales staff 
and AM in sales cabin at the front of the 
site. 
Customer/sales liaison problems 
Plot 35 
customer querying positioning of 
doors/partition around WC 
Societal 
Economic 
Changes 
Comms 
"Systemic" 
customer querying the implementation 
of home-maker alterations (changing 
garage into study) - door to garage not 
put in wall. 
customer querying length of wall around 
utility room (Blockwork taken to end of 
doorway by mistake). 
Meeting covered progress over site on 
reserved and sold units (for feeding back to 
customers/planning future sales load. 
Informal discussion ensued covering 
general home-maker problems - home- 
maker instructions often received too late 
in the programme. This causes post- 
completion maintenance budget to rise 
(f250.00). Anecdote mentioned of the 
"extreme home-maker" on Site 16 (an 
adjacent site being constructed by the 
Company), where three flats were changed 
to one extremely large unit, with 
considerable technical and programming 
effects. 
Concurrency The influence of purchaser power was felt 
Changes strongly on this site. The tight economic 
climate led the Company to "bend over 
backwards" in pandering to its customers. 
Informed purchasers, particularly those 
buying expensive detached units were, in 
some cases, taking full advantage of this. The 
illustrations here support findings in the 
interview study, that external customer 
influences have become much more 
prominent. 
Communications and planning at site level 
generally, including between sales and 
construction staff were informal and friendly. 
Discussion developed to cover site/head 
office relationships: - 
Some friction, perhaps caused by remoteness 
and conflicting objectives, was evident 
between the site staff as a whole (us) and 
head office staff and management (them). 
This could be a problem of lack of good 
communications or participation by the more 
senior head office management. 
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Attitudes - head office don't care too inuch Culture 
and this tends to be reciprocated by site. 
Lack of positive feedback - head office 
"only let you know when there are 
problems" (Sales and construction 
personnel on site agree on this! ). 
14.45 Materials deliveries and positioning 
by SM 
15.00 SM/AM phone "mastic pointers" to 
arrange their programme for the week/next 
week. 
SM general comments and discussion on 
provision of services for the site: - 
1 Water main is not Costs > 
connected as connection bill was not paid > (Potential) 
at the year end in December (in order to primary error 
improve the Company's cash flow! ). Still 
not paid at beginning of April and 
consequently water may not be on until 
June! 
"Systemic" 
2 Work will be finished 
in several units but water services will not 
have been tested thus any plumbing leaks 
will damage finishes etc, when water is 
supplied. 
3 Similar problems are 
faced with Gas/Electric all caused by too 
fast a building programme. 
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Management of finances are directed from 
the top in order to suit year end accounts 
and tax year and not necessarily building 
programme. 
15.15 SM/AM on site checking 
progress/quality. AM driving fork-lift 
truck. 
Problem of some window units not fitting 
tightly in their blank openings. 
15.30 Wallpaperers requesting lighting in 
order to work in internal bathrooms (no 
windows! ) - lighting is supposed to be 
provided in decorator's contract, but 
programme for show houses is very tight. 
AM on phone to try and solve problem 
with Company buyer. Buyer prefers that 
decorators supply lighting and charge 
Company for hire if Company eventually 
accepts responsibility. 
15.45 Phone call from home-maker co- 
ordinator (HMC) - changes to plot 36 
(currently at slab/first lift stage): - 
The water main problem illustrated the 
influence of cost and conflicting 
orientation/objectives between more senior 
management and the site. The example of the 
water main showed that influences can have a 
hierarchical structure. That is, the failure to 
pay the connection charges because of wider 
Company considerations fed into or led to 
problems of having to install the main at the 
same time as completing the dwellings. i. e. 
wider economic considerations (classed as 
"Global Influences" in the model) led to 
problems of concurrency (classed as 
"Managerial Influences" in the model). 
Problems of concurrency left no opportunity 
to correct relatively inevitable "primary 
factors" such as a poorly trained trades- 
person not jointing a pipe correctly. 
However, blame was unlikely to be attributed 
to economic pressures when finishes were 
damaged in a particular unit. 
Both site manager and assistant adopted a 
very participative approach to managing and 
evidenced this by driving the fork-lift or 
carrying out some minor work tasks. 
comms 
comms The problems of lack of light to internal 
Multiple bathrooms and no provision for generator 
causes 
supplied lighting appeared to stem from two 
causes - firstly the failure to connect the main 
supply caused by late payment of the charges 
(and stemming from economic pressures on 
the Company plus a legal connection problem 
noted below). Secondly, a failure in formal 
communications, in that the "internal" nature 
of the bathrooms in question was not drawn 
to the decorator's attention. Even if it were, 
it is almost inevitable that the decorators 
would assume that power was available 
unless direct reference was made to the need 
for lighting in specific instances 
Economics > Changes caused by late home-maker requests 
Changes not properl3! controlled caused some re- 
Systems working and gave rise to several potential defects in the finished units - see below. 
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Move wall to rear garage forward by 
750mm and upgrade 1 10mm wall to 
cavity walling, provide steel support 
over to take roof load (See sketch at 
end) 
Provide French doors in lieu of patio 
doors and place in revised position. 
9 Redesign kitchen layout 
9 Move radiator. 
* Re-hang some doors to other hand. 
Replace rendered feature bay fronts with 
brickwork (i. e. demolish and re-build 
fronts) 
Provide double in lieu of single doors to 
bedrooms 2 and 5) 
Increase width of shower cubicle to 
900mm. 
e Reduce size of linen cupboard slightly. 
Replace wardrobes with better and 
bigger units. 
e Increase size of loft access. 
Provide brick paviOrs to the whole 
driveway. 
Replace front door with better quality 
one. 
Provide obscure glass in door to 
lounge/hall. 
* Provide loft light. 
Provide electrical installation to 
TV/Satellite installation. 
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All of these have to be dealt with on site 
(starting from 16.20) 
16.20 AM checks with CB (Buyer) 
provision of revised materials for the 
above. 
16.30 Steel beams on "Fivebed" house 
type found to be wrong - two at front of 
garage called off too short (2100mm 
instead of 3730mm) - AM back on phone 
to buyer to sort out problem. 
COMMS This appears to be a mistake in the steel beam 
schedule for that house type -a failure in 
formal communications. It illustrates a 
"process stream" model of construction and 
how errors "upstream" can influence 
performance "downstream". The error in the 
schedule is probably a "primary" error (but 
made at a higher managerial level) in 
transposing details from drawings or 
specification to schedule. 
16.50 Left site. 
COMAMNT ON KEY EVENTS AND POINTS OF THE DAY - Written up at 20.30 
1 Fire brigade/short term management 
- Window cills not delivered 
- Incorrect door lining deliveries 
- Wallpaper specification in 2-bed houses incorrect and corrected on site. 
- Planning for next week's programme (mastic pointers). 
2 Problems caused by late changes - mainly customer/sales induced (Home-makers) 
Upgrading garages 
Moving partitions etc as plots 35/36 
3 Communications problems (with home-maker scheme) 
Sales to home-maker co-ordinator 
Home-maker co-ordinator to site construction staff. 
4 Conflicting objectives (especially quality/ specification with time and financial corporate 
objectives) 
- CF payments to water/electricity utilities 
held up (to miss year end/tax year etc) by 
Corporate Head Office. 
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Planning methodology. 
Tends to be "in the head" and short term. Interesting comment by SM that AM forgets 
some things and this is a planning failing. 
Interpersonal and inter-organisational conflicts. 
- Between site managers and sales office 
- Between sales office and Home-maker co-ordinator 
- Between both sales office, construction staff and head office. 
CF lack of positive reinforcement: - 
"They only let you know when there are problems" 
"They don't seem to care too much and this can rub off on us". 
Comment by SM that the Company is poor compared to his previous firm. 
Sundry errors and correction items 
- Windows not fitting 
- Walls built in the wrong place 
- Wallpaperers needing lighting for internal bathrooms 
- Steels for "Fivebed" house type wrong. 
- Electrical points in the wrong place. 
8 Role of externals - Weather problems at 11.00 and subsequently all day. 
9 Building programme projected - Jan 1996 to Sept 1996. 
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TUESDAY 23rd 
7.54 Arrive on site 
7.58 Window installer asks for 
details of windows - referred to agent out 
on site. 
8.05 SM looking for bricklayers 
to continue ground-works (footings) 
brickwork - stopped yesterday because of 
rain and failed to turn up this morning. 
8.15 Call off materials plots 
approx. 50-60 
8.40 SM phone to Water Board to 
check that main to be installed next week. 
8.45 Walk to meet other agents in Checking Communications with "rival" site 
site consortium' concerning access for the Comms managers on adjacent sites were informal 
Water Board installing their main - the and 
direct. 
route of the main must be clear of plant 
such as scaffolding and materials. Walk 
back through site with SM. 
Check delivery of PVC windows and Checking and control largely consisted of 
complain to installers about vagueness 
" walkimg" round the site with eyes open. 
of delivery dates. 
The success of this strategy appeared to 
depend on very regular walks and good 
technical experience (the manager knew 
what to look for) rather than any 
adherence to checklists or organised 
procedures. 
Ensure adequate concrete for lamp 
standards - SM uses direct, robust 
approach with ground-worker 
(authoritative, gruff, but friendly and 
cajoling at the same time). 
3 The site was originally approximately three times 
bigger than at present and two thirds were sold off to two other major house-builders in 
order (presumably) to improve the 
Company's finances in a difficult trading period. In order to deal with common town planning, services and 
the roads issues, , three companies were constituted 
as a consortium with agreed legal terms. 
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Check levels and access to homes on Comms 
first four plots (show houses). The 
problem here is that the step down from 
houses to paths and parking bays is too 
big. 
9.15 Fencers have not arrived yet 
to install fencing around entrance areas, 
show houses and show cabin (in its 
proposed new position) - SM on phone to 
fencing company to re-plan their schedule. 
9.20 AM comments that The influence of the construction 
plasterboard jointers have not arrived after programme and the need for good 
being put back because of non-delivery of planning and performance 
from external 
agencies (the window suppliers) can be 
window cills (Me j ointers cannot work seen in this incipient delay. 
inside the units unless the windows are 
glazed and the window installers are out of 
the way). 
9.30 Ground-worker (GW) on 
phone trying to get hold of a hired laser 
level or the one on hire repaired - the 
existing one appears to have moisture in its 
works after the heavy rain yesterday. 
9.35 SM on phone to call off 
door frames from joinery company 
9.40 PD, the painter boss 
(Director/owner of the decorating sub- 
contract firm) comes into site office for a 
chat. Decorators are currently working on 
the show houses and are under some 
pressure to complete - completion of the 
show houses is required by the end of the 
week ready for inspection by the Company 
senior management (including the Regional 
MD) next week. 
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10.00 BM (Line building manager - SM's immediate superior) visits the site to 
generally check progress, support the site 
staff and discuss problems. Uses a 
supportive, empathetic style, clearly 
exhibiting his roots as a tradesman and 
"site person". Problems discussed: - 
Electricity Board problems related to the 
installation of the mains stemming from 
"consortium arguments" in the 
positioning of the sub-station. Originally 
was to be on one of the other members 
portion of the site, but this was not "cut 
and dried" in the conveyance agreement 
between the consortium members. The 
consortium member concerned no longer 
wants the sub-station on its portion 
(presumably for aesthetic/sales reasons), 
but the third member of the consortium 
is prepared to have the sub-station on its 
portion. However, the legal mechanism 
of the changes of position (Way-leave) 
remain to be completed and ensuing 
delays mean that only about 8 weeks 
remain to install mains and sub-station. 
Progress planning - re-positioning of 
sales unit, finishing "small units" (first 
phase of the Company's site), finishing 
footings for the rest of the site. All 
discussed/planned informally during a 
walk round the site by Building Manager 
and Site Manager. 
Warning on problems of disposal of 
"muck" (surplus excavated sub-soil) - 
not to be dumped on another consortium 
member's site! - The other member will 
check site levels against conveyance 
drawings and legal action may ensue! 
The relations between site manager and 
building manager were good and mutually 
supporting (both come from a bricklaying 
background). Physical presence and a 
"problem solving" approach illustrated a 
participative culture. 
"Systemic I The sub-station "way-leave" problem, 
effects" together with late payment of the 
electricity company, was likely to 
Economi CS 
influence the performance of the site as a 
whole and magnify the impact of errors 
Time> by trades-people. Lack of power had 
potential already affected decorations (see above) 
error and would delay both sales of houses and 
testing of electrical installations. Again, a 
wider Company problem had managerial 
implications (concurrency), eventually 
having tactical, primary implications. 
The discussion of progress planning and 
the problems of disposal of "muck" on the 
adjacent site illustrated the use of informal 
communications (upwards and 
downwards) allowing issues to be dealt 
with. 
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"Home-maker problems discussed (plot Changes 
35-36 especially) - steel beam not to be 
put in plot 35 garage roof (to support 
construction where wall below re- 
positioned to suit purchaser), but 
construction to be supported on timber 
(no calculations/drawings provided to 
support this decision - they may arrive 
later? ). 
General discussion ensued on whether 
home-maker changes should be allowed - 
they are advocated by senior managers in 
order to achieve sales, but not liked by 
construction staff. It was felt by BM/SM 
that if changes were to be allowed, they 
should be better managed. There is a need 
for a technically qualified 
design/construction co-ordinator to deal 
with home-maker type problems. 
General problem of starting sites too "Systemic" 
quickly pointed out by BM - no firm effects - 
planning permissions (started "on risk"), Time> 
no settled run-in (time lead-in) for concurrency 
services provisions etc. > error 
10.50 PD (painting sub-contractor) returns 
and expounds on quality (he links quality to 
selection of trades people). Considers that 
he now has a good set of painters, but he 
has "had to get through a few". PD gets on 
well with SM - both have a very direct 
approach and SM considers PD a good 
performer, making very good progress. 
(Note - appears that a good memory, 
feel 
for the job is important for this type of 
construction) 
The inevitable nature of many project 
management problems was illustrated in 
the discussion of the use of "home- 
makers". It was generally agreed by all 
staff encountered during the week, that 
sales were of primary importance and to 
achieve these the purchaser needed to be 
appeased. Hence an apparent conflict 
between sales and senior managers and the 
site over the home-maker policy was seen 
here as really one of how to manage 
change induced by "home-makers". 
Accommodating changes was necessary 
and even desirable, but should be properly 
controlled through a design/construction 
co-ordinator. The failure to provide such 
an individual was probably driven by 
costs - hence another conflict, which 
could be eventually reduced to that of 
sales needs versus their costs! 
As far as quality is controllable at the 
work-face, the painting sub-contractor re- 
iterates the view that quality depends on 
selection of the worker and this will 
involve some shuffling of the pool of 
workers in order to get "the right 
selection". 
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11 
- 
10 Interview with BS, bricklaying 
foreman (see separate sheet) (NB his 
comments on pace of work). 
11.15 SM on phone to landscaper 
concerning turf laying for this week 
(around show houses) - more short 
term/informal planning. 
11.50 Visit to "penthouse flat" on other Systemic The finishing of the "penthouse flat" 
Company site (16) in developmene. A effects - 
illustrated concurrency in action. 
customer purchased three top floor flats in Economics > Carpenters, painters, plumbers and , 
a block of 9 on three floors (i. e. the whole change> 
electricians were all frantically working 
together to complete in an extremely short of the top floor of a block), and wanted the error and time. In this case the concurrency was flats knocked into one and the specification Societal > again driven by other forces - the desire 
upgraded. Work is currently at "second Time> to accommodate chang stemming from 
of fix stage plus paving and landscaping, Concurrency 
flobal customer demands, ultimately 2 
with scheduled "legal" completion on this > error 
driven by wider global economic 
considerations. 
Friday'. The carpets are due to be laid (Multiple 
tomorrow (Wednesday) in advance of some systemic 
second fixing work! causes) 
12.00 Back in site office. SM on phone 
calling off timber Ooinery order for week 
commencing 6/5/96). 
(Appears that management of site depends 
on individual energy of manager, good 
memory, informal planning - "white-board 
planning" - delivery dates (materials 
provision appears to be the key restraint) 
are written on a large white-board in the 
site office as they are scheduled on the 
telephone). 
(N. B. Work and activity comes in waves - 
hectic then quiet then hectic then quiet and 
so on). 
4 The development consists of a large area of housing in the grounds of a hospital for the mentally ill. Ile hospital remains in use, but 
due to changes in hospital treatment, especially the move towards "care in the community" some buildings and most of the grounds are no longer 
required for hospital use - They 
have accordingly been sold off for development and the company have two sites in the grounds spaced about 
0.8km apart. As mentioned above, one of the sites was 
further sub-divided into three and two portions sold to other house-builders in a consortium 
arrangement. 
On legal completion, the purchaser owns the property - this cannot take place without works being substantially complete. 
435 
Appendix 10a 
12.15 Lunch in the site canteen (Number This site and the adjacent consortium sites 
1 breakfast - large traditional were relatively democratic in their eating 
arrangements in that managers and egg/bacon/chips meal taken with the trades 
workers from an three sites shared the people and other consortium managers) same canteen. This type of meal is not universally popular 
with staff and many prefer lighter meals - 
on this site there is an alternative of eating 
at the adjacent super-store restaurant. 
13.05 AM on phone to check delivery 
dates for materials. 
13.50 AM on phone chasing electrician 
for progress - wanted on site for Thursday 
at the latest (to finish show houses). 
14.00 AM on phone - problems with Comms A conflict on cost was evident 
in the 
wallpaper to show units - the paper Costs wallpaper adhesive problem. 
requires a ready-mixed paste and will not Multiple 
stick with traditional paste (pieces are independent 
falling off the walls). The decorators have causes 
not priced for ready-mixed paste and, as 
the Company has supplied the paper, they 
feel that this is an extra. A fear has arisen 
that there may not be enough paper now to 
finish show houses for the week-end and 
the paper has a long order/delivery time for 
additional rolls. 
AM on phone to home-maker co-ordinator The view that all the head office staff are 
to discuss wallpaper, but no reply - he still at 
lunch illustrated the gap in 
thinks that all surveyors/staff are still at 
communications and attitudes mentioned 
above between site and head office. 
lunch! 
14.30 Cleaners are booked for Friday (to 
clean show houses), but have not been 
warned about lack of power, lighting, or 
hot water. AM on phone to try and warn 
cleaners but keeps getting answering 
Multiple 
Systemic 
machine. 
Internal door suppliers have 
let site down (show houses) - they cannot 
supply doors until Thursday because their 
suppliers cannot supply until Wednesday. 
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14.45 Wallpaper paste (ready-mix) cannot Costs > 
be delivered until Thursday as order was Comms 
not made until PM today - it is needed error 
immediately. SM comments that site staff Causal 
are not allowed to buy paste directly from system 
adjacent DIY super-store because of head 
office imposed "cost implications". 
14.50 SM on phone to get windows fitted 
to plots 120-123 so that scaffolding can be 
dropped. 
AM Back to home-maker co-ordinator to 
progress ready-mixed wallpaper paste. 
Agreed that this is now to be provided by 
the decorator - the paperhanger is to call at 
a trade supplier this evening to collect paste 
for use tomorrow (Wednesday). 
15.10 Conversation with GW, ground- 
works supervisor concerning problems etc. 
Excavation depths are given by the 
Company, but contract is taken with depths 
at the ground-workers risk - thus if deeper 
dig or soft spots are encountered these have 
to be handled without extra payment to the 
ground-workers. However, there is not 
normally any problem here except the 
occasional setting out errors by site 
engineers. 
15.55 SM on phone to change order for 
sIdps - yet another one is filled up. Now to 
be 3 exchange sIdps delivered in the 
morning in lieu of 2. 
16.35 CB (Company buyer) visits to 
deliver lintel schedule for plot 35. He is 
asked for beam schedule for pre-cast pre- 
stressed concrete floor beams. 
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16.40 SM planning tomorrow ground- 
works with GW (ground-worker 
supervisor) - sequence of paving, patios 
etc. They cannot finish some until power 
cables are installed. 
16.50 Left site. 
The discussion between site manager and 
ground-works supervisor again illustrated 
the nature of short term planning on the 
site: - 
Informal 
Face to face meetings 
Very frequent 
Short time horizon 
Unwritten - relying on 
memory (except for 
memo type notes on 
white-board). 
CONMENT ON KEY EVENTS AND POINTS OF THE DAY - Written up at 20.00 
1 More short term (1 week hence) planning: - 
0 calling off materials - door frames, roof timbers etc. 
arranging sub-contractors for fencing, plasterboard jointers, cleaners, landscapers 
etc. 
2 Use of "white-board", rather like a public diary, for short term planning. A diary can get 
lost, forgotten etc and is less visible! 
3 Solving short term problems: - 
0 getting bricklayers back after yesterday's rain. 
0 getting fencers to turn up 
4 Nipping problems in the bud - short feedback cycle of checking and control. 
0 adequate concrete to lamp standards. 
0 steps down from show units to parking bays too steep. 
0 no muck to be dumped on the adjacent site. 
Planning bigger oper ons: - 
0 installation of water main through adjacent sites. 
Changes as continuing problems - home-maker changes as yesterday. 
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7 Wider organisational problems: - 
services problems with electricity and water. 
Home-maker changes not properly co-ordinated by head office. 
No organised run-in for sites. 
Essential elements of site management: - 
a) Good short-term memory 
Compulsive action: - 
0 continual follow-up on phone 
keep in front of problems, e. g. muck on adjacent site, concrete to lamp 
standards. 
C) Use of visible planning on white-boards. 
d) Good feel for where job is: - 
e. g. knowing that cabins/show suite to be moved at end of week, that fork 
lift trucks cannot move cabins and that larger cranes are needed. 
e) A reliance on "just-in-time" planning: - 
i. e. an expectation and demand that things will happen now, tomorrow or 
the next day at the latest. 
f) Where appropriate some advance notice, but all planning largely "in the head" or 
confirmed with Company imposed plans. 
(General note - SM is highly regarded by several sub-contractors as well as the senior managers in 
the Company - Managing Director, Construction Director, Building Manager). 
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WEDNESDAY 24th 
9.05 Start on site. Task to Checking Continuous supervision was used during 
sort/file timber schedules for house types. (Direct the week, but only directly witnessed 
SM at top of site (show houses) supervising supervision) 
here. The building manager related an 
anecdote of this site manager allowing tarmac laying to parking areas. the incorrect tarmac to be laid on a 
previous contract and, perhaps, this is 
why he was giving this operation such 
attention here! 
9.10 Taking photographs of site 
and entrance for research report. 
9.40 SM talks to forklift driver 
concerning work required. 
Surveyor on phone concerning changes to a 
unit 
Sales staff visit site office to request further 
changes to plot 36. 
SM points out "a sign of a good tradesman The link between tidiness and quality 
- he always brings a sweeping brush with 
was used elsewhere in the research. 
him! ". 
9.50 Problem with Company 
cheque for electricity supply - now written 
out but has to be signed by Group 
Chairman because of large amount - yet 
further delay will ensue. 
(Researcher contemporM notes - 
Company seems to use pressure from 
below to activate management system 
above i. e. when the site start to shout then 
something happens. 
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Long lines of action and communications, 
delay in action, conflicting objectives 
(orientation - Turner), profit/cash flow 
versus production, lack of overall planning 
(strategic project planning) and concurrent 
working. Concurrency applies to planning, 
design, procurement, construction, but 
probably not as badly as with major 
"contract" works. It is handled by fire 
brigade management, short term planning, 
compulsive/reactive styles) 
10.00 Ready-mix concrete supplier phone 
to confirm delivery of concrete with 
ground-works supervisor (GW). 
10.30 Dry liner on phone (outwards) 
asIdng for boards and bonding plaster. 
10.35 SM chases up "hard hats" - "If 
there's anyone out there without a hat on 
can you whack them over the head with a 
f ...... shovel! " - to labourer "Patsy, 
where's your hard hat? Put it on your 
f ...... head then! " 
10.45 SM driving fork lift truck. (When 
work demands it both SM and AM will 
carry out trades/general tasks - taping, 
jointing, making good, driving, handling 
machinery etc). 
Culture - 
participation 
Continual short-term planning and 
compulsive confirmation as witnessed 
with the concrete supply appeared to be a 
feature of day-to-day planning. 
Safety issues treated as a "given" and 
measures enforced by "direct 
communication" where the object 
individual was near enough! 
Participative management in action 
10.55 Joinery sub-contract surveyor on Comms 
site measuring staircase openings for pre- 
made staircases - i. e. not happy to work 
solely from drawings. 
Bricklaying foreman (BS) checks work 
required against schedules in the site office. 
Delivery of staircase trimmings - put in 
secure store. 
A certain lack of trust for formal 
communications, or an allowance for 
design mistakes based on experience, 
illustrated here. Maps on to exhortations 
by Norman (1988) among others to 
"allow for effor". 
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11.30 SM not in office so bricklayer Responsibility A failure of the formal communications 
foreman says he will "make the decision system resulting in trades-people making 
himself". their own decisions (for better or worse). 
11.40 AM Rang in to remind SM to take 
paper up on floor of plot 132 for vinyl to 
be laid tomorrow (This allows the concrete 
screeded floor to dry sufficiently for the 
vinyl to stick). (Another example of 
compulsive planning behaviour - think -> 
phone in -> do! ). 
NB AM is not on site today as he has to 
take his baby daughter to hospital for some 
checks on her vision - SM suggested 
yesterday that he come in if he can manage 
it, but otherwise take the day off. 
NB errors noted by researcher on site walk Economics > 
round - square foundations to splayed bays Societal > 
over (probably not a serious problem, but Changes and 
stems from alternative designs for bay Comms 
windows and changes to plot allocations of 
bay types). 
12.15 Trip to area being excavated in 
order to learn how to use the laser level (an 
offer of tuition was made by GW, the 
ground-works supervisor). However, the 
team is still using a "dumpy" level and will 
not take delivery of the laser until this 
afternoon (advantage of laser is that it only 
requires one primary, whereas the dumpy 
needs three! ). 
12.30 Discussion with SM concerning site 
accidents in his experience: - 
A dumper over-turned into a basement 
construction and buried operator in 
concrete. 
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A labourer was impaled on a reinforcing 
bar dropped down a lift shaft during 
careless cleaning operations. 
Both victims survived their accident. 
12.45 GW on phone to chase up laser 
level - not to be delivered and talk on other 
end of bill not having been paid! 
(Text of site office "white-board" The "white-board" was the only evidence 
of formal planning at the site level. 
Nevertheless, there was no evidence of 
tasks and deliveries having been 
forgotten or incorrectly sequenced. On 
the contrary, the site management 
appeared to be on top of the process and 
failures of progress caused by possible 
poor planning were rare (and usually 
limited to failures to "chase up 
materials" sufficiently rather than 
failures to plan A inito). Thus, the 
planning was there, but contained in the 
memory of the site manager. 
Intl drs and linings 120-127 del 24/4/96 
Int ironmongery 120-127 " 24/4/96 
Skt/Arch plots 120-123 del on 26.4.96 
W/bds 103-109 del on 26-4-96 
Kitchen line Plot 132 25-4-96 
2x1 quadrant 300m ASAP 
told Bill to order plots 103-127 trap 
hatches. 
1 load 4.2N blocks w/c 22.4.96 
Floor beams 59-67 - 2/3 May 
Joists 115-119 w/c, 29/4/96 
Windows 120-127 Fitting w/c 15/4/96 
Roof trusses 34-35 w/c 29/4/96 
Roof trusses 36-37-38 w/c 6/5/96 
of of 110-119 w/c 13-5-96 
Roof timbers 110-119 w/c 6-5-96 
Front doors 120-127 6.5.96 
of 11 103-109 2.5.96 
of it 110-119 3.6.96 
Porch 16.4.96) 
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(SM is out on site for approximately 50- Participation 
60% of time during the day - in and out Checking like a yo-yo, a very restless character: - Comms 
Supervising 
Checldng 
Moving materials 
Short term planning) 
13.45 Take message from window 
installer's office - the installers do not need 
to return to the office to pick up goods for 
the next day. 
SM off on the site to catch kitchen fitters to 
get them to finish off in the show units. 
14.15 Take message for wall-paperers 
from the sub-contractor supervisor (PD). 
14.20 Sales personnel visits site office to Economics 
discuss dimensions around the WC for plot Society > 
35 - purchaser particularly wants 24" Changes > 
between doors and rear of room. Errors 
14.30 Tree surgery work around the show 
houses has not been carried out - not now a 
good time as trees are budding. SM 
comments that it should have been done 
before all work started on the site and that 
the trees now make the show houses dark 
inside. 
There was some evidence of R2or 
Rlanning at the overall project and 
Company construction programme level. 
The failure to prune trees at the correct 
time was one such instance of failure. 
15.00 Painters/paperers on phone 
(outwards) trying to contact their boss for 
payment! 
SM and GW chat about a good fork lift 
truck driver working on the adjacent 
consortium member site. SM had offered 
him a job, but he did not want it at the 
time. (NB obtaining workers by word-of- 
mouth recommendation). 
The attempt to "poach" the fork lift truck 
driver was evidence of the importance 
site management attach to the selection 
of the individual in achieving 
performance. 
15.30 SM personally talcing up paper from 
floors in show house ready for vinyl 
laying. 
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15.45 Chat with GW about his private 
work in renovating his own houses - he has 
renovated and subsequently sold about four 
houses and as a consequence has made 
enough money to have no mortgage and 
buy a house in Ireland. Talks about his 
hobby of ballroom dancing - an 
incongruous hobby as he personally is a 
large thick set man'. 
16.30 Bricklayers pack up and most 
workers start to leave the site. 
16.35 Leave site. 
COMMENT ON KEY EVENTS AND POINTS OF THE DAY - Written up at 18.00 
I Key role of site manager 
Sort out problems as they arise on site - out on site 50-70 % of the day supervising, 
advising, checking, very short term planning and not allowing problems to develop. 
Planning on the white-board as text above. 
2 Planning ahead and then following up to make sure plans are still on target. For example: - 
0 ready-mix concrete supplier phones GW to confirm concrete deliveries. 
Joinery sub-contractor surveyor checks on site the measurements for stair openings. 
0 AM reminds SM to take up paper from show house floors. 
The electricity board cheque saga - conflicting organisational orientation (Turner 1978) - 
profit/cash flow or production? 
4 Participation 
0 SM/AM Both drive the fork lift when necessary. 
0 AM Working on show house finishings. 
Sm taldng up paper floor protection in show house. (NB he also remembered to do 
this some time after the reminder! ). 
6 Apparently this was also considered somewhat 
incongruous within the foreman's own firm. His boss had a photograph of the foreman in a 
tuxedo on the wall of the office and 
took delight in pointing it out as being of his best foreman - "the dancing ground-worker". 
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Tidiness as an indicator of quality - "sign of a good tradesman - he always brings a 
sweeping brush with him" - SM. 
Safety issues 
0 Continual compulsive "hard hats" reminders. 
Problems with ground-workers installing sewers and working in un-sheeted deep 
trenches. SM mimics the labourers concerned: - 
" "But I'll only be in there for a minute" - you'll be in there for af...... sight longer 
than a minute if you don't get out now! 117 
0 Anecdotes on safety issues noted above. 
Attitude to children and customers found "wandering the site" (i. e. they are told to 
leave immediately)'. 
These points all indicate that safety is treated as a "given" rather than a positive production bonus. 
Safety does not help productivity (at least in the short term), but is still taken as a very serious 
"given". 
Concurrency as a problem (poor head office planning) 
0 No run-in 
0 Starting "at risk" etc. 
0 Tree surgery work still not done. 
8 Selection by work of mouth recommendation (fork lift truck driver). 
7 The ground-works Problem arose on this site and was 
discussed at some time during the day, but only recalled and noted in the evening. 
8 An incident where prospective purchasers appeared round the comer of the site hut occurred during the day, but was not recorded at the time. 
The manager (SM) politely 
but firmly asked that they leave for safety reasons. 
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THURSDAY 25th 
8.00 Arrive on site 
8.05 Problems of performance of 
electricians - the sub-contractor cannot 
provide labour over the next two days to 
second fix the show units and smaller "top 
units". Poor attendance on previous job 
(the other Company site on the same 
development) has lead SM to be wary of 
the firm's performance on this job. He was 
persuaded to give them a go by the 
surveyors in the Company (i. e. on cost 
grounds -a conflict between price and 
performance). 
According to SM the 
"electricians won't do what I want them to 
do" - they are required to change the 
fittings in the show houses from plastic to 
brass rather than work on second fixing 
other units where painters are still working. 
In their turn, the electricians are claiming 
that the show units are not ready for the 
second fix change over as they are still 
being wallpapered on the ground floor. SM 
asked for upper floors to be done. The 
upshot of this difference is that SM put the 
electricians off the site and contacted the 
sub-contractor's office to inform them. 4 
minutes later the firm calls back to say the 
electricians will do the show units as 
requested. 
Costs > Cost pressures were illustrated here and set 
Selection > against (conflict with) performance (time) 
Error requirements. 
(Systemic 
effect) 
Apparently the underlying problem is the Cost 
poor price being paid by the sub-contractor 
to their electricians for second fix electrical 
work, thus they prefer to work on easy 
units rather than harder remedial show 
units. 
(The method of control/communications Comms 
adopted by SM is very direct and robust 
trade-based approach and includes some 
brinkmanship. Hence the "sparks" are off 
the site, then back on the site! ) 
The coercive nature of control exercised In 
this instance by the site manager proved to 
be counter productive in that it appears a 
disgruntled electrician may have 
deliberately broken a WC pan (see below) 
as a result of this abrasive argument. A 
more conciliatory, participative approach 
may have avoided such action at the same 
time as getting the required performance. 
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8.30 More home-maker problems Systemic This set of changes illustrated the 
in Unit 34. Layout to study/garage has effect as consequences of uncontrolled change 
been changed to extend study into garage before pointed out 
by such authors as Petroski 
area. This has the effect of either extending 
(1985). In the current small example these Changes 
extend to wider issues of planning the span of some upper floor joists, or permissions. 
requinng an intermediate beam support. 
The home-maker co-ordinator has indicated 
layout changes but: - 
" No technical details are provided. 
" No consequential problems handled 
(e. g. planning permissions or building 
regulations requirements). 
" No changes to orders for floor joists, 
steel beams made. 
9.20 SM has a look at plot 34 and Checking - 
then to top of site to observe tarmac supervision 
topcoat being laid in show house parking 
bays. 
9.35 Roof truss company phones 
to confirm delivery of trusses for 1/5/96 
(Again, a good short term follow-up, short 
cycle planning - Just-in-time style 
planning). 
9.50 Ready-mix concrete supplier 
phone to try and deliver concrete earlier 
than required - GW has told them to 
deliver no sooner than 10.30! 
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9.55 PD (Painter boss) has a External The problem of the appearance of the 
problem with the quality of wallpaper - it problem wallpaper 
illustrated aesthetics as a 
will not go on (in one show unit) and looks 
"defect" - in prominent positions such as 
the entrance to show houses, such poor poor. He contacts Company head office on appearance could have severe (economic) instigation of SM to try and get a decision effects. 
on changing the paper (Which is a plain 
yellow "rag roll" effect paper prone to 
showing imperfections). He has suggested 
lining the walls, but has been told by the 
head office to carry on papering at the 
moment. 
10.20 SM on phone to BM (Building 
manager) - electricians come up in the 
conversation and SM explains problems 
with them not complying with programme 
etc. 
10.35 More home-maker problems on plot Comms illustrated poor formal and informal 
36. Purchaser looked around the site last communications, particularly 
in relation to 
chanj! es. T'his maps on to points made by 
night and complained that home-maker Kaminetzki (1991). 
alterations had not been put into effect. 
Apparently 1200mm wide rear door to 
kitchen is required, but 1500mm wide 
opening has been left. The home-maker co- 
ordinator had not communicated change in 
door size. With all home-makers, 
alterations are made on A4 faxed paper and 
not "full sized field drawings" (Kaminetzki 
199 1). They lack precision and detail and 
are often too late! (Appears to be a lack of 
construction stage architectural role, when 
this role can be called for) - 
11.00 HOS from head office phoned to 
confirm what information had been 
provided for plot 36 home-maker - not at 
all clear from the drawings. 
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11.20 BI from the Building Guarantee 
Company on site for inspection. He was 
watching the concrete placers pouring 
concrete when mixer/driver added water to 
the mix as it was being placed (in order to 
make the concrete flow better into the 
trench). This would affect adversely the 
strength of the poured concrete and BI 
objected and insisted on obtaining further 
advice before approving pour. He phoned 
Guarantee Company head office engineer 
to see whether this was a real problem and 
this was confirmed! BI is to write to 
Company head office to point out issue and 
will later consider any further 
tests/measures that may be required. 
Simple 
violation - 
primary 
error 
This event fitted into the category of 
"violations" pointed out by Reason (1990). 
(This is a "classic" violation as Reason 
(1990) -a short cut to "take the easiest 
path". Successfully picked up by 
inspection, but now concern is raised over 
concreting to the whole site)'. 
SM is "not too concerned" about the 
problem, He points out that the ground- 
workers are contracted to take all such 
construction risks and will have to replace 
concrete if required. Nevertheless, knock- 
on problems over the issue could cause 
delay affecting other trades and the 
Company. 
On BI "condemning other foundations SM 
points out that the Guarantee Company 
should be here all the time inspecting, but 
the "trouble is that you can't inspect 
everything all the time" (i. e. the recognised 
QA problem of not being able to inspect 
quality into the works - Oakland (1993)). 
Checking 
9n fact, a visual inspection reveals that this appears 
to be an isolated failing - the foundations to the detached unit with the "watered" concrete 
are clearly distinguishable 
the next day as having characteristically "glossy" surfaces, unlike the rest of the foundations. 
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12.00 Problem of what the correct plate 
height is on the "Fivebed" house type (plot 
35) - no section is shown on the drawings. 
This is left for the bricklayer and site 
manager to sort out on site. (Poor 
communications - the lack of a section - decision left to the site rather than designer 
- this indicates a role for a "technical co- 
ordinator" for these communications 
problems and to deal with "home- 
makers 19). 
12.05 Buyer (CB) phones to inform SM 
that the opening sizes for French doors in 
plot 36 (subject to home-maker changes) 
should be 1267mm and not 1200mm. The 
latter opening will be too small. SM 
decides to suspend work on unit until 
proper drawings and instructions are given 
- "no point in spending too much time 
when details keep changing". 
12.20 Bricklaying supervisor (BS) reveals 
problem with lintels to the "Fivebed" house 
type (plot 35) not matching up with the 
lintel schedule. Some changes appear to 
have been made by the lintel supplier to 
suit their supply and to suit the "cottage 
eaves" house details. 
12.45 SM on phone to fencing sub- 
contractors - worried that fencers have left 
site as post holes were not dug in 
preparation for them. The holes are now 
dug (10 minutes later) and job is ready to 
proceed, but fencers have vanished. 
12.50 Lunch/breakfast 
13.15 Counting lintels to plot 35 and 
checIdng against drawings and schedules. 
See "Fivebed" problem above. 
14.15 Pass list of lintels drawn up on site 
to BS (bricIdayer supervisor) for use on 
plot 35. 
COMMS > The lack of a section illustrated poor 
effor formal communications, which, In this 
instance, could easily be redeemed by 
reference to a qualified party such as a 
designer. The Company designers were 
located some 200 miles away and there is 
no locally based skilled design co- 
ordinator. 
Systemic Again, poor communications in relation to 
Comms > changes were evidenced here. 
effor 
COMMS Poor formal communications and changed 
Changes 
I 
suppliers were evidenced here. 
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14-35 SM chasing order from head office 
for timber external boarding for next week 
- more short term planning. 
15.30 SM on phone to electricity company 
to try and progress electric supply. 
Electricity company have still not been 
informed of sub-station position and supply 
situation. SM comments that " 16 houses 
will be completed at the end of May and 
they will have no power at all! ". 
Systemic The wider consequences of chM were I 
illustrated here. 
Further associated problem is that "the 
electricity company have put the new sub- 
station position to the Borough Council and 
they are not happy with the position 
because of its prominent position and the 
lack of screening". Le. a knock-on effect is 
the need for alterations to planning 
approvals. 
(A good example of concurrency, with a 
lack of control stops, indicative of poor 
overall planning viz., introduces: - 
Legal problems 
Town planning problems) 
Negotiations with the consortium, the 
planners, the services supply companies etc 
is the responsibility of the commercial 
managers (quantity surveying background). 
15.45 Go to the top of the site to learn 
how to use the laser level. The dig depths 
at the rear of the site are about 1500mm in 
clean clay, but the excavations are near to 
existing trees and thus must be deep to 
avoid subsidence caused by clay shrinkage. 
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GW recounts the ground-works efforts to 
win work from the company as including 
entertaining senior staff - events such as boxing, racing, rugby etc. (thus awarding 
contracts may not be related to any 
recognised restraint - time, cost or 
quality! ) - 
16.50 Leave site. 
COMMENT ON KEY EVENTS AND POINTS OF THE DAY - Written up at 21.00 
Direct and sometimes overly abrasive management style of SM (eventually leading to 
complaints from electrical sub-contractor to building manager). SM uses threat of 
"removal" as tool to get compliance with programme. Uses some " brinkman ship" (e. g. 
putting "sparks" off-site for not complying with the programme). 
2 Uncontrolled changes (again) - the home-maker to plots 35 and 36 left to be solved on site. 
Also evidence here of poor communications. 
3 Control/ supervision method 
Stand and watch some work performed - i. e. continuous supervision rather than 
test/inspect. Example is SM watching the tarmac wearing course to parking bays being 
laid. Again, evidence here of short-cycle feedback and control methods. 
4 Aesthetic quality problems - the unsatisfactory yellow rag-roll effect wallpaper. 
5 Checking and inspection - BI catching the ground-workers in the act of watering foundation 
concrete to make it flow. Classical violation as Reason (1991). 
Poor commumcations 
Section details of "Fivebed Cottage" house type not showing height of plate at front 
of garage - left to site to decide. 
0 Lintels ordered not matching those delivered because of changes to suppliers etc. 
7 Concurrency and lack of planning again - the continuing sub-station problem. 
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FPJIDAY 26th 
8.01 Arrive on site 
AM is collecting new WC pan for one seen Sabotage - to be damaged yesterday afternoon. SM is primary 
on site - he suspects that the electrician has error 
deliberately damaged the pan after 
yesterday's arguments about work 
schedules. 
Plumber notes that tank stand is in wrong Comms (or This appeared to be a simple primary 
place in a show unit and SM agrees to get primary? ) trades-person's error, picked up, in this 
carpenter (Doug) to move it later that day. 
instance, by another following tradesman 
before it developed into a problem. 
SM is not happy with the Company after Culture The problem of poor site/head office 
lack of overall planning and support attitudes was evidenced here, together 
concerning the sub-station and water main with, what appeared 
to be a lack of good 
' 
problems. He considers problem to be in 
overall planning of the site. T his in turn 
May have been driven by other pressures, 
control of commercial director and such as time and cost constraints in the 
surveyors, but envisages that they will head office. For example, it was known 
avoid responsibility by attributing blame to that the surveyors were working under 
others - for example one of the other 
considerable pressure at the time, as the 
market had just started to recover slightly 
consortium members. SM reports that the from recession and a decision had been 
other consortium member most affected made at Group level to retain the house- 
had requested meetings concerning the building company. Several new sites were 
siting of the sub-station, but they had had being started and sub-contracts were 
being 
no response from the company. 
let. Conversely, staff had been lost 
through redundancy, including most of 
the Regional design staff, as a result of 
pressures on cost. 
(Researcher note - this implicates 
organisational attitudes, orientationg lack of 
management-site communications and 
general remoteness of senior managers 
(Turner 1978)9 compounded by lack of 
overall project level planning (Morris 
1994, Meredith and Mantel 1995). 
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8.50 GW (Ground-worker) in site 
office demanding details of ground and finished levels for proposed retaining 
walls. Robust argument develops 
concerning "theft" of drawings, where SM 
claims that the ground-works sub- 
contractor has two copies of all relevant 
drawings (Generally this argument is 
superficial banter). GW borrows SM's 
spectacles to read the drawings (yet again) 
- indicative of quality assurance problems 
caused by short-sightedness! 
9.05 Carpenter (Doug) in the 
office for a discussion with SM. As a result 
of home-maker changes on plot 34 the span 
of joists are longer. The carpenter has 
"raided" a pack of joists for another unit, 
but after he has cut these to length, he 
realises that the depth of the joists is 
different. 
The importance of good formal 
conununications was illustrated here. The 
work on retaining walls could not start 
without proper drawings. 
Changes > Consequence of uncontrolled changes 
error 
I 
were illustrated here. 
(Researcher note - this is another 
consequence of uncontrolled change and 
the socio-technical nature of error in 
complex technologies. The error in cutting 
up the wrong depth joists could be treated 
as a primary, carpenter error, but problem 
is really due to poorly planned and 
communicated changes - incidentally this is 
realised by the site manager (SM) and not 
inaccurately attributed. 
9.20 GW (Ground-worker) 
complains that gutter outlets on plots 
122/123 are wrongly positioned 
necessitating a longer run of rainwater 
drains and re-positioning of rainwater eyes. 
The consequence is likely to be only 
increased costs, but could result in over- 
shallow falls and a slight increase in task 
duration. Thus, this illustrates inter- 
relatedness of cost, time and quality. 
Caused in this case by plumber not 
following detail on drawing, and this not 
being checked or corrected by 
agent/foreman- 
COMMS This illustrated the inter-relatedness of 
cost, time and quality. The interaction of 
these three factors was used elsewhere in 
the research, where cost and time were 
used as proxies for defects. 
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Problem again invokes robust discussion 
between SM and GW. SM did not ask GW 
to provide extra drain - he simply told him to "f... off". 
9.50 SM on phone to fencers 
about fencing around show houses - they did not stay on site yesterday to fix posts 
and have not turned up today. They report 
that their van has broken down. SM "won't 
have that" and is giving the fencers "some 
stick". SM is still exhibiting a very 
abrasive style of management! 
10.00 SM on phone to building manager - 
wants the electricians and fencers removed 
from the site. He considers that he has 
given plenty of notice to both sub- 
contractors. Concerning chasing these 
firms, SM comments "I know their phone 
numbers off by heart because I am phoning 
them all the time! ". 
10.05 SM on setting examples - He relates Culture 
that he is not able to get hold of the 
surveyors after 2pm on Friday because they 
are all in the pub - lead by the Commercial 
Director. SM claims that he has never been 
drinking during the working day. 
10.06 Lack of control - PD (decorator) 
does not like the quality of the wallpaper, 
but SM says he has no control whatever 
over wallpapering standards and this is thus 
not his problem. 
10.20 SM on phone to ground-worldng 
sub-contractor's office to discuss the 
"watering the concrete" incident. The 
Building Guarantee Company have sent a 
fax to the building manager (BM) to 
complain about the problem. 
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(General question - should senior managers have to spend time on site in order to 
improve attitudes, communications, 
understanding and culture? ) 
10-22 Walk around site with SM: - 
1 Talk to ground-workers in their site 
hut about avoiding watering concrete 
batches in future (core tests may need to be 
taken for those where BI saw concrete 
being watered). In the worst scenario 
concrete may have to be removed on one 
or two units. 
Pro-active approach to avoiding defects 
was illustrated here. 
2 L4Dok at foundations/trenches at far 
end of site. Two units appear to have some 
laitence on top of concrete and thus may be 
suspect. One unit remains to be excavated 
and one unit has open excavations. 
3 Look at units 34-37. SM noted first 
floor joists are very level and commented 
on the high level of skill of the carpenter. 
Checking - informal and based on 
manager's personal skill. 
4 Look at the show unit of an 
adjoining consortium site and talk with 
SM's counterpart running this site. 
Overall - SM again using short feedback 
cycle feedback and control (keeping on top 
of the job). 
11.25 Further discussions with GW 
concerning "water in the concrete" 
incident. 
11.31 SM on phone to head office to 
progress detailing of unit 35 - details of 
lead trays needed now for the bricklayers. 
12.00 Lunch at the nearby super-store. 
12.50 SM on phone planning move of 
cabin units with crane hire firm (to be 
carried out early next week). 
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SM checking concerning the replacement 
of 4 floor JOIsts used on plot 34 (as a 
consequence of the home-maker there). 
(i. e. using memory and good short-term 
planning to pick up problem created earlier 
by changes). 
13.05 SM Brings white-board plan up to 
date. 
Thumb through Building Guarantee 
Company site file. Items include: - 
27/2 Cavity fill too high generally 
Brickwork in foundations laid on slurry in 
trenches. 
Weep-holes over openings not at 450 c/s 
6/3 Suspended slabs needed where fill 
Written plan updating ready for the 
following week. 
The site file did not contain all defects as 
this would "clutter up the file too much" - 
BI. As defects were attended to, the item 
was normally removed. Some defects had 
considerable potential, for example, not 
providing sufficient weep-holes over 
lintels could have produced dampness 
internally. However, the occurrence of the 
problem was likely to be infrequent. 
Most defects were commonplace and 
appeared with stochastic regularity 
according to BI. This site was considered 
by him to be "no worse and no better" 
than any other site run by a large house- 
building company with a premium rating 
from the Guarantee Company. 
9 
Primary 
7 
7 
over 600 generally 
25/4 Water added to concrete plot 63 Primary 
6/3 Suspended slabs needed because of 
well-shaft, plots 118,119. 
'1 
28/2 Insufficient under-floor vents to rear I? 
elevation on plot 130 
Incorrect bonding party-external wall Primary 
lot 130 blocks-On-2-1-'-"' 
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14-00 BS (Bricklayer supervisor) wants to know what lintel to put over door D7 (a 
non-load-bearing opening). Choices are a 
small lintel, or alternatively to leave wall 
open to ceiling for carpenter to box in 
later. Detail not shown on drawings or on 
lintel schedule. 
comms Another failure in formal 
communications. 
14.15 Given instruction on driving 360 
degree tracked excavator. 
14.30 Carpenter comes into the office 
looking for truss clips. 
GW (Ground-worker) is on phone 
organising next weeks excavation 
programme. 
14.45 BS (Bricklayer foreman) pays up a 
bricklaying gang - they are not "up to 
scratch" and will not be employed for next 
week! 
SM/AM on phone sorting out work 
schedules for next week. 
16.00 Sales personnel (SP) comes into 
office and informs SM/AM that the Sales 
Director does not know about problems on 
Participation 
(Culture) 
This was an example of the use of hiring 
and firing to ensure an adequate standard 
of worker on the site. Again, emphasis 
was put on selection - other primary based 
options such as training and education 
were not used. 
Poor communications. 
the site: - 
Substation 
Water supply 
Poor wallpaper finish 
Poor fencing to show houses 
AM notes that all these things had been 
discussed in monthly construction/ sales 
meetings and minuted! 
(Poor communications, orientation, 
attitude) 
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16.15 Buyer (CB) visits site and AM 
mentions problems with lintels on block 36 
-2 missing and patterns do not match 
orders etc. AM/CB generally plan 
information requirements for next week. 
16-35 General discussion of next week's 
plans with sales (SP/CB/AM) - provision 
of flagpoles, fencing show houses entrance 
areas etc. 
16.45 Left site 
Use of informal planning for the 
fol. lowing week's operations. 
CONEMENT ON KEY EVENTS AND POINTS OF THE DAY - Written up at 9.45 on 
Saturday 
Deliberate sabotage - not in Reason (1991) paradigm - the broken WC pan caused by 
electrician resentment. 
2 SM was not happy with poor senior management organisation and is looking for another 
job. 
Communications 
ground-workers do not have drawings for retaining walls, even though SM claims 
that they have two copies. 
0 details of lintels over D7, plot 34 are not on the drawings. 
4 Genuine knowledge based errors masking organisational error! problem of carpenter cutting 
up wrong depth joist for plot 34 really caused by home-maker changes increasing span of 
joists. (Poorly planned and communicated changes). 
5 Interaction of cost, time, and quality - wrongly positioned gutter outlets to plots 122/123 
caused increased run of drains (cost), extra time to excavate (f1mg) and reduced falls 
(_quality). 
Cause of error: - 
Plumber not following drawing? 
0 Non-availability of running outlet? 
No checIdng (very difficult to spot)? 
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Short feedback cycle planning evidenced again - e. g. chasing fencers all the time for 
Performance. 
7 Attitudes, orientation, examples feature again (Surveyors all in the pub after LOOpm on a 
Friday). 
The "reverse checking" syndrome - workers picking up errors and communicating these to 
the checkers - PD and the problems with the wallpaper in the show house - decorator tries 
to warn managers and interior designers, but in the end they give up! 
Supervision and checking as opposed to proactive control: - 
a) SM warns ground-workers in passing not to add water to the concrete mix. 
b) SM checks work of carpenters (plots 34-37) on a walk round. 
10 Short-term planning again - bringing the "white-board" up to date at the end of the week. 
Discussions with buyer (CB), about next week's deliveries. 
Communications top to bottom - sales director not knowing about problems on the site 
despite meetings. 
12 Type of defect uncovered. 
Generally a few minor problems with low risk (but high potential! ) consequences. 
Note - to add to Methods Section - Method of researcher integration: - 
Discussions with bricklaying foreman 
learning to use laser level with ground-worker 
Driving excavator 
Helping with problems (lintels on plot 35) 
Work tasks - completing materials requisition sheets 
Generally achieved participant/ob server status. 
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